Informal Norms in Judicial Selection

Both formal rules and informal norms guide government operations; formal rules often function through informal norms. Balanced budget requirements (BBRs) are formal rules, but they are implemented via the intermediary of informal norms—interpretation of BBRs by state officials. This article examines the fiscal implications of informal norms that govern budgetary balance. We propose that informal norms have substantive implications in policy making and implementation. To test the proposition, we obtain state self-reported, time-varying data on balanced budget provisions as observations of informal norms, compare them against formal, codified balanced budget requirements from recent research to identify gaps between rules and norms, and decompose the gaps using two categories—“interpretations” and “reverse interpretations” of formal balanced budget requirements. We then conduct probit estimation to obtain the effects of informal norms as well as the interpretations and reverse interpretations on two measures of budgetary balance. Results show that informal norms do affect outcomes of government financial operations; the two-step decomposition of the gaps between formal rules and informal norms provides further information on the locus of these effects. The article identifies the interpretation of formal rules as a new research area, thus contributing to the budgetary institutions and policy implementation literatures.

This article deals with the problem of tackling corruption within the Russian construction industry. It examines the interplay between formal anti-corruption rules and extensive informal norms that have become institutionalized within the Russian construction sector as well as the broader Russian society, especially when it comes to interaction with state officials. The article concludes that commitment and cooperation of a multitude of actors, leading to reduced reliance on informal rules and norms and an anti-corruption ethos that permeates all levels of interactions (i.e., citizen/state, business/state, business/business, citizen/citizen, and state official/state official) are key when it comes to corruption reduction.

The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective

Ministers are faced with intense account-giving pressures when things go wrong under their watch. While ministers carry hierarchical responsibility for the behavior of their top administrators, ministers have incentive to shift blame and scapegoat them after policy failures. This is likely since political-administrative relations in most parliamentary systems have become more managerial. However, there is little empirical research regarding the formal and informal accountability rules that govern ministerial and administrative accountability after failures. This article compares two parliamentary systems with ministerial responsibility: the Australian State of New South Wales (NSW) and the Netherlands. NSW political-administrative relations have become more managerial than Dutch ones. The comparison highlights two important ethical constraints for ministers: (a) formal rules guiding political-administrative relations; and (b) informal norms regarding appropriate ministerial account-giving. While hierarchically oriented accountability rules and informal (parliamentary) norms buttress Dutch top administrators, these buttresses are less patent in the NSW case. Subsequently, while Dutch ministers have multiple times taken “sacrificial responsibility” for policy failures, NSW top administrators often have to front the media and have taken the fall for their ministers. To conclude, formal accountability rules and informal rules-in-use make ministers take the heat instead of shifting the blame.

As part of the XVI April International Academic Conference on Economic and Social Development, HSE - Moscow, two sessions on economics and law were held 9 April 2015. The first session, Law Enforcement and Entrepreneurs, was chaired by a leading researcher from the Institute of Law Enforcement at the European University in St. Petersburg Kirill Titaev and the second session, Economic Analysis of Regulatory Bodies, was moderated by Andrey Shastitko, researcher from the Institute for Industrial and Market Studies, HSE Moscow. Speakers at the sessions included Irina Chetverikova (Institute for the Rule of Law at the European University at Saint-Petersburg), L. Bardin (Central Bar in Moscow), Anton Kazun (HSE), Zinaida Poghosova (HSE) and Elena Podkolzina (HSE), D. Tsytsulina (HSE - Nizhny Novgorod), Svetlana Avdasheva HSE), and Svetlana Golovanova (HSE - Nizhny Novgorod).The direction of the debate in the first session was partly formulated by Titaev, when he noted that more correct name for first session would be Law and Rational Choice. According to the Titaev, in this case, it is appropriate to speak about economic rationality, which is common to all parties involved in the process: the accused, the victim, judges and defendants. At the next session, the focus shifted to the discussion of the Federal Antimonopoly Service (FAS). Real decision-making practices and risks of introducing criteria for evaluating the effectiveness of the organization were at the center of the debate. Both sessions highlighted the obvious challenge that often formal rules and their changes do not completely determine the situation, but may also be influenced by informal norms. The distinction between formal rules and informal norms is a key issue of economic sociology. The focus of both sessions was not only the formal rules in law enforcement system, but also real-life practices. Speakers described the logic of awarding judgment using the examples from different legal cases. They concluded that actions which seem illogical for an external observer (such as the refusal of companies to provide FAS evidence in their favor) often have their own internal rationality. Therefore, researchers need to know not only the laws, but also the informal norms. This problem has been widely discussed in recent years and definitely will be an important issue for future studies in economic sociology.

