Improving public health in the ASEAN

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has been hailed as one of the more successful regional organisations in the developing world, credited for maintaining regional peace and stabilit...

The role that peer pressure plays in efforts by member nations of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in socializing a reluctant or recalcitrant member(s) toward a diplomatic posture or policy position has been noted but not systematically addressed in the existing literature. Given that the decision-making in ASEAN has traditionally been a consensus-based, political suasion is therefore the key modality through which ASEAN members develop shared perspectives and, where possible, ensure collective assent to an existing or emerging norm or position. Peer pressure is likely the only means available for ASEAN states to promote 'voluntary compliance' without contravening their institution's non-interference principle. Three historical developments are examined: Indonesia and the formation of ASEAN, the establishment of the ASEAN Charter,

Severino (2011) usefully informs us about what processes and issues the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has come through to promote regional economic cooperation and what obstacles ASEAN has to overcome in the process toward the establishment of the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) in 2015. Severino succinctly describes a constellation of ASEAN economic cooperation schemes with concise explanations. His paper will serve as a useful historical guide in this field. This is an important exercise since evaluations of ASEAN's role in regional cooperation, including regional integration in a wider East Asia, are starkly divided among international relations specialists. Sound empirical research on ASEAN's effort to accomplish the AEC is required. One of the most controversial debates regarding ASEAN cooperation has evolved around the so-called ASEAN Way, its guiding principle which informally stipulates nonintervention, nonbinding, and consensus-based decision-making approaches to regional cooperation. For instance, the ASEAN Way is considered to be an impediment to a high level of regional institutionalization because it tends to avoid transnational cooperation which often requires the imposition of regulations and obligations on each state. The ASEAN Way is mainly applied to the political and security fields, but the basic elements can also be identified even in the economic field. Regional integration through Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) which involve legally binding provisions for the reciprocal exchange of preferences that discriminate against nonpartner countries is inharmonious with the ASEAN Way. It seems that a mismatch between ASEAN norms and economic integration practices has hindered the further institutionalization of ASEAN economic cooperation, something which Severino (2011) explains in a great deal of detail. One of the most important issues Severino raises concerns ASEAN's cooperation with external larger states and its role in a wider regional integration framework. This is because what has sustained ASEAN's need for the further promotion of integration schemes to accomplish economic growth is the need to secure external markets and elicit wider economic cooperation from larger extraregional states, rather than just sharing the benefits to be accrued from intraregional cooperation. In effect, nearly 80% of ASEAN's trade has been with non-ASEAN countries, and the exports of Indonesia and the Philippines to the ASEAN region are less than 10% and 6%, respectively, of their total exports, while the combined population of these two nations account for nearly 60% of the ASEAN total. Furthermore, 90% of foreign direct investment (FDI) has been from non-ASEAN economies. Although Severino consistently asserts that ASEAN has kept the major powers engaged in East Asia with itself as the hub and core, through the ASEAN Plus Three (ASEAN+3), FTAs, or the East Asia Summit (EAS), a step toward the commencement of negotiations of an East Asia FTA, be it ASEAN+3 or ASEAN Plus Six (ASEAN+6), depends on ASEAN's willingness to move beyond this framework. ASEAN's reluctance to move trade liberalization by itself, or perhaps its inability to take the political initiative toward wider regional integration as a unified player, can be found in the fact that it has never proposed an FTA to any of those “+1” partners. ASEAN as a loose group of relatively small economies inevitably depends on external economies for its growth through FDI and exports, but a view that its institutional significance would be diminished if a larger arrangement such as an East Asian FTA developed rapidly is ASEAN's major dilemma. The lack of willingness and capability on the part of ASEAN would be a major obstacle to the establishment of region-wide integration in East Asia, so the conclusion that ASEAN+1 FTAs would “serve as building blocks for freer trade in goods and services and for investment liberalization and facilitation in the region and in the world” (Severino, 2011, p. 30) needs further exploration. A major factor that has made it possible for ASEAN to host the ASEAN+3 Summits, an event which is often cited to validate ASEAN's greater role in East Asia, is competition between China and Japan because both regional powers, strongly suspicious of each other's initiatives, tended to have strong incentives to drive ASEAN to side with either of them. They avoided engaging in full-scale completion for regional hegemony, and what they tried to do was to attract ASEAN to their side through the financial support for ASEAN's integration effort, as a prerequisite for East Asian integration. In fact, despite the positive evaluations of expanded ASEAN machinery to socialize East Asia with the same norms and values that ASEAN has developed, it is still difficult to discern any official statement which clearly delineates what ASEAN actually does in this context (Jones & Smith, 2007). Now that trilateral cooperation among China, Japan, and Korea has started to flourish with the growth of trans- and intragovernmental networks, and that the negotiations for a trilateral investment treaty are almost complete and a feasibility study report for the trilateral FTA is expected to be submitted to the 2012 Summit, the establishment of an AEC by 2015 is ASEAN's urgent need. Yet, Severino (2011) demonstrates that ASEAN will face a thorny process to achieve this aim.

