Indigenous Audibilities: Music, Heritage, and Collections in the Americas By Amanda Minks. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2023

Language learning

This article hypothesizes that economic reforms become sustainable when the discursive conditions prevailing in society tip against the existing paradigm under exceptional circumstances. Thus, unless the pro-liberalization constituencies dominate the development discourse, economic reforms, initiated under the exigencies of crisis and conditionalities, or carried out by a convinced executive with or without the stimulus of a crisis, will be reversed. The discursive conditions are determined based on eight factors: the dominant view of international intellectuals, illustrative country cases, executive orientations, political will, the degree and the perceived causes of economic crisis, attitudes on the part of donor agencies, and the perceived outcomes of economic reforms. The paper seeks to prove this “discursive dominance” hypothesis for the Indian case through a cross-temporal, comparative review of the evolution of economic policy in India over six different phases.

The history of science came early to Oxford. Its first champion was Robert T. Gunther, the son of a keeper of zoology at the British Museum and a graduate of Magdalen College who took a first there in the School of Natural Science in 1892, specializing in zoology ([figure 1][1]). As tutor in natural

Happy accidents happen even in philosophy. Sometimes our arguments yield insights despite missing their target, though when they do others can often spot it more easily. Consider the work of Donald Davidson. Few did more to explore connections among mind, language, and world. Now that we have critical distance from his views, however, we can see that Davidson’s accomplishments are not quite what they seem. First, while Davidson attacked the dualism of conceptual scheme and empirical content, he in fact illustrated a way to hold it. Second, while Davidson used the principle of charity to argue against the dualism, his argument in effect treats the principle as constitutive of a conceptual scheme. And third, while Davidson asserted that he cannot define what truth ultimately is—and while I do not disagree—his work nonetheless allows us to saymore about truth than Davidson himself does. I aim to establish these three claims. Doing so enriches our understanding of issues central to the history of philosophy concerning how, if at all, to divvy up the mental or linguistic contribution, and the worldly contribution, to knowledge. As we see below, Davidson was right in taking his work to be one stage of a dialectic begun by Immanuel Kant.1 He was just wrong about what that stage is. Reconsidering Davidson’s views also moves the current debate forward, as they reveal a previously unrecognized yet intuitive notion of truth—even if Davidson himself remained largely unaware of it. We begin however with scheme/content dualism and Davidson’s argument against it.

