In whose name? Construction of the EUropean agency in the European Union’s institutional discourse on the war in Ukraine

The 2022 Europe report of the Lancet Countdown on health and climate change: towards a climate resilient future

The scientific article identifies the prospects for the development of the defense sector of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe in the context of Russian aggression. In particular, it is noted that the war in Ukraine has become a catalyst for the search by European countries that have struggled with balancing military power and the social security system. It is emphasized that the policy of upholding common security interests, intensive interaction of allied countries, strengthen the positions of all parties, strengthen the basis for bilateral and multilateral relations, and increase the arsenal of means for responding to common threats. The need to strengthen the European defense budget in general and individual countries of the European continent, the development of their military-industrial capabilities is indicated, and the prospects for deepening internal cooperation in the defense industry, the creation of a European army, subregional alliances of countries, the development of new formats of interaction with NATO and the European Union, and the establishment of partnership relations with the United States and allied countries are identified. The arguments are presented that the construction of joint defense enterprises for the production of ammunition with the help of partner countries, the expansion of their own production of new technical equipment, the involvement of NATO member states in exercises within the framework of the Northern European military alliance, the deployment of new forces of the North Atlantic Alliance in the region in order to prevent the occupation of countries or their parts will contribute to increasing the defense capability of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe in modern conditions. The conclusion is made that the countries of Central and Eastern Europe should resist today's changes in the security paradigm through more effective coordination of defense spending, increasing the role of the European Defense Agency and increasing financing of the defense industry.

It is analyzed how the full-scale Russian military aggression against Ukraine in 2022, which became an exogenous threat to the EU, intensified the need for security integration and cooperation of its Member States, including the streng- thening of PESCO and the interaction and coordination of the EU actions with NATO. The following aspects of the transformation of PESCO’s security pri- orities, taking into account the exogenous impact of the full-scale stage of the Russian-Ukrainian war on it, have been highlighted: organizational, financial and functional. From an organizational point of view, it has been noted that Denmark joined the European Defense Agency (EDA) and PESCO; Malta is considering joining this initiative. From a financial point of view the most visible reaction to the war in Ukraine is the EU Member States' reassessment of their defence capabilities, the growth of their investments in military modernization, reflected in the obligation of States to increase their defence expenditures to strengthen the armed forces, purchase the newest weapons and increase the opportunities to participate in cyber and hybrid warfare to counter potential adversaries. It is emphasized that the increase in the defense budgets of the EU Member States should be combined with growing cooperation for the acquisition and/or deve- lopment of new security and defense capabilities and overcoming inconsistencies and fragmentation of interests in decision-making taking into account their me- dium and long-term impact on the EU defense landscape. From a functional point of view, the project dimension of PESCO has been clarified. It was emphasized that the fifth wave of projects was approved on May 23, 2023: 11 of them were approved, 3 were closed, 68 projects are being implemented. Challenges on the way to the implementation of projects within PESCO are singled out: leadership and sectoral orientation of certain Member States on individual projects, incon- sistency of defence budgets of Member States and fragmentation during their formation, initiation of similar projects by them outside PESCO, slowness of project implementation, etc. It was noted that in light of Russia’s full-scale inva- sion of Ukraine, PESCO projects are acquiring an operational dimension, which is confirmed by the launch of new projects and the successful development of several existing ones. Therefore, PESCO is valuable in the event of the military crisis, as it improves the speed of joint response of the EU to it.

The issue of energy security and energy dependence has been discussed in many studies by different authors. The aim of this study is to show the high value of energy dependence of the European Union on the import of fossil energy sources from Russia in the context of the war in Ukraine. This paper used the theory of mutual interdependence and warned about the critical situation of mutual energy relations between the European Union and Russia and the risk associated with the low level of energy security of the European Union. The Article evaluated mutual energy relations between the European Union and Russia, which were given a new dimension in connection with Russian aggression in Ukraine. Equally the article accented the political element of mutual energy relations. Based on the theory of interdependence, the article explains the importance and risks of exporting and importing raw materials for Russia and the EU member states. The analysis was mainly based on data from the European statistical agency Eurostat. The synthesis of knowledge confirmed the urgent need to strengthen the energy security of the European Union. The conclusions of this article can be applied to other case studies that will continue research on the given topic and will respond to the current situation in Ukraine.

The outbreak at the end of February 2022 of the Russian invasion of Ukraine—and the Russian–Ukrainian hostilities that began in 2014 with the Euromaidan—has led to numerous dramatic episodes from both a humanitarian and an informative perspective. In this context, social media have been filled with rhetoric and narrative mechanisms, both from civil society organisations and from European media and institutions, in their eagerness to define their position within the dialectical battle. This research aims to address organisational communication in the European Union during the first year after the invasion, taking as its object of study the publications of four institutional bodies: European Commission, European Parliament, European Council, and European External Action Service. For this purpose, a content analysis of tweets was carried out, as well as in-depth interviews with specialised actors in institutional communication and disinformation at the EU level. Overall, the results show that the parallel narrative of the Commission, the Parliament, the Council, and the EEAS has been quite similar and lacks significant divergences, reflecting coherence and coordination in the communication strategies around the Ukrainian war, although there are interesting findings on the interaction of the institutions with the media and other civil society actors in communicating this international crisis via social media.

The European Union (EU) ‘agencification’ process is a story of success. European agencies are relied on in an ever-wider variety of sectors, ranging from the internal market to economic and social regulation. Over the past two decades, they have acquired increasing practical importance, both as an institutional phenomenon and as a method of policy delivery. Unsurprisingly, their functional and normative significance has become central in the institutional discourse and has caught the attention of European legal scholars.