Abstract
A dynamic Stackelberg game with linear dynamics, quadratic cost functions, and the dominant player having access to imperfect closed-loop information is considered. The closed-loop Stackelberg equilibrium solution is derived, and the relation between the amount of information available to the dominant player and his cost under the equilibrium solution is discussed. As a consequence, the basis for calculating the value of information in hierarchical dynamic games is provided.
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