This article serves as a potential departure point for the ASEAN Inter-parliamentary Organization (AIPO) to better come to terms with the increasingly important process of economic integration in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). As ASEAN prospects for regional integration are gaining momentum in the areas of trade and investment, it is important to see how the ASEAN legislative and institutional framework could respond to such a progress of ASEAN economic integration and how AIPO could play its role in the regional development and integration process. In a world of increasing interdependence among nations, international co-operation and integration have gained strong momentum, and the need to pay special attention to regional groupings has arisen. This has raised important questions not only about the projects of ASEAN economic integration, but also about the contribution of the ASEAN Inter-parliamentary Organization (AIPO) to ASEAN's development. This article serves as a potential departure point for AIPO to start engaging itself with the process of trade liberalization and economic co-operation within ASEAN by developing its own modalities with future legal developments within the grouping. AIPO was formed on 2 September 1977 by the Parliaments of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. Its membership has now expanded to include the National Assemblies of Vietnam and Lao PDR. The aims and purposes of AIPO as stipulated in its statutes were: 1. To promote closer inter-parliamentary cooperation among the Parliaments of ASEAN member countries and closer contacts and understanding among their members; 2. To facilitate the achievement of the goals of the ASEAN as constituted in the ASEAN Declaration of August 1967 made in Bangkok, Thailand; 3. To study, discuss and suggest solutions to problems of common interest; and 4. To keep all the AIPO member Parliaments informed of steps taken and progress achieved by each Parliament in realization of the aims and purposes of the AIPO. This study aims to recommend to AIPO and its ASEAN National Parliaments' Representatives how to effectively respond to the trend of increasing trade liberalization and economic co-operation within ASEAN as this process requires more co-operation on legal framework issues and commitments. It reviews past ASEAN economic achievements and outlines potential problems and policy implications for ASEAN legal commitments while concurrently examining the consistency of its institutional framework. The major emphasis is on the need for AIPO to pay greater attention to legal harmonization and coordination so that the success of the future ASEAN integration process is guaranteed. The article is divided into three major parts: the progress of ASEAN economic integration and cooperation from the past to present; the degree of ASEAN economic integration through its legal and institutional framework; and future issues and recommendations for AIPO as ways and means to further deepen and enlarge ASEAN integration. Progress of ASEAN Economic Integration The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) turned 30 years old on 8 August 1997. The grouping now embraces almost all nations of Southeast Asia, except Cambodia. The challenge is now open to ASEAN to transform Southeast Asia into a credible regional community of cooperative peace, shared prosperity and social and cultural enrichment. The pace towards further integration in ASEAN seems to have gained momentum in the past few years. This situation is in contrast to the pre-1990s when ASEAN was more apprehensive towards the integration idea and concentrated mainly on economic and political co-operation. At present, ASEAN leaders and policy-makers are feeling more at ease to talk and discuss deeper and wider integration. ASEAN is at the point where it must broaden its own horizons in order to keep up with rapid changes and increased competition in a global economy. …

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is the focal point for regional diplomacy and interstate governance in Southeast Asia. Since its foundation in 1967, the organization’s membership, institutional footprint, and mandate have expanded markedly. The now ten member states—Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam—and its professed ASEAN Community are engaged in an ever-expanding array of regional initiatives across political-security, economic, and sociocultural concerns. The organization is of growing importance for states beyond the region as well, given the region’s place within the wider “Indo-Pacific” region and ongoing tensions between the United States and China. The literature on diplomacy in ASEAN is vast and varied. Much material centers on the origins, evolution, and efficacy of ASEAN as a regional organization and its diplomatic principles and norms, the so-called ASEAN way. The literature surveyed here examines the institutional and normative context within which ASEAN diplomacy operates and highlights major contemporary issues in the study of ASEAN diplomacy. This article is structured in eleven sections. It begins with a series of general, canonical accounts of ASEAN diplomacy and governance. The second section highlights literature engaged in a debate over the efficacy and consequence of ASEAN and its diplomatic norms. The third section surveys literature that centers attention on a core element of the study of ASEAN diplomacy: the prospects of a security community in Southeast Asia. The fourth section surveys a growing and related literature that examines the practice and discourse in ASEAN diplomacy. The fifth section highlights literature that situates ASEAN diplomacy within the context of the institutions of the wider Asia-Pacific region, including the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), East Asian Summit (EAS), and ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting Plus (ADMM+). Section six focuses on regional peace and conflict management between ASEAN member states. The seventh section explores two additional intraregional issues: leadership in ASEAN and relations with the so-called CLMV states of Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam, with a focus on Myanmar. Section eight centers on track two diplomacy and the role of civil society organizations in regional diplomacy and governance. Section nine examines institutional evolution with a focus on the changing organizational and normative context of ASEAN diplomacy. Section ten highlights ASEAN-China relations with a focus on the diplomatic management of the South China Sea disputes. The final section surveys a growing literature that places ASEAN diplomacy and governance in a comparative context.