Reviewed by: Oxford Scholarship Online Stephen Henry Oxford Scholarship Online. [New York, New York]: Oxford University Press, (2008–). http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/ (Accessed 10 October 2017). [Requires a Web browser and an Internet connection. Subscription and perpetual access purchases are available] Oxford Scholarship Online (OSO) provides full-text access to "over 13,000 outstanding academic books from Oxford University Press" (http://oxfordscholarship.com/page/about-oso/about, accessed 4 October 2017). The books are organized into twenty categories, including music. Oxford updates the collection three times a year. Institutions may subscribe to all of OSO or to individual subject areas or they may make outright purchases of individual titles, complete subject modules, or updates within subject modules. Content Oxford Scholarship Online presents scholarly monographs only. Specifically excluded are Oxford publications meant for general audiences, books in the Handbooks series (which are included in a separate resource, Oxford Handbooks Online), tertiary reference sources (some of which are included in Oxford Music Online), and Richard Taruskin's The Oxford History of Western Music (an entity onto itself, available separately from Oxford at http://www.oxfordwesternmusic.com). In addition, OSO is not to be confused with Oxford Bibliographies Online, which features online bibliographies on various topics. Oxford Scholarship Online exists as a subset of Oxford's umbrella interface University Press Scholarship Online. Through University Press Scholarship Online, subscribers may add titles published by a growing number of "partner presses." Publishers with notable offerings in music include University of California Press (102 titles), University of Chicago Press (41 titles), University Press of Mississippi (38 titles), and Yale University Press (31 titles). University Press Scholarship Online and Oxford Scholarship Online users may elect to search within OSO, within any single partner press, or across all partner presses simultaneously. This review will focus on the content available through Oxford Scholarship Online, but comments on the interface and usability apply equally to University Press Scholar ship Online. There are currently 509 titles in OSO's music subject category. The OSO music component was released in 2008; most titles date from that time or later, although Oxford has added several pre-2008 titles over time with the earliest being Martin Williams's Jazz Changes (1993). While not every scholarly monograph on music released since 2008 is represented in the resource, I found few conspicuous absences. As a way of assessing whether Oxford had included the most important music titles, I looked for the presence of books that had won major awards from the American Musico logical Society (AMS), the Society for Ethnomusicology (SEM), and the Society for Music Theory (SMT) since 2008. All four of the Oxford publications that have won AMS's Otto Kinkeldey Award since 2008 are available in OSO. [End Page 480] In addition, Oxford has included Jane A. Bernstein's, 1998 work Music Printing in Renaissance Venice: The Scotto Press (1539–1572). Furthermore, two Oxford titles currently nominated for the 2017 Otto Kinkeldey Award—Kofi V. Agawu's The African Imagination in Music and Michael Marissen's Bach & God (both 2016)—are also included. Award winning Oxford books in the field of ethnomusicology are similarly well represented, albeit not comprehensively. Four of the five Oxford titles published since 2008 that have won the SEM's Alan Merriam Prize are in OSO, the exception being Carol Silverman's Romani Routes: Cultural Politics and Balkan Music in Diaspora (2012). I was unable to determine why Silverman's book had been excluded, but it is an obvious candidate for inclusion. Unfortunately, the field of music theory does not fare as well. The Society for Music Theory has awarded its Wallace Berry Award to four Oxford books since 2008 and only one of them is in OSO: Elizabeth Hellmuth Margulis's On Repeat: How Music Plays the Mind (2013). Absent from the collection are Giorgio Sanguinetti's The Art of Partimento: History, Theory, and Practice (2012); Janet Schmalfeldt's In the Process of Becoming: Analytic and Philosophical Perspectives on Form in Early Nineteenth-Century Music (2011); and Danuta Mirka's Metric Manipulations in Haydn and Mozart: Chamber Music for Strings, 1787–1791 (2009). It is not clear whether these titles have been excluded for content or for licensing...

