Abstract
AbstractThe incentive mechanism literature is mostly theoretical since data limitations typically prohibit the testing of predictions. This paper offers an empirical study of the relationship between incentives and economic performance as applied to conference revenue sharing in college football. Revenue sharing acts as a disincentive to build a stronger team since the pecuniary rewards of team success are diminished if a team must share these rewards with conference opponents. This proposition is tested using data on team performance and revenue sharing rules in Division I‐A college football. The results confirm the main theoretical proposition – conferences which share more, tend to be weaker.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
