Incitement to Religious Hatred and the ‹Symbolic’: How Will the Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006 Work?

In its General Comment No. 34 dealing with freedom of expression, the United Nations Human Rights Committee (UNHRC) rejected the idea that a blasphemy law could ever be human-rights compliant, unless its function was to prevent incitement to religious or racial hatred. This is a widely shared view that is consistently endorsed when any international blasphemy controversy (such as that involving the Danish Cartoons in 2005) arises. This article assesses the legitimacy of this view. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) permits freedom of expression to be limited inter alia in the name of public morality, provided that the law in question is also necessary to achieve this end. This article argues that because a blasphemy law can be a response to a public moral vision; therefore a blasphemy law can serve a legitimate purpose insofar as human rights law is concerned. It is further submitted that whereas some blasphemy laws are unacceptably draconian, it is not inherently impossible for such a law to represent a proportionate response to a public morals concern. Thus, the conclusion from the UNHRC is not warranted by the text of the ICCPR. Moreover, there is a risk that, in reaching this conclusion the committee is evincing an exclusively secularist worldview in its interpretation of the ICCPR that undermines its claim to universality.

The Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006 finally received Royal Assent on 16 February 2006, although it did not come into force until 1 October 2007. This was the third attempt by the Labour government to introduce such legislation following the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Bill 2001–2, and the Serious Organized Crime and Police Bill 2004–5.1 On each previous occasion, parliamentary opposition in both the lower and upper houses led to the removal of the clauses relating to incitement of religious hatred. The Bill that passed in 2006, which amended the Public Order Act 1986, was significantly altered by four amendments to the Government’s proposals: first, the provisions relating to incitement of religious hatred were to be separated from the existing provisions for the incitement of racial hatred; second, unlike the racial hatred provisions, the new offence would be confined to the use of ‘threatening’ words or behaviour, and not extend to words that were ‘abusive and insulting’; third, the prosecution would need to prove the intent to stir up religious hatred rather than — as is the case with racial hatred — demonstrate that it was ‘likely’ to do so; fourth, a new clause was introduced explicitly protecting freedom of speech — ‘Nothing in this Part shall be read or given effect in a way which prohibits or restricts discussion, criticism or expressions of antipathy, dislike, ridicule, insult or abuse of particular religions or the beliefs or practices of their adherents’.2

The recent enactment of the Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006 makes it (for the first time) unlawful to incite hatred on religious grounds in England and Wales. This legislation has however been attacked by a number of Muslims on the basis that it is too rigidly drawn, and that the scope of the offence of incitement to religious hatred is narrower than comparable legislation governing incitement to racial hatred. In critically analysing the Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006, this article makes particular reference to the recent Islamic Council of Victoria case in Australia on religious vili cation and hate speech which, it is suggested, provides a salutary lesson to those who would seek to expand the remit of the Act. It is argued that the Racial and Religious Hatred Act is not merely a symbolically important measure, but is also a fair and workable compromise which protects faith groups from incitement to religious hatred without placing excessive curbs on free speech.

Focusing on the Italian legal system, this article aims to explore old and new legal remedies applicable to cases of religious hatred. Traditionally, institutional religions are granted legal protection through criminal sanctions of blasphemy. Included in the Criminal Code since 1889 and revised in 2006, norms regarding blasphemy are conceived to protect religious feelings, which are considered as part of the inner conscience of the faithful as well as an element of collective religious identity. However, social developments and an increasingly multicultural and multi-religious society reveal questions and issues that need to be legally addressed. One of the most controversial of these is the intertwining of race and religion as grounds for hate discourse, which must be tackled through specific legal instruments, banning racial, ethnic and religious hate speech and intolerance.

ObjectiveThe article contributes to the literature on discrete events and behavioral change among the public by studying the link between the United Kingdom's 2016 “Brexit”referendum and racial and religious hate crime.MethodsTime series intervention models on daily and monthly hate crime numbers from the UK Home Office and police forces, controlling for other events such as terror attacks. A range of robustness tests including additional vector auto‐regression.ResultsThe Brexit referendum led to a 19–23 percent increase in hate crimes, but did not lead to a longer‐term increase. The results are robust to a range of alternative specifications, and there is no evidence of a relationship between media coverage of hate crime or immigration salience and hate crimes. The results also show the consistent, large effect of terror attacks on increasing the number of hate crimes.ConclusionThe Brexit referendum caused an increase in hate crimes on par with terror attacks. Discrete political events, like referendums and elections, can play a sizeable role in prejudicial behavioral change.