Dogged Don

Emergence of the concept of endocrine function and endocrinology

Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Notes 1 I would like to thank members of the Phronesis Group and the Logos Group, as well as participants in the Workshop on Anil Gupta's Experience and Empiricism (Valencia, 20–2 June 2006 Gupta, A. 2006. Empiricism and Experience, Oxford: Oxford University Press. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar]), for their comments on earlier versions of this paper. More specifically, the final version has benefited from remarks by Manuel García‐Carpintero, Tobies Grimaltos, José Martínez Fernández, Carlos Moya, and Josep Ll. Prades. 2 Gupta, 2006 Gupta, A. 2006. Empiricism and Experience, Oxford: Oxford University Press. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar], p. 225. 3 Ibid., p. 3. Sometimes Gupta presents the Insight of Empiricism as involving a stronger idea, namely, that experience is not only our principal epistemic authority, but 'the final authority on the validity of our beliefs' (Gupta, 2006 Gupta, A. 2006. Empiricism and Experience, Oxford: Oxford University Press. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar]: p 3; my italics). I am convinced that there is a relevant sense in which even this stronger claim may be recognized as true, but I have no room in this paper to justify my claim. 4 Gupta, 2006 Gupta, A. 2006. Empiricism and Experience, Oxford: Oxford University Press. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar]: p. 5. 5 Ibid., p. 6. 6 'The problem of empiricism and experience is to answer our initial question – What is the contribution of experience to knowledge? – and to answer it in a way that respects the Insight of Empiricism and the Multiple‐Factorizability of Experience' (Gupta, 2006 Gupta, A. 2006. Empiricism and Experience, Oxford: Oxford University Press. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar]: p. 11). The tension between these two principles can be expressed in rather general terms as follows: 'If we could begin our inquiry into the world with a true conception of the self and the world then we should have no difficulty deriving truths from experience. On the other hand, if we could derive truths from experience, we could through successive approximations arrive at a true conception. The problem is that at the beginning of our inquiry we have neither: neither a true conception nor a vociferous and truthful experience. … The problem is how to break into this circle?' (Gupta, 2006 Gupta, A. 2006. Empiricism and Experience, Oxford: Oxford University Press. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar]: pp. 10–11. 7 'In summary, then, the propositional given forces one to a Cartesian conception of experience. It forces one to hold that the given is about the subjective realm and that a logical gulf exists between ordinary judgments of perception and the given in experience. Since there is little reason not to admit the propositional given once one accepts a Cartesian conception, we can formulate our conclusion thus: Cartesian conceptions are equivalent to the propositional given' (p. 36). In my view, Gupta's argument in favour of the first conditional claim (i.e., 'the propositional given forces one to a Cartesian conception of experience') is unsound because it relies on some feature of experiences which Gupta claims to be independent of a Cartesian view, whereas I regard the way he understands those features as an expression of that view. 8 'Classical empiricism leads to either skepticism or idealism. In the former case, it is plain that the Insight [of Empiricism] is not preserved. The same holds in the latter case also, though this can be masked by phenomenalist constructions. … The underlying motivation for the Insight comes from a moderately realist attitude towards the world. Once one accepts idealism, the Insight loses all motivation' (p. 56). 9 'The logical category of the contribution of experience is not that of proposition but that of function. Let e be an experience and let Γe be the logical contribution of e – the given in e. Then the suggestion is that Γe is a function that takes views ν as input and yields classes of judgments Γe (v) as output' (Gupta, 2006 Gupta, A. 2006. Empiricism and Experience, Oxford: Oxford University Press. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar]: p. 79). 10 See Gupta, 2006 Gupta, A. 2006. Empiricism and Experience, Oxford: Oxford University Press. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar], section 4B. 11 My alternative conception is inspired by general views expressed in Brandom, 1994 Brandom, R. 1994. Making it Explicit, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press. [Google Scholar], 2000 Brandom, R. 2000. Articulating Reasons, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar], McDowell, 1996 McDowell, J. 1996. Mind and World, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar], 1998a McDowell, J. 1998a. "'Values and Secondary Qualities', in McDowell". In Mind, Value and Reality, 131–50. