Industrial policy conflicts and their impact on analysts' forecast accuracy and behavior

The central government's policy attitude will affect local governments' innovation adoption behavior, but the diffusion process is not static, which shows dynamic changes. This essay illustrates the spreading process of the Chinese River Chief System (RCS). It discusses how the factors influencing the diffusion of the RCS alter dynamically under various policy attitudes of the central government by using the segmented Event History Analysis (EHA) and Piecewise Constant Exponential (PCE) models. The results found that, under the central government's implicit policy attitude, peer city pressure and official promotion increase the probability of adoption of the RCS. When the central government's policy encourages the attitude, intra-city factors and peer city pressure affect the diffusion of the RCS. Still, official promotion is no longer an influential influencing factor. All three factors are no longer practical when the central government introduces mandatory regulations. In addition, vertical higher-level pressure and horizontal peer city pressure on adopting the RCS are competitive rather than complementary relationships. Local governments' attitudes regarding the RCS went through a path of "good governance signal-governance tool-authority obedience" under the varied policy philosophies of the central government. Local governments pay more attention to the actual circumstances in the region due to the non-mandatory central government direction, which advances the art of adopting policies. Contrarily, the central government's stipulations render the other factors' policies obsolete.

The local election is a political and democratic tool owned by the community after Indonesia's reformation. Aceh and its regencies and cities will carry out the local election in 2022. The central government's policy to postpone the implementation of the local election in 2024 has created a polemic in the community. Based on this phenomenon, this study aims to determine the problems that arise in political communication among the community against the central government's unilateral policy in delaying the implementation of the local election. The approach used was qualitative by using observation and interview techniques. The results of this study are: The Acehnese are disappointed with the central government's intervention in the form of a policy of postponing the local election, based on the justification that Aceh has the local regulation, that is called 2006 Aceh Government Law, where Aceh has independence in managing its household. Furthermore, the communication built by the Central Government is coercive communication, ignoring comprehensive communication from the community. With the ecological influence of the local election postponement policy and communication built by the central government, the people ignore the government's advice to keep the environment more conservative and ignore the fight against Covid-19.

In support of renewable energy industries, China’s central and local governments have pursued divergent goals, as central government policies have encouraged industrial upgrading through ‘indigenous innovation’ (Liu and Cheng 2011, State Council 2006), while local governments have continued to provide incentives and policy support for traditional manufacturing activities. In this environment, China’s wind and solar firms have often shunned central government requirements for autonomous technology development, drawing instead on local government resources for mass production. To date, China’s wind and solar firms continue to rely on global partners in the development of renewable energy products, even as China has become an important location for the commercialization of new wind turbine and solar panel technologies. Has local government support for the manufacturing economy undermined the central government’s indigenous innovation strategy for renewable energy sectors?This paper argues that local manufacturing policies have not prevented the establishment of innovative capabilities in Chinese wind and solar firms. Rather, local government policies have provided an important corrective to some of the weaknesses inherent in China’s indigenous innovation policy framework, most importantly its inattention to the collaborative nature of innovation in contemporary supply chains and the importance of innovative manufacturing capabilities in product development. Based on 107 interviews in 43 Chinese wind and solar firms, I find that China’s wind and solar firms have build on local government resources for manufacturing to establish highly innovative capabilities in mass production. By utilizing local manufacturing resources to establish innovative manufacturing capabilities, Chinese wind and solar firms have not defied upgrading and innovation, but have followed global trends toward niche specialization and collaboration in product development. These findings suggest that local government policies to support the manufacturing economy are not in conflict with central government goals for upgrading and innovation. Resources for manufacturing firms provided by local governments have enabled new options for the establishment of innovative capabilities in manufacturing itself -- options which have been neglected by the narrow conceptualization of innovation underlying the central government’s indigenous innovation framework.

