Abstract
The Tax incentives offered by Brazil to local production triggered a WTO dispute by the European Union and Japan against the presumably ‘discriminatory tax advantages’ that for years have severely harmed these countries’ automotive and technological industries. This article explores, through the review of the claims submitted by the parties to the dispute, the Panel and the Appellate Body’s resolutions, if these tax incentives effectively increased the border protection in Brazil by imposing a higher tax burden on imported goods than on domestic goods; conditioning tax advantages to the use of domestic goods and, providing export-contingent subsidies. WTO, Brazil, GATT, TRIMS, INOVAR-Auto, Informatics, Tax incentives, Subsidies
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