IN DEFENCE OF CLASSICAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

For Kant and many modern cosmopolitans, establishing the rule of law provides the chief mechanism for achieving a just global order. Yet, as Hart and Rawls have argued, the rule of law, as it is commonly understood, is quite consistent with “great iniquities.” This criticism does not apply to a sufficiently robust, republican conception of the rule of law, which attributes a basic legal status to all persons. Accordingly, the pervasiveness of dominated persons without legal status is a a fundamental violation of the rule of law. This legal status can be understood in Kant's sense as an original “right to freedom,” one that is not derived from or acquired by membership in a community or from citizenship. The realization of this kind of legal status can already be found in the “cosmopolitan constitutions” of many democracies, which include rights of persons (and not just citizens) to habeas corpus and other statuses that protect those vulnerable to domination. In order that all persons have the appropriate institutional space within which to exercise the powers of persons to address and make claims, institutions such as human rights courts to which those who lack legal status can appeal and be recognized are necessary for a form of the rule of law that is adequate to current circumstances.

Introduction. The term “legal state” can be found in numerous international and national legal instruments, as well as in the works of contemporary scholars and scholars of previous generations. This word combination is widely used by politicians and lawyers. Its various applications dictate the need for a definition of the essence of the “rule of law” and its manifestations. Theoretical Basis. Methods. From the position of scientifically grounded concept of integrative legal understanding, according to which only principles and norms of law contained in a single, multilevel and developing system of national and international law forms implemented in the state, the article concludes that it is theoretically debatable that in the special literature, international and national legal documents and legal acts two separate concepts of “rule of law” and “legal state” exist. Results. The notion of the rule of law has a long history of development. In the relevant context, the concept appeared as early as in the writings of Plato and Aristotle. At present, there are also many scientific works devoted to the study of this issue, which is still relevant. The article analyses the notion of the “rule of law” from the perspective of legal positivism as well as the scientifically grounded and scientifically debatable concept of integrative legal understanding. Based on the results of the study, the author concludes that the concept of “the rule of law” has evolved in different historical epochs under the influence of social, economic factors, emerging scientific views, but is still incomplete. From the perspective of the scientifically based concept of an integrative legal understanding, the author believes that it is theoretically more reasonable to view the rule of law as the goal of regulating legal relations in a legal state, self-limited not only by “internal” law, but also limited by “external” law. Discussion and Conclusion. Concepts of the rule of law according to the types of legal understanding of the researchers can be classified into concepts developed on the basis of: legal positivism (‘thin’ concepts; scientifically debatable concepts of integrative legal understanding, arguably synthesising both the right and the wrong); scientifically substantiated concepts of integrative legal understanding. According to the latter approach, a valid legal state is not only self-limited by “internal” law, but is also limited by “external” law, and theoretically more precisely by the principles and norms of law contained in a single, evolving and multilevel system of national and international law forms.

The article defines the concept of the principle of the rule of law both in the narrow and broad sense. In the narrow sense, the principle of the rule of law is understood as the rule of law over legislation, and in the broad sense - as the rule of law over the state, state arbitrariness. Different approaches to disclosing the content of the principle of the rule of law in national and European legal doctrines are systematized. The lack of a single generally accepted concept of the principle of "rule of law" is emphasized. The decisions of the European Court of Human Rights are analyzed; attention is focused on their interpretation of the rule of law. The realization of the principle of the rule of law, primarily presupposes the domination of inalienable and inviolable human rights and freedoms over the political power of the state, and also requires quality laws and observance of the principle of legal certainty. The interpretation of the principle of the rule of law in the decisions of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine is considered. The CCU emphasizes that the rule of law is first and foremost the "rule of law in society"; characterizes the principle, linking it to the ideas of social justice, freedom and equality, without which it is impossible to imagine true human development and existence. The Constitutional Court calls justice as one of the basic principles of law, which is crucial in defining it as a regulator of social relations, one of the universal dimensions of law. Examples of application of the rule of law in the practice of the Supreme Court of Ukraine are given. Judges not only make a formal reference to the rule of law, but also try to analyze and disclose the content of its constituent elements (requirements) within a specific legal case. The main problems that hinder the effective implementation and realization of the rule of law in judicial practice are identified, namely - the lack of proper regulation and official interpretation; low quality of laws and legislative process; excessive number of conflicting laws; low level of legal awareness and legal culture of Ukrainian society, and early stage of civil society development in Ukraine. It is concluded that the rule of law is a principle whose main content is expressed in the following aspects: ensuring the rule of law over political power; subordination of state institutions to the needs of human rights protection and ensuring their implementation; priority of these rights over all other values of democratic, social, and legal state; preventing the manifestation of arbitrariness of state power, as well as ensuring compliance with the requirements of justice.

