In search of the Truth in the Polish Civil Procedure

Right to a hearing as a manifestation of the principle of equality of parties and participants in civil proceedings Introductory RemarksThe Constitution of the Republic of Poland contains many principles, including those applicable to civil proceedings.One of these principles is the principle of equality before the law.The constitutional principle of equality before the law guarantees not only equality before the law but also the right to equal treatment by public authorities (Article 32(1) of the Polish Constitution). 1 This principle is understood to mean that all subjects of the law characterised by a given essential feature are to be treated equally and that differences between subjects of the law should be applied to differences in treatment that result from the law. 2 The principle's counterpart under the Civil Procedure Code is the principle of equality of the parties and participants in the proceedings, also known as the principle of equality of the parties and participants in the proceedings 3 or the principle of equality and hearing of the parties. 4One of the important manifestations of the implementation of this principle in civil proceedings is that the parties and participants in the proceedings are guaranteed the right to be heard during the proceedings.In doing so, the right to be heard is also of utmost importance to guarantee that the parties or participants in the proceedings can participate in fair proceedings.A restriction or deprivation of this right can lead to far-reaching procedural consequences.It is 1 See comments on this principle in the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court, M. Ziolkowski, Zasada równości w prawie [Principle of equality in law], PiP 2005, z 5, p. 94 et seq. 2 See J. Falski, Ewolucja wykładni zasady równości w orzecznictwie Trybunału Konstytucyjnego [Evolution of the interpretation of the principle of equality in the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Tribunal], State and Law 2000, no. 1, p. 52. 3 See, inter alia, E. Waśkowski, System procesu cywilnego [Theoretical introduction.Principles of rational court system and civil trial], Vilnius 1932, pp.

Eugeniusz Waśkowski is regarded as an eminent Polish civil law and lawsuit specialist of the procedure of law, although he did not live in Poland until 1924 when he turned 58. His earlier years were spent in the Russian Empire and in Bolshevik Ukraine. In Russia he was one of the most respected specialists of the procedure of law and of the civil law, and his works have continuously been reissued in the last 30 years. He arrived in Poland when the works on civil procedure had reached an advanced level. Probably as a result of this, he was not included in the work of the Codification Commission on the Polish civil procedure, although he became a member of it in 1928. This does not mean, however, that he did not have any influence on the Polish civil procedure – which is the subject of the article. The research described in the article shows that the comments made by Waśkowski in 1928, in relation to the draft of the civil procedure developed by the Codification Commission of the Republic of Poland, often corresponded to the changes introduced into the draft according to the later draft of 1930. This was established by comparing the wording of individual provisions resulting from the draft developed by the Codification Commission of the Republic of Poland to which Waśkowski referred, the content of Waskowski’s comments of 1928 and the content of the draft in the redaction published in 1930 and the codes of civil procedure of 1930 and 1964. Dealing with these changes is important and may be of practical significance, since the vast majority of the provisions in the wording given to them in the 1930 draft of civil procedure became law as of 1 January 1933. Subsequently, many of them were transferred directly or with amendments to the Civil Procedure Code of 1964 currently in force.

The adversarial principle has a long tradition in Polish civil procedure. It was one of the main principles under the Polish Civil Procedure Code of 1930. Later on, the change of the state system to socialism brought significant modifications to the shape of the subject principle. Due to the different bases of socialist civil procedure, the adversarial principle was almost completely forgotten. It was later resurrected, with another change of state system. The contemporary lawmaker is much interested in shaping the adversarial principle in the right way. The latest amendments to the Polish Civil Procedure Code of 1964 were focused on creating the proper bases for the functioning of the courts and for proper regulations regarding parties remaining active throughout the process. The presented analysis leads to the conclusion that the adversarial principle is, and always has been, of very high importance to civil procedure.

The article’s objective is to present the essence of the system of extraordinary remedies in the Polish civil procedure, as well as a characterization of the particular remedies comprising that system. Application of the dogmatic method has also verified the hypothesis according to which the Polish legislator, in giving those remedies (including extraordinary ones) a normative structure, has in view that their objective is to seek a change in or to set aside the contested ruling. The article accents particularly regulation of the extraordinary grievance, considering its status as novel legislation giving rise to numerous doubts and reservation, as the normative shape of that remedy constitutes a source of collision between two values – the stability if a judicial ruling, and its lawfulness. The emergence of this remedy has led to the conclusion that there is a need to review the existing position of the civil procedure doctrine concerning respect for the principle of exclusivity adopted in our system of remedies.