During one of the worst economic crises that Portugal has faced in the last decades, with a considerable debt to deal with, emigration, population loss, ageing and unemployment afflicted our economy and society, particularly in rural territories. The aim of this article is to access the main local and central government policies to fight depopulation and territorial inequalities, and their attempts at sustainable development. What remains in the Portuguese inland regions and how is it being addressed by the few who still believe in life outside the cities? What is the role of local government in the sustainable development of the territory? All over the country, and particularly in rural areas, there is an urgent need to attract people and investment (Almeida 2017a). What are the main issues addressed by the central government to deal with this problem? For this research, a database was built with the political programmes of the 308 mayors elected in 2013, which were subject to a thorough analysis, and the new socialist government recently approved National Programme for Territorial Cohesion, aimed at promoting a more balanced territorial planning. This article describes the demographic situation and compares the municipalities’ economic strategies. The results are yet to be observed, but these new local and central policies at least reflect a change of paradigm from the social-democrat coalition government (2011–15) and introduce a discourse of hope for inland regions, even if the political time of each government (four-year terms) is never enough to solve such complex issues.

This article argues that manufacturing policies of Chinese local governments have provided an important corrective to some of the weaknesses inherent in the central government’s indigenous innovation framework, most importantly its inattention to the importance of advanced manufacturing capabilities for innovation. Based on an original dataset of over 100 executive interviews conducted with 43 Chinese wind and solar firms, I identify both central government R&D funding and continued local government support for manufacturing as a critical factors in enabling innovation among China’s renewable energy firms. In particular, this article shows that firms have utilized a combination of both central and local government policies to establish unique engineering capabilities required for innovation in commercialization and scale - up to mass production. The findings suggest that continued local government support for the manufacturing economy has not undermined central government innovation policies, but has (1) broadened the range of resources available to entrepreneurial firms and (2) enabled new options for industrial upgrading that are outside the conceptualization of innovation underlying the central government’s indigenous innovation framework.

This article argues that manufacturing policies of Chinese local governments have provided an important corrective to some of the weaknesses inherent in the central government's indigenous innovation framework, most importantly its inattention to the importance of advanced manufacturing capabilities for innovation. Based on an original dataset of over one hundred executive interviews conducted with 43 Chinese wind and solar firms, I identify both central government R&D funding and continued local government support for manufacturing as critical factors in enabling innovation among China's renewable energy firms. In particular, this article shows that firms have utilized a combination of both central and local government policies to establish unique engineering capabilities required for innovation in commercialization and scale-up to mass production. The findings suggest that continued local government support for the manufacturing economy has not undermined central government innovation policies, but has (1) broadened the range of resources available to entrepreneurial firms and (2) enabled new options for industrial upgrading that are outside the conceptualization of innovation underlying the central government's indigenous innovation framework.

In recent years, the Chinese central government has issued a series of energy conservation and environmental protection policies to promote China 's ecological civilization construction. As the main executor of the central government 's energy conservation and environmental protection policy, local governments in China should have implemented the policy as required. However, some local governments in China, regardless of the specific reality of the implementation object and policy environment, promote the implementation of the policy in a simple “One-size-fits-all” way, while other local governments selectively implement the central policy and resort to fraud in the face of inspections. Grassroots governments and local governments at higher levels are so tacitly " conspiring " that the ecological and environmental protection policies of the Chinese central government cannot be fully implemented and the policy effectiveness cannot be fully demonstrated. Why do China 's local governments still have these situations in the process of policy implementation when the Chinese central government explicitly prohibits them ? Why do local governments make a choice between “One-size-fits-all” and " collusion " ? Taking the implementation of energy conservation and emission reduction policies and environmental protection policies in S city of China as an example, this paper puts forward the analysis framework of " local government execution resources-time " to analyze the behavior choice of local governments in China. This study finally found that under the common pressure of completing tasks and superior inspections, Chinese local governments will choose to adopt “One-size-fits-all” behavior or " collusion " behavior according to the matching degree of their own execution resources and time resources. The research in this paper helps to better understand the logic of Chinese local governments ' choice of policy implementation methods, and also has certain reference significance for Chinese local governments ' choice of policy implementation methods in other fields.