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press. [Google Scholar], 1998b McDowell, J. 1998b. "'Wittgenstein on Following a Rule', in McDowell". In Mind, Value and Reality, 221–62. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press. [Google Scholar], and Stroud, 2000 Stroud, B. 2000. The Quest for Reality: Subjectivism and the Metaphysics of Colour, Oxford: Oxford University Press. [Google Scholar]. 12 Lewis, 1997 Lewis, D. 1997. 'Naming the Colors'. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 75(3): 325–42. [Taylor & Francis Online] , [Google Scholar]. 13 Ibid., p. 327. I am leaving aside other worries as to how to express these biconditionals in such a way that they are true of colours and not of shapes. See in this respect, Pettit, 1991 Pettit, P. 1991. 'Realism and Response‐Dependence'. Mind, 100: 587–626. [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar], Johnston, 1989 Johnston, M. 1989. 'Dispositional Theories of Value'. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 63(Suppl.): 139–74. [Google Scholar], 1992 Johnston, M. 1992. 'How to Speak of the Colors'. Philosophical Studies, 68(3): 221–63. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar], 1993 Johnston, M. 1993. "'Objectivity Refigured: Pragmatism Without Verificationism'". In Reality, Representation and Projection, Edited by: Haldane, J. and Wright, C. New York: Oxford University Press. [Google Scholar], 1998 Johnston, M. 1998. 'Are Manifest Properties Response‐Dependent Properties?'. The Monist, 81: 3–43. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar], Stroud, 2000 Stroud, B. 2000. The Quest for Reality: Subjectivism and the Metaphysics of Colour, Oxford: Oxford University Press. [Google Scholar], Wedgwood, 1998 Wedgwood, R. 1998. "'The Essence of Response‐Dependence'". In European Review of Philosophy 3: Response‐Dependence, Edited by: Casati, R. and Tappolet, Ch. 31–54. Stanford, Calif: CSLI Publications. [Google Scholar], and Wright, 2001 Wright, C. 2001. 'On Being in a Quandary'. Mind, 110/437: 45–98. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]. 14 Lewis, 1997 Lewis, D. 1997. 'Naming the Colors'. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 75(3): 325–42. [Taylor & Francis Online] , [Google Scholar]: 327. 15 Ibid., p. 336. Some materials in this section are drawn from Corbí, 2004 Corbí, J. E. 2004. 'Normativity, Moral Realism, and Unmasking Explanations'. Theoria, 19(2)(50): 155–72. [Google Scholar]. 16 I am not thereby denying that another route towards such a dilemma could actually be elaborated. In fact, it has been deployed insofar as contextualism may be associated with some forms of relativism, but this is an issue whose discussion I cannot even sketch here. On the other hand, I should stress that contextual approach to the Given satisfies, in a rather trivial way, the four constraints on an account of experience specified by Gupta (see section 2B). 17 'There is no level of "the deep logical form". We can analyse our sentences in different ways and there is no unique answer to the question of which of the analyses captures the deep logical form – at least, none that is independent of the functions that the analyses are meant to serve' (Gupta, 2006 Gupta, A. 2006. Empiricism and Experience, Oxford: Oxford University Press. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar]: p. 132). 18 'There is another point about perceptual judgments that is important to note: the demarcation of judgments that are perceptual is not absolute. The demarcation can shift as one shifts one's view. The shift can be large, as for example when we shift from our ordinary, commonsense view to a sense‐datum view. The shift can be small and subtle, as for example when we shift from one ordinary view to another. … The shifting demarcation of the perceptual from the non‐perceptual is not a problem for our account of the given. The account does not rest on a prior, absolute demarcation of the perceptual. It needs only a relative demarcation' (p. 84) (see also pp. 83–4). 19 'A striking feature of the ordinary phenomenon of direct awareness is its flexibility. At one moment, I can be directly aware of the stick in my hand. At another moment, I can focus on the feelings in my hand. And at yet another, I can be directly aware only of the unseen ball behind the dresser that I am trying to roll out with the stick. I seem to touch the ball directly, and the stick seems to become an unperceived part of me. The flexibility of direct awareness is essential to our ability to efficiently manipulate things in the world, and is of critical importance to our survival' (p. 153).