The rule of law is in crisis. The crisis’ epicenter is in Iraq and Syria, but it also sends shockwaves into the international legal order and in national legal systems further afield. The crisis escalates rule of law challenges from the initial ‘war on terror’ after the attacks in the United States on 11 September 2001. These challenges are direct insofar as organizations such as Al-Qaida or Islamic State reject the existing system of government at national and international levels. The challenges are indirect insofar as the reaction of the international community may itself undermine the rule of law. The first part of this paper gives an account of the rule of law. It describes three dimensions of the rule of law: the existence of a state of legality; the adherence to modal principles of legality; and the promotion of a culture of legality. Each of the three dimensions is useful to assess the rule of law in a given jurisdiction and to consider direct and indirect challenges. The second, third, and fourth parts of the paper set out the ways in which the rise of Islamic State, and the UN Security Council response, pose challenges to the rule of law. In direct terms, Islamic State’s seizure of territory challenges the existence of the (national) state of legality in Iraq and Syria and also the international state of legality in the Middle East. In indirect terms, the UN Security Council response does not respect the modal principles of legality that constitute the second dimension of the rule of law. Two principles illustrate the point: that laws should be clear and understandable; and that they should reflect natural justice. The culture of legality in and across states may also come under challenge in both direct and indirect ways as a result of action by Islamic State and by the UN Security Council. A full assessment of this final challenge would require a lengthier examination of legal culture than is possible here. On this point, therefore, the paper merely postulates the challenge for further exploration. The paper’s conclusion is that the escalation of the crisis caused by Islamic State renders vulnerable the stabilization of collective power to which the rule of law is central. This potential destabilization requires us to consider the fragility of the rule of law in the ‘wars on terror’ in the twenty-first century. The prospective longevity of current conflicts on cultural, ideological, and religious grounds may reverse the narratives of progression in national law and in international law and relations since World War II. The danger is not of a return to anarchy but to a state in which the law serves to legitimize exercises of power but does little to constrain that power.

The subject of the study is historical method of interpretation in law, its capacities and types. Despite the recognition of historical interpretation by legal science, there are no specialized works and there is no consensus on the content of this method of interpretation. Historical interpretation is considered both as an interpretation based on a previous rule of law, as an interpretation considering the conditions for the adoption of the norm, and as an interpretation based on the practice of applying the interpreted norm.The purpose of the study is to substantiate the authors' hypothesis that historical interpretation in law is an intellectual activity that involves clarifying the content of a legal prescription, achieved based on identifying legal and non-legal factors that both precede the creation of the norm and accompany its adoption. In addition, the authors set the task to identify those factors that should be taken into account in historical interpretation, as well as to classify the types of historical interpretation. The analysis of historical interpretation is made using scientific methods: induction and deduction, formal legal, comparative legal synchronous and diachronic methods.The main results, scope of application. Historical interpretation considers political, economic, social, and legal factors. Legal factors include the rules of law that preceded the interpreted norm, repealed acts, official and unofficial documents of law-making entities, draft laws, acts and the norms contained therein that accompanied the interpreted regulation, i.e. were adopted simultaneously with the interpreted norm, as well as other factors, such as the level of development of legal science and legal technique.The authors suppose that historical interpretation cannot be considered as a homogeneous way of interpretation. In reality, the historical interpretation in law can be carried out using different techniques and methods, in relation to heterogeneous legal prescriptions, and carried out by subjects with different legal status. Therefore, several grounds for classifyinghistorical interpretation are proposed. First, it is a classification that considers the connection of historical interpretation with the other ways of interpretation. According to this criterion, it is possible to divide it into a proper historical and a complex historical interpretation. Complex historical interpretation includes historical-systematic, historical-functional, historical-teleological, historical-legal, and historical-linguistic interpretation. Second, the basis may be the sources of law that contain the rules of law. On this basis, historical interpretation is divided into the interpretation of prescriptions of normative legal acts, legal customs, normative contracts, etc. Third, it is possible to classify the historical interpretation, depending on whether the rule of law is valid or not, into the historical interpretation of the rules that have lost their legal force and the historical interpretation of the rules of the current law. The latter, in its turn, is divided into the interpretation of the current legal norms of the current content and those legal norms that have not lost their force but are outdated in content. The fourth classification is based on subjects and includes historical official interpretation and historical unofficial interpretation.Conclusions. Correct approach to the concept and process of historical interpretation of the content of legal norms, as well as the choice of the type of historical interpretation helps in law enforcement, allows you to put forward scientific hypotheses, predict the further development of law based on historical knowledge of the interpreted norm, assess the possibility of reviving canceled acts in recurring socio-economic and political-legal situations.