The attempt by Severino (2011) to cover the width and depth of the intriguing integration process in Southeast Asia over four decades merits serious attention. One can hardly disagree with the comprehensive description and crispy analysis by Severino, a former Secretary General of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Nevertheless, it will be useful to revisit some of the highlights and issues. ASEAN is unique. It was born in the heat of the Cold War driven primarily by security concerns emanating from communist threats. ASEAN was so loosely structured that the acronym was interpreted by some to read as "Ad-hoc Strategic Entity of Ambiguous Nature." Ambiguity turned out to be a virtue as it provided the flexibility, the absence of which the regional body might have aborted. ASEAN was wise enough to go for "consensus" by focusing on issues that would unite its members and steering away from contentious areas that would break up the fragile entity at the initial stage. From its inception in 1967 until the Bali Summit in 1976, ASEAN was seemingly dormant, but the hindsight shows that the first decade was not wasted, as it provided the space for its members to bury their hatchets and build confidence, trust, and understanding so that they could move on. The Bali Summit was a major milestone for ASEAN as it marked the end of the beginning and the dawn of a new era of economic cooperation, albeit on an extremely modest scale. The subsequent story was just one of "learning by doing" without any blueprint or road map, as manifested by the cumbersome "item-by-item" trade liberalization and clumsy industrial cooperation based on five mega projects. ASEAN had apparently put the cart before the horse by identifying the projects and the locations followed by feasibility studies. The projects were understandably shunned by the private sector. Lessons learned from this episode led ASEAN policymakers to work more closely with market forces. ASEAN was more successful in its external relations with major powers and trading partners, thanks mainly to the Cold War. The external support that ASEAN had received in its infancy was due not to its bargaining strengths but its inherent weaknesses and the importance the developed countries had attached to the region in geopolitical terms. The end of the Cold War was a rude awakening for ASEAN which had to reinvent itself to stay relevant not only for the rest of the world but also for its own sake. Consequently, the 1990s turned out to be very challenging. Understandably, ASEAN has largely been reactive, not proactive. It is commendable that ASEAN could respond to these challenges in a positive way by widening and deepening the regional integration, as demonstrated by the expansion of ASEAN from six to ten and the bold integration initiatives, which included ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), and the ASEAN Charter. It is also remarkable that these processes gathered momentum despite the 1997/1998 Asian financial crisis. The latter was a blessing in disguise as it underscored the need for regional arrangements. All is not well in ASEAN. It is doubtful if AEC will come to fruition by 2015 as planned. Community building calls for a single identity and a common destiny based on convergence of values and dreams, but there is still too much national pride and sovereignty. Business people tend to look at the region differently from policymakers. Things that seem too sacred to the latter in terms of national sovereignty are often seen as no more than obstacles by the former. The weakest link in the chain relates to the shallowness of financial integration. ASEAN has a long way to go before there can be meaningful macroeconomic policy consultation, cooperation, and collaboration, especially with respect to monetary, fiscal, and exchange rate management. ASEAN is too small to make a global impact: it is less than half of the size of China in terms of both population and purchasing power. The extensions through ASEAN+3 and East Asia Summit do help, but the centrality of ASEAN in the mosaic of concentric circles cannot be taken for granted. There are already signs that the center of gravity in East Asia is shifting from Southeast Asia to Northeast Asia. The huge development gap in ASEAN is also a cause for concern. The new members need a lot more help than what the older ones have provided thus far. In fact, the ASEAN efforts at reducing the intraregional development disparity pale miserably in comparison with the extraregional contributions. There is a need for a greater pooling and sharing of resources within ASEAN to close this gap. Finally, a reference must be made to the leadership crisis in ASEAN. Indonesia under Soeharto did play the "big brother" role in ASEAN. It is now obvious that there is a leadership vacuum which no member country is willing or able to fill. Indonesia is preoccupied with setting its own house in order. Thailand has no gumption in the face of domestic political turmoil. Singapore is too small to take the lead. Malaysia does not have the oomph or the charisma.