Crisis situation induced by the pandemic caused by the SARS-CoV-2 coronavirus has influenced the way of organization of hearings in civil cases. Undoubtedly, the possibility of remote meetings that was introduced by the Act on special solutions related to the prevention, counteracting and combating of COVID-19, other infectious diseases and crisis situations caused by them, was a novelty in Polish civil procedure. The main research intention of the article was to assess the impact of the regulation caused by the crisis situation on the current wording of the provisions of civil procedure. Following the amendment of the Civil Procedure Code of 7 July 2023, the provisions of the Covid Act were implemented in this area into the Civil Procedure Code. The article focused on assessing the impact of civil proceedings with the use of remote hearings on the implementation of the principles of fair trial, in particular the principle of open proceedings. Risks associated with the use of sentencing that have arisen in practice and ways of avoiding them have also been identified.

The paper aims to show what changes have taken place in the Polish civil procedure with regard to the so-called subjective limitations on judicial enforcement, and how these changes have affected the way enforcement proceedings are conducted and how they affected the passive party to the enforcement proceedings – the debtor. The paper presents the origin of the introduction of subjective limitations on judicial enforcement to the Polish civil procedure, which occurred in 1932 within the scope of the Ordinance of the President of the Republic of Poland of 27 October 1932 – the Law on Judicial Enforcement Proceedings, and then discusses the evolution of these regulations that took place during the existence of the People's Republic of Poland. In the final part of the paper the historical legal status is compared with the currently binding provisions, which made it possible to formulate conclusions allowing for an answer to the question raised in the title of the paper. The analysis takes into account the arguments of a structural nature, which made it possible to formulate a thesis that the scope of the enforcement limitations in question has significantly increased since 1932, and a certain “inflation” of the provisions in question results from the progressing development of the level of social life. Sources which made it possible to answer the question posed in the title of this article include the materials of the Codification Commission of the Second Polish Republic, commentaries to the Code of Civil Procedure of 1930, commentaries to the Code of Civil Procedure of 1964, jurisprudence of the Supreme Court and other materials such as scientific monographs or scientific articles on enforcement proceedings and the subject limitations of judicial enforcement.

I dedicate the article to Professor of the Department of Civil Law and Process of the Faculty of Law of Tomsk State University, Doctor of Law, Honored The article highlights the role of the Professor of the Department of Civil Law and Procedure of Tomsk State University Viktor Nifonovich Shcheglov in the development of the theory and method of teaching civil procedural law. I can separate the main directions of V.N. Shcheglov’s research activities: the legality and validity of a court decision, civil procedural legal relationship, the problem of a “broad” understanding of civil procedure and the subject of civil procedural law, a lawsuit and a claim form of legal protection. We pay particular attention to the formation of a scientific school under the leadership of Professor V.N. Shcheglov, continuity in conducting theoretical research, and introducing its results into the method of teaching civil procedural law. The content of the works of Professor V.N. Shcheglov enables us to conclude that the research interest of the scientist was focused primarily on the analysis of the nature, features and problems of the effectiveness of civil procedure as a special legal form of protection of rights and legally protected interests. Within the framework of this broad problem, it is possible to identify several methodologically significant aspects, which were found in the articles and monographs of V.N. Shcheglov. The first of them is the consideration of civil procedure as a special legal relationship. V.N. Shcheglov devoted several articles to this issue and his monograph “Civil Procedural Legal Relationship” (1966) was awarded the Tomsk State University Prize in 1967. The main idea defended by the author was the assertion that the civil procedure is a social relationship regulated by the norms of civil procedural law. The subject of this relationship is, on the one hand, the jurisdictional body that resolves the civil case, and on the other hand, the parties to a civil trial. The content of this legal relationship is the behavior of its subjects that is clothed in in the form of procedural powers, subjective, procedural rights and obligations. V.N. Shcheglov paid attention to a broad understanding of civil procedure and the subject of civil procedural law; whether civil procedure is only a trial of civil cases or any jurisdictional procedure aimed at protecting civil rights. V.N. Shcheglov and Professor N.B. Zeider concluded that the nature of the procedure is determined not by the body resolving the case, but by the nature (branch affiliation) of legal relations that are the subject of consideration within the framework of a particular procedural form. Therefore, civil procedural law regulates the procedural relations that develop in adjudication of civil cases by various jurisdictional bodies (a broad understanding of the subject of civil procedural law). The author declares no conflicts of interests.

The following study constitutes a historical outline of the evolution of Romanian civil procedure in the period between 1918 and 2013 from the perspective of the norms applicable in Transylvania as part of Romania. Romanian civil procedure in the period immediately after 1918 presented a diverse picture, with several procedural regimes applicable in the same country at the same time. This raised the necessity of unifying procedural norms, at first attempted by recodification and later accomplished by the extension of the Code of Civil Procedure of the Kingdom of Romania to Transylvania in 1943. As the Soviet-type totalitarian regime was consolidated in the late 1940s, a reform (much rather a recodification) of civil procedure occurred in the new spirit of the age, which, along with subsequent norms led to the reduction of judicial remedies and the introduction of a ‘lay element’ into the process by the presence of assessors, and it also increased the role of public prosecutors during the civil trial. Following the 1989 regime change, civil procedure in Romania at first, before a comprehensive reform, reverted to historical models, and then finally recodification was achieved.