Ralph Vaughan Williams. Bucolic Suite. Study score. Edited by Julian Rushton. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. [Pref., p. iv-v; source, p. vi; textual notes, p. vii-ix; orchestration, p. [x]; score, p. 1-133. ISBN 978-0-19-337955-8. 20.95[pounds sterling].] Ralph Vaughan Williams. Serenade in A Minor (1898). Study score. Edited by Julian Rushton. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. [Pref., p. iv-v; source, p. vi; textual notes, p. vii-viii; orchestration, p. [x]; score, p. 1-132. ISBN 978-0-19-337956-5. 20.95[pounds sterling].] Ralph Vaughan Williams. Fantasia for Piano and Orchestra. Study score. Edited by Graham Parlett. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. [Pref., p. iv; manuscript, p. v; editorial method, p. v; textual notes, p. vi-vii; orchestration, p. [viii]; score, p. 1-87. ISBN 978-0-19-338825-3. 15.50[pounds sterling].] Ralph Vaughan Williams. Burley Heath. Study score. Edited by James Francis Brown. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013. [Pref., p. v; manuscript and textual notes, p. vii; orchestration, p. [viii]; score, p. 1--32. ISBN 978-0-19-339939-6. 7.95[pounds sterling].] Ralph Vaughan Williams. Harnham Down. Study score. Edited by James Francis Brown. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013. [Pref., p. v-vi; manuscript and textual notes, p. vii; orchestration, p. [viii]; score, p. 1-19. ISBN 978-0-19-339940-2. 6.95[pounds sterling].] Ralph Vaughan Williams. The Solent. Study score. Edited by James Francis Brown. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013. [Pref., p. v-vi; textual notes, p. vii; score, p. 1-33. ISBN 978-0-19-339941-9. 7.95[pounds sterling].] Despite an increasing presence in both performance and scholarly domains, it seems unlikely that Ralph Vaughan Williams (1872-1958) will be honored with a uniform and complete critical edition any time soon. Unlike his younger colleague William Walton, whose monogamous relationship with a publisher--Oxford University Press--combined with a fairly short work-list and unusually neat handwriting made the completion of the William Walton Edition manageable in less than twenty years, Vaughan Williams's spidery script and sprawling oeuvre spread across several publishers' catalogs (principally Stainer & Bell, Oxford, and Curwen, with in varying states of international copyright protection) pose practical challenges to the production of a complete edition. In recent years, Oxford has been steadily churning out new critical editions of a varied selection of Vaughan Williams in its catalog--including Symphonies 5, 6, and 7, as well as lesser (e.g., the Tuba Concerto, and Flos Campi). This worthy initiative has been the beneficiary of the Vaughan Williams Charitable Trust. The six reviewed here (all dating between 1895 and 1907) are products of the same initiative, but have remained hitherto unpublished. Although in 1903 he could regard these as among his most important works (see letter 31 in Letters of Ralph Vaughan Williams 1895-1958, ed. Hugh Cobbe [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008], 44), all were subsequently withdrawn by the composer. Indeed, scrapped was the word Vaughan Williams generally used for them, but he did not completely discard them. Each of these survives only in an autograph full score. (The autograph of the Serenade is held by Yale University; those of the other five are preserved at the British Library.) With but a single source, these editions are straightforward: some regularization of articulations and dynamics, a number of dubious notes emended, and an occasional creative rethinking of the original notation, but there are no challenging textual variants to be reconciled. Harnham Down seems to have required the least intervention (Very little editorial clarification was necessary since expression marks and dynamics were consistent, p. vii); Burley Heath--breaking off at m. 173 in the surviving source--required the conjectural addition of twenty-six measures (adapted slightly from earlier in the work) to provide a convincing conclusion. …