Public service is the face of successful democratic and inclusive governance. In the context of Indonesia as a decentralized state, the role of local governments in delivering public services has become increasingly significant. However, one of the fundamental challenges that continues to surface is the lack of synchronization between central and local government policies. This misalignment not only leads to overlapping authorities and program inefficiencies but also directly impacts the continuity and quality of services that should ideally benefit citizens. This article aims to critically analyze the dynamics of policy misalignment across governmental levels and propose relevant strategies to foster a more adaptive and responsive policy harmonization. Employing a qualitative-descriptive approach based on literature review, the article examines regulations, policy documents, and relevant academic literature. The analysis reveals that the root causes of policy synchronization issues lie in several key factors: weak vertical and horizontal coordination, sectoral ego among institutions, limited institutional capacity at the local level, and the absence of an institutionalized consultative mechanism. To address these challenges, reforms in governance coordination are necessary strengthening the facilitative role of the Ministry of Home Affairs, integrating development planning through a national digital system, and designing a decentralized model that allows contextual flexibility while maintaining the principle of national policy unity. Strong policy synchronization is a vital prerequisite for building public services that are citizen-oriented and aligned with the vision of sustainable national development.

In late 1989, in the wake of the traumatic political events at Tiananmen Square, the Chinese leadership clearly indicated its intention to launch a retrenchment of economic reforms. A recovering patient typically looks good in comparison with his appearance during his illness, and the Chinese economy in 1991 looks quite healthy in comparison with that of 1989-90. The prospect of price reform in the context of growing inflation caused alarm among the Chinese population. The Chinese leaders had shown that they could, at least temporarily, restore order to the economy through tight control of the banking system, state sector investment, and wages. Local government representatives pointed to their extensive expenditure obligations–many mandated by central government policies–and the reduction in their revenues that was occurring due to the central government's austerity policies. The government started an export promotion drive and slapped strict controls on imports, particularly of consumer goods.

Structurally, China is a unitary centralized state in which all the power institutionally belongs to the central government while local governments at various levels are executive agencies of the central government and should faithfully perform and implement the central government's policies. But in fact, the local governments also are the groups of interest's distribution and have relatively independent interest requirements, resulting in a deviation trend between central and local governments gradually. This paper emphasizes on discussing the current situation and plight of political and economic game between the central and local governments, furthermore the corresponding solutions are proposed.

The Missing Ingredient: Inter-Municipal Cooperation and Central-Local Relations in the UK

How do policies take effect in the development of the urban mining industry? A local capability perspective: Evidence from Miluo, China (2000–2017)

The social and environmental costs associated with water management practices in state environmental protection projects in Xinjiang, China

Evolution of environmental policy for China's rare earths: Comparing central and local government policies

The choice of environmental regulation strategies for marine ecological pollution governance is vital for China’s promotion of collaborative marine ecological management. First, based on the assumption of limited rationality, we established a three-party evolutionary game model of China’s central government, local governments, and marine enterprises from the perspective of environmental policy to explore the dynamic evolution process of the game strategies of the three participants and the stability of the system equilibrium point. Second, we used numerical simulations to investigate how the incentive- and penalty-based policies of central and local governments have different effects on local governments and marine enterprises, respectively. Finally, we introduced a reputation loss model of public participation to explore the game strategy choices of the three parties under public participation. The finding reveal that (1) Local governments are more sensitive to the central government’s punishment policies than marine enterprises are. (2) Increasing the punishment of local governments on enterprises can simultaneously enhance the willingness of enterprises to govern and the willingness of local governments to implement. Moreover, the local governments policy of punishing enterprises was more direct and effective than that of the central government. (3) Although local governments subsidies for marine enterprises can increase their probability of governing marine ecology, they can also decrease local governments' willingness to implement. Finally, (4) Public participation can quickly promote the active governance of marine enterprises. Accordingly, the suggestions are proposed to maintain China's marine ecological security, e.g., the central government should focus on urging local governments to strictly implement marine environmental protection policies; local governments should take the lead in supervising and guiding marine enterprises; and all levels of government need to take measures to promote public participation in marine ecological governance.