Incentives for individual compliance with pandemic response measures

Abstract

The common methods to fight against COVID-19 are quasi-standard measures which include wearing masks, social distancing and vaccination. However, combining these measures into an efficient holistic pandemic response instrument is even more involved than anticipated. We argue that some non-trivial factors behind the varying effectiveness of these measures are selfish decision-making and the differing national implementations of the response mechanism. In this chapter, through simple models, we analyze the impacts of individual incentives on different measures of the decisions made with respect to social distancing, mask wearing, and vaccination. We shed light on how these may result in suboptimal outcomes and demonstrate the responsibility of national authorities in designing these games properly regarding data transparency, the chosen policies, and their influence on the preferred outcome. We promote a mechanism design approach: it is in the best interest of every government to carefully balance social good and response costs when implementing their respective pandemic response mechanism; moreover, there is no one-size-fits-all blueprint when designing an effective solution.