ABSTRACTPublic agencies face diverse expectations from external actors regarding their responsiveness. However, systemic research explaining how institutional pressures arising from these expectations, particularly formal rules and informal norms, motivate public agencies to respond remains limited. By conducting a national‐scale field experiment among 949 provincial‐level agencies in China, this study tests the effect of regulative pressure from formal rules and normative pressure from informal norms on their responses to freedom of information requests. The results show that legal regulative pressure and social normative pressure make agencies more likely to respond within the legal timeframe and provide the requested information. Legal regulative pressure and professional normative pressure increase the likelihood of agencies providing additional information beyond the requested information. The findings suggest the critical roles that institutional pressures play in enhancing various degrees and aspects of bureaucratic responsiveness, with pressure from formal rules being more effective in enhancing responsiveness than informal norms.

Abstract: Much of the debate about the of in democratizing states centers on formal institutional design as the key to building a democratic judiciary. While acknowledging the importance of a good institutional blueprint, I argue that superior institutional rules do not necessarily lead to a healthy judicial culture that enshrines democratic principles and compels actors within the judiciary to take the formal rules seriously. Drawing on nearly 400 original survey and interview responses from judges in Romania and the Czech Republic, this article offers an empirical overview of aggregate-level trends across several key dimensions of judicial culture, including perceptions of judicial independence, attitudes toward corruption in the judiciary, and the professional satisfaction and commitment of judges. The findings of the study not only run counter to the institutionalist thesis that better institutional rules will produce a more democratic judiciary, they suggest an important theoretical linkage between judicial culture and patterns of trust in the self-governing institutions of the judiciary. (1) Keywords: Czech Republic, democratization, judicial culture, Romania, of ********** In both academic and policy circles, the rule of law (2) is often treated as a kind of panacea for democratizing states--at once credited with protecting the basic rights and liberties of citizens, providing a key horizontal check on government power, and laying the institutional groundwork for a functioning market economy. (3) In turn, a substantial body of literature has emerged in recent years examining the development of the of in politically transitioning states around the world, including a significant corpus of research focused specifically on the challenges faced by transitioning legal systems in the post-Communist region. One of the clearest themes in this literature is the importance of institutional design in the post-Communist legal reform process. More specifically, reform advocates argue that by crafting institutional rules that encourage judicial independence and protect against political interference in the judiciary, policymakers can stave off corruption and lay the foundations for the democratic of law. However, empirical studies of courts in the region tell a different story, indicating that court performance is seldom a direct function of formal institutional powers and protections. Moreover, a large body of social science research suggests that formal legal institutions, like other political and social institutions, are shaped by powerful informal rules and norms that may contradict or undercut the effectiveness of formal procedures and safeguards. Following these insights, the present study explores the role of the judiciary's informal culture in the process of post-Communist legal reform. While acknowledging the importance of a good institutional blueprint, I argue that superior institutional rules do not necessarily lead to a healthy judicial culture--i.e., one that enshrines democratic principles and compels actors within the judiciary to take the formal rules seriously. Rather, the informal culture of the judiciary reflects a variety of concerns beyond the bounds of formal institutional design, which often work at cross purposes with formal structures and safeguards designed to foster transparency and judicial independence. In turn, if we are interested in building the of in the transitioning states of the region, I argue that we must focus not only on designing good institutions, but on promoting an informal judicial culture that contributes to that goal, rather than working against it. Drawing on nearly 400 original survey and interview responses from judges in Romania and the Czech Republic, this article offers an empirical overview of aggregate-level trends in judicial culture in two post-Communist states. Surveying several key dimensions of informal culture--including perceptions of judicial autonomy, attitudes toward corruption and professional misconduct, and the professional satisfaction and commitment of judges--I demonstrate that macro-level attitudinal patterns in the two cases run counter to the institutionalist thesis that better institutional rules will produce a more democratic judiciary. …

