Abstract
We study incumbency effects for individual legislators from two political parties (Christian Democracy and the Italian Socialist Party) in Italy’s lower house of representatives over ten legislatures (1948–1992). Results of a regression discontinuity design adapted to multimember proportional representation show no incumbency advantage for legislators after one term. Only a tiny elite in each party successfully creates an incumbency advantage. Incumbents are advantaged for reselection by their political party, which we interpret as a party loyalty premium. Our study depicts a political environment monopolized by party leaders who reward party loyalty but hamper legislators in appealing directly to voters.
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