This guide accompanies the following article(s): ‘Mechanistic Theories of Causality Part I.’Philosophy Compass 6/6 (2011): 421–432, DOI: 10.1111/j.1747‐9991.2011.00400.x; ‘Mechanistic Theories of Causality Part II.’Philosophy Compass 6/6 (2011): 433–444, DOI: 10.1111/j.1747‐9991.2011.00401.xAuthor’s IntroductionMechanisms are a hot topic in the philosophy of science, with a large number of papers written on mechanisms and mechanistic explanation across the sciences in the last decade. The question naturally arises as to whether mechanisms can shed light on the notion of cause, and, indeed, several authors have suggested that C causes E just in case C and E are connected in the right way by a physical mechanism. The papers accompanied by this guide examine the prospects of mechanistic theories of causality.In the following section, I provide some related readings that would work well with the papers for more detailed discussion of mechanistic theories of causality. The sample syllabus below situates discussion of mechanistic theories of causality in the context of a course on the epistemology and metaphysics of causality.Author Recommends Salmon, Wesley. A New Look at Causality, in his Causality and Explanation. New York: Oxford University Press, 1998. 13–24. A very gentle introduction to process theories of causality. Dowe, Phil. Physical Causation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. A detailed defence of Dowe’s conserved‐quantity process theories of causality. Machamer, P., L. Darden, and C. Craver. ‘Thinking about Mechanisms.’Philosophy of Science 67 (2000): 1–25. Perhaps the most influential development of the mechanistic turn in the philosophy of science. Glennan, Stuart. Mechanisms. The Oxford Handbook of Causation. Eds. H. Beebee, C. Hitchcock and P. Menzies. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009. 315–25. A recent exposition of Glennan’s complex‐systems theory of causality. Illari, P. M., F. Russo, and J. Williamson. Causality in the Sciences. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011. A collection of papers on causality. The relationship between mechanisms and causality is a major theme running through the book. For example, chapter 24 extends Dowe’s account, while chapter 38 provides a general characterisation of mechanisms.Online Materials Causality in the Sciences conference series: http://www.kent.ac.uk/secl/philosophy/jw/cits.htm The main forum for discussion of theories of causality in relation to scientific method.Sample Syllabus Topic I: Difference‐making theories of causality Reading Paul, L. A. ‘Counterfactual Theories.’The Oxford Handbook of Causation. Eds. H. Beebee, C. Hitchcock and P. Menzies. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009. 158–84.Williamson, Jon. ‘Probabilistic Theories.’The Oxford Handbook of Causation. Eds. H. Beebee, C. Hitchcock and P. Menzies. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009. 185–212.Woodward, James. ‘Agency and Interventionist Theories.’The Oxford Handbook of Causation. Eds. H. Beebee, C. Hitchcock and P. Menzies. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 234–62. Topic II: Mechanistic theories of causality Reading Salmon, Wesley. ‘A New Look at Causality,’ in his Causality and Explanation. New York: Oxford University Press, 1998. 13–24.Machamer, P., L. Darden, and C. Craver. ‘Thinking about Mechanisms.’Philosophy of Science 67 (2000): 1–25.Williamson, Jon. ‘Mechanistic Theories of Causation Parts I and II.’Philosophy Compass (2011). Topic III: Pluralist theories of causality Reading Hall, Ned. ‘Two Concepts of Causation.’Causation and Counterfactuals. Eds. J. Collins, N. Hall and L. Paul. MIT Press, 2004. 225–76.Godfrey‐Smith, Peter. ‘Causal Pluralism.’The Oxford Handbook of Causation Beebee. Eds. H. Beebee, C. Hitchcock and P. Menzies. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009. 326–37.Reiss, Julian. ‘Third Time’s a Charm: Causation, Science and Wittgensteinian Pluralism.’Causality in the Sciences. Eds. P. M. Illari, F. Russo and J. Williamson. Oxford University Press, 2011. 907–27. Philosophica 77.1 – special issue on causal pluralism. Topic IV: The epistemology of causality Reading Russo, F. and J. Williamson. ‘Interpreting Causality in the Health Sciences.’International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 21.2 (2007): 157–70.Gillies, D. A. ‘The Russo‐Williamson Thesis and the Question of whether Smoking Causes Heart Disease.’Causality in the Sciences. Eds. P. M. Illari, F. Russo and J. Williamson. Oxford University Press, 2011. 110–25.Illari, P. M. ‘Disambiguating the Russo‐Williamson Thesis.’International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, forthcoming.Weber, E. ‘How Probabilistic Causation can Account for the Use of Mechanistic Evidence.’International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 23 (2009): 277–95.Darby, G. and J. Williamson. ‘Imaging Technology and the Philosophy of Causality.’Philosophy & Technology, forthcoming; doi: 10.1007/s13347‐010‐0010‐7.Russo, F. and J. Williamson. ‘Generic versus Single‐case Causality: The Case of Autopsy.’European Journal for Philosophy of Science 1.1 (2011): 47–69; doi: 10.1007/s13194‐010‐0012‐4.

Much mainstream legal comment on human rights law presents an unhelpfully crude picture of disagreement concerning the significance that should be attached to human rights in particular cultural co...

Composite predicates2 (abbreviated as CPs) are verbal structures comprising a verb such as give, make, have, take and a deverbal noun (e.g. give an answer, make a call, have a drink, take a guess)....

Language learning

Teaching and Learning Guide for: Interpreting Magic and Divination in the Ancient Near East and Magic and Divination in Ancient Israel

COVID-19 Catatonia—Would We Even Know?