Relevance of the study is caused by the often usage of the term «legal state» at the modern stage of the development of our society. With this some authors refer to the desire to emphasize that declaring itself as sovereign and independent Ukraine become at the same time the legal state and the other authors want to prove that the construction of such state is a matter for the longer term. Due to the article 1 of Constitution of our state, Ukraine is a sovereign, independent, democratic, social, legal state. But the realities of today clearly demonstrate that it is only a declaration. Ukraine is not a law-governed state, since it needs to overcome the number of problems that prevent it from being law-governed. Formation of legal state in Ukraine is extremely difficult multifaceted process that includes not only formation of the authority structures that are able to ensure the compliance with the law and citizens’ rights but also the availability of a wide range of political parties and movements, social groups and strata with specific interests particularly in legal, political, social, economic behavior. Legal state is such a sovereign state that functions in the civil society and where by legal means the real protection of fundamental rights and freedoms of man and citizen are provided. It is based on the certain principles, the most important of which is the rule of law, separation of powers, the reality of the rights and freedoms of man and citizen, legality, the presence of high legal culture of citizens. Overcoming the deformation of legal consciousness and creation of condi- tions for improving of legal culture of population, active and conscious participation of citizens in the implementation of reforms today are the primary tasks of society and the state towards the development of civil society and legal state in Ukraine. Keywords: law, positive law, natural law, society, rule of law, legal environment, interpretation of law, sovereign state, Ukraine.

I INTRODUCTION In common-law legal orders, public power is supposed to be exercised in accordance with the rule of law. Administrative law, the law that governs the exercise of power by public officials, is the body of rules and principles developed by judges to ensure that when public officials act, they act in accordance with the rule of law. Severe tensions can arise within the common-law understanding of administrative law when a legislature enacts a law that meets the legal order's formal criteria for validity, yet purports to exempt officials from the requirements of the rule of law. If those officials' decisions are challenged before a court, should the court declare them invalid simply on the basis that they fail to accord with the rule of law? Judges who adopt positivistic theories of law will generally answer no to this question, while judges of a more natural law bent will tend to answer yes. The former will determine a law's validity based only on the criteria explicitly set out in the positive law of their order, while the latter will think that there is more to the question than positive law--namely, the transcendent moral values of the rule of law. Although judges of a natural-law bent will likely appreciate the tensions better than positivistically inclined judges, a more sophisticated response to the problem is available than one that simply reduces it to a question of whether a law offensive to the rule of law is or is not a law. That response presupposes a natural-law understanding of the rule of law, one which holds that the value content of the rule of law transcends what any formal source of law declares the law to be. However, such a response does not require that a law is always invalid when it fails to comply with the values of the rule of law. Rather, all it requires is that the tensions created by such a law are understood as tensions internal to legal order, tensions which must be resolved in order for that legal order to sustain its claim to be such--an order constituted by law. Thus, judges are not necessarily always able or even often best suited to resolve such tensions. An exploration of this response begins with an account of how judges in common-law legal orders have found the norms of international law, in particular international human rights law, helpful in elaborating their understanding of their role in upholding the rule of law. Indeed, international human rights law has helped greatly to clarify the idea of the rule of law on which the judges rely, both in terms of the interactions among its components and the assumptions that hold it together. Judges have found international law particularly useful in ensuring that the rule of law is respected in an area in which traditionally positivistic judges have deemed the rule of law inapplicable--namely, in the exercise of public power, which is based, not on law, but on the prerogative of the executive to deal with immigration and national security as it sees fit. Natural-law judges have been amenable to the influence of international law because their understanding of law and the rule of law rejects positivistic assumptions that lead to the marginalization of international law, even to its very claim to be law. However, international legal bodies have proven capable of introducing the same sorts of tensions--tensions often created in the areas of national security and immigration. One might say that these natural law judges, working within the common law tradition, have paid international law the compliment of not only recognizing its claim to be law, but also of considering it to be constitutive of their understanding of the rule of law or legality, so that public officials must comply with international law if they are to abide by the rule of law. Thus, it is incumbent on the international bodies charged with making decisions affecting the interests of individuals subject to their legal regimes to repay the compliment. …