International tribunals are pulled between a commitment to judicial autonomy and the need to manage their members’ political expectations, lest these rein in the tribunal’s power. We argue that when the formal design of international institutions leaves them exposed to political control, institutional actors can respond by self-imposing constraints to protect themselves from excessive oversight. We examine this phenomenon in the context of the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) Appellate Body (AB), touted until recently as one of the most successful international tribunals in existence. We argue that the early insistence on collegiality and consensus opinions among WTO AB members had the effect of (i) deflecting political blame and (ii) providing cover for adjudicators who did not dissent when governments might have wished them to. As the informal norm of consensus opinion was weakened, political control by WTO members grew stronger, culminating in the United States’s move to paralyze the AB. Weaker actors can thus improve their position under formal rules, yet this requires a strong commitment to a set of informal norms, which comes with its own challenges.

Interactions between organizations and networks in common-pool resource governance

This paper examines why some transitions are more successful than others by focusing attention on the role of productive, protective and predatory behaviors from the perspective of the new institutional economics. Many transition economies are characterized by a fundamental inconsistency between formal and informal institutions. When formal and informal rules clash, non compliant behaviors proliferate, among them, tax evasion, corruption, bribery, organized criminality, and theft of government property. These wealth redistributing protective and predatory behaviors activities absorb resources that could otherwise be used for wealth production resulting in huge transition costs. Non compliant behaviors -- evasion, avoidance, circumvention, abuse, and/or corruption of institutional rules -- comprise what we can be termed underground economies. A variety of underground economies can be differentiated according to the types of rules violated by the non compliant behaviors. The focus of the new institutional economics is on the consequences of institutions -- the rules that structure and constrain economic activity -- for economic outcomes. Underground economics is concerned with instances in which the rules are evaded, circumvented, and violated. It seeks to determine the conditions likely to foster rule violations, and to understand the various consequences of noncompliance with institutional rules. Noncompliance with ‘bad” rules may actually foster development whereas non compliance with “good” rules will hinder development. Since rules differ, both the nature and consequences of rule violations will therefore depend on the particular rules violated. Institutional economics and underground economics are therefore highly complementary. The former examines the rules of the game, the latter the strategic responses of individuals and organizations to those rules. Economic performance depends on both the nature of the rules and the extent of compliance with them. Institutions therefore do affect economic performance, but it is not always obvious which institutional rules dominate. Where formal and informal institutions are coherent and consistent, the incentives produced by the formal rules will affect economic outcomes. Under these circumstances, the rule of law typically secures property rights, reduces uncertainty, and lowers transaction costs. In regimes of discretionary authority where formal institutions conflict with informal norms, noncompliance with the formal rules becomes pervasive, and underground economic activity is consequential for economic outcomes.

This chapter offers a typology of decision-making on crisis response across four international organizations. However, unlike previous scholarship, this research focuses on how decisions are taken in practice rather than the formal rules themselves. The chapter also discusses the interactions between the existing formal rules and the informal norms that develop around them and that guide actors’ behavior. The formal institutional design of an organization sets the tone for how such informal norms will be institutionalized. To measure institutional differences, the author focuses on four key metrics: environment, socialization, friendships, and perceived culture. These factors are reflected in the survey questions asked of staff and ambassadors involved in the peace and security committees of four international organizations. The chapter then presents the results of the survey data in conjunction with scholarly data. Through the use of original and comprehensive analyses, the chapter is able to systematically explain variation in institutional culture across the peace and security committees of each organization. The typology’s descriptions of different regional styles of crisis response encompass formal rules, informal norms, and relevant anecdotes of the contentious deliberations.

