Abstract
The claims that “The brain processes information” or “Cognition is information processing” are accepted as truisms in cognitive science. However, it is unclear how to evaluate such claims absent a specification of “information” as it is used by neurocognitive theories. The aim of this article is, thus, to identify the key features of information that information-based neurocognitive theories posit. A systematic identification of these features can reveal the explanatory role that information plays in specific neurocognitive theories, and can, therefore, be both theoretically and practically important. These features can be used, in turn, as desiderata against which candidate theories of information may be evaluated. After discussing some characteristics of explanation in cognitive science and their implications for “information”, three notions are briefly introduced: natural, sensory, and endogenous information. Subsequently, six desiderata are identified and defended based on cognitive scientific practices. The global workspace theory of consciousness is then used as a specific case study that arguably posits either five or six corresponding features of information.
Highlights
How is “information” used in the cognitive sciences? There is broad agreement that the brain and cognition involve information processing, and many theories explain neural, cognitive, and behavioural phenomena in informational terms [1–4]
In order to evaluate which theory of information should be appealed to in cognitive scientific explanations, one should first determine which notion of information is invoked
As a backdrop for identifying and defending the desiderata, we propose a trichotomy of information that distinguishes between some very general uses of “information” in the cognitive sciences
Summary
How is “information” used in the cognitive sciences? There is broad agreement that the brain and cognition involve information processing, and many theories explain neural, cognitive, and behavioural phenomena in informational terms [1–4]. The present analysis is motivated by the explanatory work semantic information often does in the cognitive sciences in virtue of its semantic properties Such information can be found, for example, in animal communication studies. Insofar as “information” is a theoretical construct that binds together different cognitive systems studied across the cognitive sciences, this concept—even when various subtypes of information are concerned—should be explicated For it is often unclear which notion of information is used, and whether this notion does explanatory work in a respective neurocognitive theory or model.. If information plays an explanatory role in T, the scientist should heed the proposed desiderata In this sense, information should satisfy an analogue of Ramsey’s “job description” challenge for representational explanations [18] (b) If T uses “information” in describing such processes, do the underlying cognitive/neural/biological states play this sort of informational role, and, if so, how?
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