The concept of legitimacy has a dual meaning: it is both the form of supreme power of the state and the justification of that power. Max Weber distinguishes three types of legitimate authority: traditional authority, charismatic authority, and the rational-legal authority. The prevailing form of power in the modern world is the third type of legitimate authority, which is reflected in the concept of 'the legal state' or 'the rule of law rather than the rule of people'. In that regard, the rational-legal authority is based on Jean-Jacques Rousseau's idea on law as the expression of the 'general will'. This idea was introduced into the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen (1789): 'Law is the expression of the general will. Every citizen has a right to participate, personally or through his representatives, in its foundation. It must be the same for all, whether it protects or punishes...' Consequently, except for the entire body of citizens (referendum legislation) and their representatives (parliamentary legislation), all other state authorities emerge as the holders of the particular will. In this original article, the author lays down the theoretical standpoint that 'the general will' is in fact a totality of (normative) legal principles. Today, the institution of a constitutional court (or some other equivalent institution) is recognized in almost all legislations of the European-Continental legal tradition falling into the Roman-Germanic-Slavic legal family. There is no dispute on whether such an institution may examine the compliance of by-laws with the Constitution and the applicable law because, in that case, the holder of one particular will controls the holder of another particular will. However, it is disputable whether the constitutional court, as the holder of particular will (and the only administrative authority whose members are selected by the legislature), may invalidate the laws which it considers to be unconstitutional because, in that case, one particular will rises above the general will. According to Rousseau, this is despotism, which is indisputably a form of illegitimate power. Yet, law need not necessarily be the expression of the general will. Rousseau clearly distinguishes between man as an individual (who is a holder of the particular will and the citizen (who is a holder of the general will). Thus, we cannot rule out the possibility that these particular wills may exercise different forms of oppression over the general will, under the shroud of law. Rousseau does not explicitly propose the solution for such a state of affairs but merely points out that the holders of the particular will 'shall be forced to be free'. This raises the question of the right to resist oppression. This right was a much debated issue at the turn of the Middle Ages and the New Age. The leading proponents of political philosophy, Monarchomachs and John Locke consider that this right does not belong either to an individual or to the masses of common people but to the nations organized in corporations. The ultimate message in this paper is the need for the revival of corporations as the holders of the right to resist oppression, in the best tradition of Roman tribunes and Spartan ephors. The addendum deals with the 'external legitimacy' of church authorities which entails their recognition by the state as an essential presumption for the existence of Church Law; in that context, the author elaborates on different types of relations between the state and the Church.