Existing accountability efforts in Nigeria primarily serve as retrospective policing. To enable accountability to guide change prospectively and preemptively, we drew from a literature review to develop a framework that highlights mutually reinforcing dimensions of accountability in health systems along three counterbalancing axes. The axis of power sparks change by wielding 'sticks' that curb the potential abuse of power, but also by offering 'carrots' that motivate constructive agency. The axis of ability supports change by enabling service delivery actors with formal rules that appropriately expand their authority to act, but also the informal norms and inputs for improved performance. Last, the axis of justice orients the strategic direction of change, balancing political representation, community ownership and social equity, so that accountability measures are progressive, rather than being captured by self-interests. We consulted Nigerian government officials to understand their viewpoints on accountability and mapped their responses to our evolving framework. All government officials (n = 36) participating in three zonal workshops on routine immunization filled out questionnaires that listed the top three opportunities and challenges to strengthening accountability. Thematically coded responses highlighted dimensions of accountability within the axes of ability and power: clarifying formal roles and responsibilities; transparency, data and monitoring systems; availability of skilled health personnel that are motivated and supervised; addressing informal norms and behaviours; and availability of inputs regarding funding and supplies. Other dimensions of accountability were mentioned but were not as critical from their viewpoints: managerial discretion; sanctions and enforcements; political influence and community engagement. Strikingly, almost no respondents mentioned social equity as being an important aspect of accountability, although a few mentioned broad development concerns that reflected community perspectives. Reframing accountability as a means of sparking, supporting and steering change can highlight different dimensions of health systems that need reform, particularly depending on the positionality of the viewpoints consulted.

This book addresses the seriousness of harmful occupational and corporate convenience by deviance in business. At the lower end of seriousness, scholars found that business deviance tends to be perceived as and treated as corporate irresponsibility and not as misconduct, wrongdoing, offending, or law violation. Some studies in Europe have shown that the public apply criteria that regard corporate wrongdoing as a very low enforcement priority. The issue of business deviance seriousness relates both to lack of compliance and lack of conformance. Compliance refers to obeying the formal and informal rules, regulations, and norms in force at a given time and place. Conformance refers to meeting and potentially exceeding societal and other informal norms and obligations. As argued by scholars, organizational theory has long emphasized the importance of conformity to prevailing norms, rules and laws. In this book, the term crime is used in the criminological sense of both compliance and conformance, where the requirement is that the act is bad, and the actor should be punished.

This thesis uses three case-studies to evaluate the extent to which multi-sectorial Judicial Councils and Impeachment Juries protect judicial independence in the process for the removal of lower-court judges in the Argentine Republic. Based on 36 in-depth interviews conducted with a wide range of stakeholders in the removals process, this thesis considers two jurisdictions, the Autonomous City of Buenos Aires (ACBA) and the Argentine federal level, where since the late 1990s, removals have been conducted by way of a two-step process involving judicial councils and impeachment juries, and contrasts this with the experience of the province of Tucuman, where the process is conducted by a legislative committee and an impeachment jury. The thesis evaluates whether judicial independence is better protected where judicial removals processes have been professedly depoliticised by being entrusted to independent judicial councils. Differences at the Federal and ACBA levels also illustrate the strengths and weaknesses of the judicial council model in dealing with different challenges. It concludes that whilst multi-sectorial judicial councils do prevent the arbitrary removal of judges, they do not ensure adequate judicial accountability. Additionally, the early stages of investigation into judicial behaviour are susceptible to being used as a way to place pressure on judges.

In this chapter we turn to the operation of the Athenian popular courts. Just as in the case of Athenian statutes, court verdicts played a vital role in maintaining order despite the absence of the operation of the rule of law. I argue that the courts may have had a substantial impact on Athenian behavior despite the ad hoc nature and inherent unpredictability and inscrutability of individual court verdicts. While the Athenian courts did not reliably and predictably enforce the laws under which cases were brought, the courts did, in the aggregate, enforce norms. Many of these norms were informal social norms, not subject to explicit legal regulation: norms relating to the treatment of friends and family and private sexual conduct, for example. Other norms enforced by the courts were the subject of statutes, but were unrelated to the charge in the case. I refer to these norms enforced by the courts as “extrastatutory norms,” meaning that they were unrelated to the statute at issue in the case in which they were raised, though some of these norms were the subject of other statutes.