Abstract
This paper explores the flexibility of thermostatically controlled loads (TCLs) as a way of absorbing the intermittent and variable renewable energy resources. We propose an innovative mechanism, which allows load serving entities (LSEs) to pay incentive rates to customers for the control of thermostats. We apply a game-theoretic framework to model the interactive behavior between LSEs and customers in the contract design and subscription process. As a result, LSEs are able to manipulate subscribers’ thermostat set-points in a certain way that the aggregated TCLs are managed to follow the renewable energy output as close as possible. This is formulated as a linear-quadratic (LQ) tracking problem with inequality constraints and is solved by model predictive control approach. We also study the sensitivity of contract design parameters to the maximum tracking error and total cost.
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