Relevance of the paper. One of the most important classifications of regulatory acts is their classification according to legal force. It is legal force of the legal act that determines the place it occupies in the hierarchical (vertical) structure of the current legislation. According to Article 1 of the Constitution of Ukraine, Ukraine is a social and legal state. Back in 2001, the Constitutional Court of Ukraine clearly stated: "... in a legal state there is a strict hierarchy of regulatory acts ...", but until now the hierarchy of regulatory acts is not legally established. Besides, between the separate laws of Ukraine, including those defining the status and powers of the public administration bodies, there is inconsistency regarding their place according to their legal force. There is no consensus on this issue in the scientific literature. It negatively affects the state of law in the state. Consequently, the relevance of this article is conditioned by the existing collisions in the legislation of Ukraine regarding the hierarchy of regulatory acts.The purpose of the article is the study of the current state of the hierarchical place of regulatory acts in the current legislation of Ukraine, the identification of collisions in it and the justification of proposals for their elimination.Body of the paper. Most Ukrainian scholars insist that the codes have the same legal force as the laws. However, some Ukrainian codes, in particular the Civil Code of Ukraine, the Budget Code of Ukraine, contain articles about their higher legal force. However, there are no such norms in other codes of Ukraine, therefore it should be noted: it can not be that in one branch of law the codified law has a higher legal force, and in the other it has not. Consequently, the issue of the legal force of codified and un-codified laws requires legislative regulation.The question arises as to the legal force of the resolutions of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine and the decrees of the President of Ukraine (that is resolutions of the Parliament and decrees of the President of Ukraine of elusively regulatory nature). For example, in Article 113 of the Constitution of Ukraine, the Law of Ukraine "On the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine" the preference is given to the resolutions of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, but in the Law of Ukraine "On Civil Service", on the contrary - to the decrees of the President of Ukraine.Conclusions. Until now, neither the Constitution of Ukraine nor other legislative acts define the hierarchy of certain regulatory acts, and therefore the scientific literature raises justified questions regarding their legal force. The current laws of Ukraine regulating the activities of public authorities solve these issues differently. And in law enforcement activities, including the issues on resolving litigation, the key role is played by subjectivity of a law enforcer. Eliminating this gap is possible only in one way that is by adopting the Law of Ukraine "On Regulatory Acts", which, among other issues, should clearly define the hierarchy of regulatory acts.

The action of a taxpayer when trusting in information concerning the content and interpretation of tax law obtained from tax authorities – between the constitutional principle of legalism and the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations

The aim of this paper is to establish freedom as an embracing concept of the legal state and the rule of law. At times, especially by positivist scholars on the continent and i.e. Dicey in England, ‘legal state’ and ‘rule of law’ have been interpreted as seemingly antagonistic conceptions. If a broader concept of law is applied, the opposition between the two principles can be overcome. From this philosophical point of view they can be understood as two formulations of a common goal, distinct in some results and institutional settings, but united in a core value. For this purpose I understand law as a system of norms the enactment and enforcement of which is organized by procedures, which are themselves subject to norms. Because of this structure, law addresses freedom and is at the same time an expression of freedom. As a norm, law addresses freedom by directing the choice between alternative actions; these norms open and limit areas for the enactment, adjudication and enforcement of norms and actions. Accordingly, the principle of the legal state and the rule of law base public authority on legal freedom. Both principles can thereby be intrinsically connected to democracy. Against the narrative of antagonistic principles, my article will sketch how the development of the concept of the legal state is heavily indebted to the rule of law and has only towards the end of the nineteenth century gone a separate path.KeywordsSupra NoteLegal StateSecurity ModelLegal OrderLegal NormThese keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Legal state and the Rule of law are terms created in the 19th century. Nevertheless, legal writers researched the origins of individual elements of these theories studying preserved texts from the oldest period of human civilisation. The authors represent the beginning of idea of legal state and the rule of law and the major elements of developed theories in the 19th and the 20th century. In addition, the authors point out some of the modern challenges that the legal state and the rule of law are faced to, thus acquires rounded picture about transformation of those terms, from the basic idea to the modern theories. Finally, the authors indicates some of the possible tendencies in further development of legal state and the rule of law.