Proving civil cases involving electronic documents and information electronic evidence which is now legalized has become electronic evidence that can be trusted (legitimate) and has been regulated in Article 1866 of the Civil Code in conjunction with Article 184 HIR in conjunction with Article 5 paragraph (1) and paragraph (2) Law Number 11 of 2008 concerning ITE. Panel of Judges in assess whether electronic information is Electronic Evidence valid based on a digital forensic assessment. Even though it is related to assessment procedures electronic evidence using digital forensics is regulated in the ITE Law and Law others, but in civil trial practice the method is not necessarily used digital forensics because there are technical obstacles. Additionally, Law Civil Procedure in Indonesia has not improved specifically regarding electronic evidence in civil evidence. So there is no procedure that regulates how how to present electronic evidence in civil trials. Without it yet This regulation actually results in legal uncertainty regarding the procedures These electronic devices are shown in civil trials. Given that there are obstacles in judicial practice, the State must immediately carry out reforms Civil Procedure Law in Indonesia regarding electronic evidence, can do this renewal of the evidence system to accommodate developments in evidence electronic documents submitted by the parties during the trial.

The Disappearing Civil Trial: Implications for the Future of Law Practice

Providing the reasons for judgments is a highly important part of the court’s judicial practice. Two distinct ways of providing the rationale for judgment by a judge can be distinguished in the Polish civil procedure, namely a statement of reasons for judgment and providing explanation of the underlying rationale for the judgement (which is often referred to as ‘verbal summary reasons for judgment’). This latter form has been significantly modified by the amendment of the Polish Code of Civil Procedure, which came into effect on 7 November 2019. Under this amendment, the rule that a written statement of reasons for judgment delivered at closed court hearings is to be provided was modified and the written statement of reasons have been replaced with writtensummary reasons for judgment. It resulted in a growing importance of this form of judicial rationale for the judgment. This article describes the current status of the summary reasons for judgmentin the Polish civil procedure. The author describes their specific features that distinguish summary reasons for judgmentfrom the statement of reasons for judgment and attempts to set down the requirementswhich they have to meet under the current law.

The dynamic development of information technology poses new challenges for the judiciary but also opens up opportunities to modernize existing procedures. One of the key areas of these transformations is the electronic form of service of court documents in civil proceedings. The article analyses the latest legislative changes that fundamentally transform the way documents are served by courts, parties and attorneys. The author attempts to answer questions about the scope, effectiveness and legal consequences of electronic service, pointing out both its potential to streamline proceedings and the inadequacies that can have serious procedural consequences. Particular emphasis is placed on analysing the timing of service, the relationship between technical delivery and legal effect, and the compatibility of the new solutions with the principle of due process. The article attempts to assess whether digital technologies are capable of replacing traditional forms of service, and identifies areas that require further legislative and interpretative work. The text will be of interest to both legal theorists and practitioners seeking an answer to the question of how to safely and effectively implement digital solutions in the civil procedure.

Polish civil procedural law is still the subject of numerous legislative changes. Only in recent years the Code of Civil Procedure has been amended over 30 times. These changes resulted from various reasons. Firstly, from the need of implementation of EU procedural law. Secondly, they were the result of the introduction of provisions aimed at adapting the code to modern technologies. Thirdly, changes aimed at speeding up the hearing of a civil case and at introducing some instruments to strengthen the protection of public interest in judicial proceedings. This article focuses on three selected examples and presents the discussion of the disputable issues that they have already arisen. Firstly, the topic of electronic process activities. It presents electronic pleadings, electronic delivery in trial, electronic judicial protocol and the possibility of presenting grounds of judgment in electronic form. Secondly, the new institution of a judgement rendered at closed session (in camera) was discussed. Thirdly, the article describes a new extraordinary complaint against final judgement, which can challenge any !nal judgment of a common court as a result of a prosecutor’s or other public-interest entity’s initiative.

The possibility to use sources and techniques of electronic communication in Polish civil procedure has been in force since January 1st, 2010, which is since the amendment to the Code of Civil Procedure was passed. The amendment involves the introduction of a new manner of conducting legal action which is electronic proceedings by writ of payment based on the plaintiff’s statement.

The paper deals with problems connected with the premises conditioning the acceptance of a cessation appeal by the Supreme Court, in particular the interpretation and practical use of article 3989 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In the first place, a legal institution called a “przedsąd”, a first stage of the process of examining a cessation appeal by the Supreme Court, is briefly summarized. Subsequently, the author explains questions common to all the premises regulated by article 3989 of the Code of Civil Procedure and the connection between those premises and the grounds for a cessation appeal. Next, the author proceeds to interpret the premises governed by article 3989 of the Code of Civil Procedure and explains how they are put into practice. The last part of the paper contains the author’s conclusions: the premises are strongly connected with the public interest and the development of law; putting them into practice demands a lot of work, even from lawyers.