Abstract
We propose a particular style of punishments to support collusive behavior in an infinitely repeated Cournot oligopoly model for at least the same range of discount factors as Friedman’s trigger strategies. The punishment lasts for a finite number of periods and asymmetry is introduced in such a way that each punisher’s output is the individual best response.
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