In November 2014, the Obama administration announced the Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents (DAPA) initiative, which built upon a program instituted two years earlier, the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) initiative. As mechanisms to channel the government’s scarce resources toward its enforcement priorities more efficiently and effectively, both DACA and DAPA permit certain individuals falling outside those priorities to seek “deferred action,” which provides its recipients with time-limited, nonbinding, and revocable notification that officials have exercised prosecutorial discretion to deprioritize their removal. While deferred action thereby facilitates a highly tenuous form of quasi-legal recognition for its recipients, it does not provide legal immigration status. Accordingly, the two initiatives are not an equivalent substitute for legislative reform proposals that would create a pathway to durable legal status for a much larger number of individuals. Nevertheless, critics have accused the Obama administration of imposing by decree precisely that which Congress has declined to authorize by statute: namely, legalization of noncitizens who lack lawful immigration status. In this Article, I critically examine those assertions and develop a rationale for the deferred action initiatives, anchored in rule of law values, that has received no meaningful attention in recent debates about DACA and DAPA. As the decision by U.S. District Judge Andrew S. Hanen enjoining those initiatives illustrates, legal discourse has mirrored and reinforced the same incorrect claims about deferred action that circulate in anti-immigration political discourse. Like the Obama administration’s political critics, Judge Hanen repeatedly mischaracterizes the initiatives as providing “legal status” and, on that basis, flays the Obama administration for “total[ly] abdicat[ing]” immigration enforcement. These conclusions ultimately amount to what I describe elsewhere as “judicial truthiness,” highlighting an erosion of the conventional lines between litigation, adjudication, and public discourse in politically salient cases more generally.The flawed discourse surrounding DACA and DAPA underscores the need for a more careful assessment of the complex relationships between enforcement priorities, prosecutorial discretion, and the rule of law in an era of mass deportation. The blunt and distorted nature of that discourse, however, in turn has distorted the substantive analysis of those relationships. As the scale of the expansive and fragmented immigration enforcement regime has grown to such enormous levels — making the interrelated challenges of ensuring consistent execution of the law and fidelity to enforcement priorities more formidable — the need for effective mechanisms to supervise the discretion exercised by rank-and-file officials has only grown more important. But even as it purports to respect the government’s enforcement priorities, the logic of Judge Hanen’s ruling would largely disable policymaking officials from implementing such mechanisms, requiring them instead to let the vagaries of the bureaucracy reign supreme. The decision therefore not only inhibits the agency’s ability to establish enforcement priorities and manage its scarce resources, but also fails to acknowledge the importance of rule of law values such as consistency, transparency, accountability, and nonarbitrariness in the execution of the immigration laws.

The medieval systems of law in Italy and Europe have been proposed as a sort of virtual laboratory to deal with the issue of ensuring that the principle of equality in the rule of law be compatible with the recognition of indigenous peoples’ customs. The legal framework of the medieval communes sought to strike a balance between the general interest in having legal certainty and uniformity with the citizens’ interest in ruling their family life and economic assets according to their cultural and social values. Up until the 14th century, in Lombardy an individual’s legal status, family and inheritance continued to be ruled according to the customs of the individual’s natio, be they Lombard or Roman. The ascertainment of customs is an arduous task, as oral customs are fluid and vary from place to place and from family to family. For this reason, in the Middle Ages ascertainment was always entrusted to judges and legal experts (sapientes). Until a few decades ago, recognising and enforcing customs was mostly unthinkable due to legal positivism and the principle of equality. Now, however, the limits of the principle of legal equality are well known: »Legal positivism was not able to abolish status« (G. Alpa). The recognition of »legal Indigenous status« provides continuity between the past (the Middle Ages) and present (Indigenous Peoples Basic Law). Just as in the past, when living according to a given natio’s laws and customs did not mean self-government, so today the enforcement of an indigenous peoples’ basic law should not undermine the sovereignty of the State.

idea in these lectures is to discuss relation between and rule of law in a deeper way than this has been discussed in past, in particular in a way that reflects realistic understanding of how rights are created and modified. I use Lockean phrase the measure of property but gist of my argument will be that our thinking about rule of law needs to focus on all ways in which is non-Lockean in its origin, legal status, and moral force. In course of doing this, I will be looking at some of rather naive assumptions underlying tight connection that has been forged between rights and rule of law in neo-liberal political economy. And I will argue that we can abandon or modify some of these naive assumptions about without compromising very great importance that is properly attached to ideal of rule of law. There are three lectures in all. Unfortunately original lecture titles are not a good indication of eventual contents. Lecture 1 was called The Classical Lockean Picture and its Difficulties and it mainly addresses alleged contrast between (a) rule of law and (b) rule by law, and suggestion that rights might be privileged under (a). It explores Richard Epstein's version of this idea and then it spends some time on Lockean account of property. argument is that in real world even Lockean has an inescapable public law dimension. Lecture 2 was called Unraveling Form and Substance of but it is really about contrast between formal/procedural and substantive views of rule of law and dificulties inherent in identifying respect for private rights as a substantive dimension of rule of law. argument is that given accordion-like expandability of category of property, this cannot work to privilege rights over other legal rights etc. Lecture 3 was called The Rule of Law, Property, and Legislation and it is a defense of legislation, including regulatory and redistributive legislation in light of rule of law. Readers should note that although I spend a lot of time discussing fact situation in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992), these lectures are not lectures in American constitutional law, nor do they aim to build pathways through swamp of US takings jurisprudence.