The hate crime legislation is introduced in the UK and US to send a strong message to the community that serious racism leading to violence will not be tolerated in a democratic society but such laws are not implemented in Australia because of which violence motivated by racial and ethnic hatred in the Sydney beach town of Cronulla is considered under standard criminal laws. Hate crime legislation must be introduced by Parliament which includes all violent acts which are motivated by racism, ethnic or religious hatred in order to enable the police and the courts to successfully prosecute those who partake in acts such as those carried out in Cronulla as hate crime offenders.

The article presents the results of a content analysis of the interviews of participants of radical nationalist groups who committed serious and heinous crimes of violence motivated by racial and religious hatred and enmity ("hate crimes"). The study involved 20 people aged 18 to 30 years. As the results of the interview, the subjects demonstrated the need for "black and white" perception of the world in which there is necessarily an image of an enemy to be destroyed. This makes them particularly susceptible to the incentive effects of extremist communications. We showed very similar socio-demographic and socio-psychological characteristics in respondents which suggest the presence of a common set of character traits that form a stable syndrome. We highlighted the socio-demographic and socio-psychological traits of individuals who are prone to commit "hate crimes".

This paper examines why there are different thresholds for the offences of stirring up racial hatred and stirring up religious hatred in the UK’s Public Order Act 1986. Concepts of genealogy, intertextuality and problematisation are used to structure a critical discourse analysis that traces different understandings of race, religion, and racial and religious hatred across legal texts. The analysis reveals a rift between assertions within parliament that race is an immutable characteristic, and much more flexible and inclusive judicial understandings of race. This finding challenges justifications for the legislative discrepancy and points to more progressive possibilities.

The significance of the right to free speech is evident from the fact that the societies that curb and limit the freedom of expression are more prone to crimes and incidents of torture, ill-treatment and disappearances. Almost every state has imposed restrictions on the right to free speech on account of national security, defamation, religious hatred, extremism or radicalism. This article starts with the general discussion on the topic of free speech under the Pakistani laws and current regime. It examines the limitations on the freedom of speech under judicial interpretations. The article explores the confrontations in the context of defamation, blasphemy laws and contempt of court in Pakistan. It concludes that the limitations and restrictions imposed on the right to free speech must be clearly defined and reasonable.

The place of religion in the public sphere has become increasingly controversial in recent years and there have been many examples of the ‘clash of rights’. Much attention has been afforded to the clash between freedom of religion on the one hand and freedom of expression on the other, leading to moral panics and resulting in the enactment of new laws. A further trend in many Western societies has been the repealing or re-configuring of historic legislation prohibiting blasphemy. English law, for example, has moved from an offence of blasphemy that protected (exclusively Christian) religious beliefs to a clutch of offences of stirring up religious hatred that are intended to protect believers. The move away from traditional blasphemy offences raises a question which forms the focus of this chapter, namely whether there now a right to blaspheme. Analysing the difference between the old blasphemy law and the newer offences, this chapter asks what is now lawful that was previously unlawful. Taking an historical approach, it seeks to describe the contours and limits of the new right to blaspheme exploring a possibly unintended side effect of the changing statutory regime.

In this introduction we want to bring attention to and provide a contextualization and analysis of the last years burning of the Quran that have taken place and still takes place in the Nordic and Scandinavian context. Whilst many countries around the world still have blasphemy laws or laws against religious hatred that protect “religion” (however defined), or religious sensibilities from being desecrated or mocked, most Western countries, including Sweden, Denmark and Norway have removed blasphemy laws and made it possible to offer critique of religion, including the right to criticize religious texts. While this special issue primarily discusses the contemporary practice of public rituals where a physical copy of the Quran is burnt, we argue that understanding why this practice has become so widespread in the Nordic region requires a historical awareness of how blasphemy, as well as freedom of religion and freedom of expression have been understood and practiced in this very specific cultural and political environment of the far corners of Europe. Besides providing a historical background, the introduction includes an overview to how Muslims have discussed how to handle copies of the Quran that have been worn-out and why the intention is important for understanding the controversy around the burning of the Quran.

