Abstract

INDIA, with the fourth largest armed forces in the world, might now have been in a position to play a major role in the Indian Ocean region but for the fact that its military capability is fully extended in coping with its own security problems. Even though India's leadership keeps talking, mostly for overseas consumption, of the country's stake in peace and stability in the region, there is little evidence of willingness to work for policies which would give New Delhi more military elbow room. The possibility of making the problem of India's own security more manageable by political initiatives is raised every now and then by some Opposition parties, notably by the Left and Right Communists at one end of the spectrum and the conservative Swatantra party at the other. But the idea of accommodation with either Pakistan or China gets scant public support. As a result, Mrs. Gandhi's Government, inhibited by a slender parliamentary majority and the danger of dissidence within the ruling Congress party, is unable to face up to the political hazards inherent in the give and take of negotiations. In India's perceptions, China is seen as the bigger but long-term threat, while Pakistan figures as the more active and immediate one. The validity of this view rests on the assumption that China has already settled the boundary dispute to its satisfaction, and is now occupying such areas of territory in Ladakh as it really wants. China has, of course, outstanding claims-to 32,000 square miles in the NEFA area, for instance-but these are not expected to be seriously pursued. Likewise, no Indian in his right mind considers it feasible to recover the lost real estate, even though pledges to remove the aggressor feature in the election manifestos of most parties. In contrast, Pakistan has a live and continuing grievance over Kashmir. The fact that armed clashes took place twice in 1965-first, on a limited scale, in the Rann of Kutch, and, later, much more extensively over Kashmir-has given the long-standing confrontation between the two countries a sharper edge, triggering off an arms race which causes grave concern to the international community. The war of September 1965, during which the Chinese presented an ultimatum to India, ostensibly over military works on the Sikkim-Tibet border, gave an added dimension to Indian perceptions of danger.

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