Human dignity is inviolable. It must be respected and protected. Everyone has the right to respect for his or her physical and mental integrity. [1] Hate crimes are crimes motivated by racial, ethnic, or religious hatred or hostility. Media regularly reports violence against certain ethnic groups. Lithuania, like other EU countries, applies EU law directly or transposes it into national law. These changes have also had an impact on the fight against hate crime, as this type of crime has received increasing attention from the international community in recent years. Crimes of this sort not only cause physical and mental suffering or economic loss but also lead to changes in relations between different social groups, mistrust, suspicion, and hostility. These crimes can also lead to armed conflicts, forcing many people to flee their homes and seek asylum abroad. The increase in the number of victims of these crimes is a breeding ground for radical extremism and even terrorism. Countries work on improving laws criminalising hate crimes. Over the course of writing the present article, the author held meetings with representatives of the Jewish and sexual minority (LGBT) communities, conducted 35 indepth interviews with representatives of each group, and examined the EU and Lithuanian case law. Possible hate incidents recorded in the study range from verbal abuse to assault and knife stabbing. It has been found that people belonging to the Jewish and LGBT communities feel hostility not only from strangers but also from co-workers and peers. The Jewish community daily face anti-Semitic stereotypes and jokes, whether spoken directly to them or behind their backs. LGBT people also experience hatred from family members and relatives who not only stop communicating with them upon learning about their sexual orientation but also make insulting comments.

The paper considers the issues of implementing the standards of the international legislation on religious and extremist crimes in the national legislation of the Republic of Tajikistan. With regard to its ideology the category of extremism is reflected in the criminal law through the concept of extremist crime: crime for political, ideological, racial, national or religious hatred or hostility reasons or crimes resulting from hatred or hostility towards any social group. According to the understanding of hatred and hostility, which is deeply rooted within the criminal law, the latter one represents external practical (conflict, destructive) actions whereas the first one illustrates hostility without specific actions. The criminal law warrants five kinds of hatred or hostility motives: political, ideological, racial, national, religious hatred or hostility, as well as hatred or hostility towards any social group. These kinds partially overlap in their content, which requires their correct definition. In order to improve the criminal legislation the authors analyzed the disadvantages of the legislation of the Republic of Tajikistan and made certain suggestions.

ABSTRACTStudying hate crimes in a country divided along sectarian lines, such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, presents a substantial challenge for researchers. The consequences of hate crimes are multifaceted, and in an environment of institutional crime-control mechanisms that are still developing, these events can negatively affect society at large. Hate crimes often lead to ethnic and religious homogenisation, polarisation, intolerance, overt hatred and violence. This paper provides an overview of research findings relevant to policing hate crimes in post-conflict Bosnia and Herzegovina. Special focus is placed on policing at three levels: government policy (strategies for action at the level of the interior ministries), police policy (the implementation of action strategies in lower organisational units) and police practice (police fieldwork). The study is primarily based on a qualitative approach including interviews, observations and secondary data analyses. The general findings indicate that crime control is inadequate and influenced by an apparent lack of political will to tackle the problem. Our findings also revealed the absence of any systematic approach to deal with hate crimes, which implied numerous problems in policing at all levels. Bosnia and Herzegovina, as a transitional post-conflict country, has a long way ahead in establishing law enforcement institutions that will enable the rule of law, protect human rights and ensure political accountability.

Jews and Jewish institutions have suffered the majority of reported religion-motivated hate crimes in the United States for nearly two decades. According to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), in 2014 the 609 reported anti-Semitic incidents made up 59% of all religious bias hate crimes alone. Rates of reported anti-Semitic hate crimes vary considerably over the course of a year. Yet, little scholarly attention has been given to what factors cause reported anti-Semitic hate crimes to fluctuate so substantially in the United States. This paper hypothesizes that violent Israeli military engagements are critical in explaining weekly surges of reported anti-Semitic hate crimes. Utilizing FBI hate crime data from 2001 to 2014 and fixed effects negative binomial regression models, consistent findings underscore that violent Israeli military engagements significantly increase the likelihood of a state reporting anti-Semitic hate crime. Most dramatically, their occurrence increases the likelihood of reported hate crime intimidating individuals or characterized as violent by nearly 35%. This paper underscores that homeland perpetrated violence can directly impact the security of diaspora communities.