This article examines the efforts that have been made by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as an institution to deal with the Asian crisis. At the national level, member countries have taken steps to strengthen supervision of banks, foster great transparency in financial transactions, and promote competition. At the bilateral level, ASEAN members have extended assistance to the most affected countries, especially Indonesia. At the international level, ASEAN members have collectively appealed to the advanced countries to keep their markets open, to be more accommodating in the renegotiation of debt, and to remember to protect the poor in their reform programmes. The article traces ASEAN initiatives at successive meetings, but concludes that existing economic co-operation programmes need to be widened in scope and deepened in commitments. Introduction There appears to be a serious gap in perceptions between ASEAN officials and the public in and outside ASEAN on the efforts made by that institution to overcome the economic crisis that has affected all its members, albeit in varying degrees. Indonesia, Thailand and Malaysia have been hit hardest; Singapore and the Philippines to a much lesser extent. Yet, a prolonged and deep crisis in the severely affected regional economies will also pull down the growth rates in Singapore and the Philippines as has been evident since the beginning of 1998. Even countries such as Vietnam and Laos that are relatively more insulated are also affected by the economic slowdown in the region. Since the regional impact of the crisis is so pronounced, it would be logical to expect ASEAN to be in the forefront of regional and international responses to the crisis. In the public's view this is one of the most important reasons for having ASEAN and for promoting ASEAN economic co-operation. The public has been largely disappointed with ASEAN. Its perception is that of a helpless ASEAN, an ASEAN that cannot move decisively, an ASEAN that is trapped under its organizational and bureaucratic weight, and an ASEAN that fails to respond to real, current problems and challenges. Perhaps this public perception has been influenced mainly by ASEAN's failure in 1996 and 1997 to do something tangible about the severe regional haze problem that affected the health of the people in many ASEAN countries. The expansion of ASEAN membership to include a problem country such as Myanmar, and the difficulties ASEAN has encountered in bringing in Cambodia, are regarded as hampering ASEAN's ability to act swiftly. They are also seen as weakening the diplomatic clout that ASEAN would need to effectively mobilize international support in resolving the crisis (Hernandez 1998). There has been much soul-searching in ASEAN during the past year that coincided with the onset of the crisis. Until then ASEAN was still in a state of euphoria due to the region's remarkable record of rapid economic growth, the near completion of the One Southeast Asia enterprise, and its important role in the creation of the wider regional co-operative structures by virtue of being a copilot in APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation) and occupying the driver's seat in the ARF (ASEAN Regional Forum). This position crumbled almost overnight with the financial meltdown. ASEAN's future relevance to its members and to the region suddenly becomes a relevant question in many quarters, even within the ASEAN officialdom. ASEAN, some have argued, cannot maintain its relevance if it continues to be inhibited by the principle of nonintervention that it has held sacrosanct. Suggestions were made to bring ASEAN back to the drawing board. It is to be re-established under a new principle of constructive involvement (Malaysia's Anwar Ibrahim) or flexible engagement (Thailand's Foreign Minister) that enables its members to discuss domestic developments in an ASEAN member that affect other members' security and well-being, ASEAN's cohesiveness, and the security of the wider region (Wanandi 1998). …

Anumber of international and regional organizations, bodies, and forums are working on cybersecurity issues.1 Given that international cooperation is to some extent required to deal effectively with the cross-border nature of cyber-related threats, this article examines efforts in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) region to counter these challenges. To date, national and regional efforts to adopt comprehensive cybersecurity strategies have been slow and fragmented. Similarly, the efforts of the ten ASEAN member states to adopt both national and comprehensive regional frameworks for cybersecurity have so far been piecemeal.2 Because governments and institutions will be required to foresee emerging trends and adapt quickly to new realities in order to preempt cyber incidents, this article envisages greater cooperation on cybersecurity among ASEAN and its members through the adoption of new structures and novel ways of thinking that complement national initiatives and international efforts. Further, regional cooperation efforts could encourage both collective security and the greater development of national cybersecurity measures.Cyber-related threats are creating increasingly serious risks for the global economy as well as for national and international security. The European Union (EU), for example, considers cyber threats as having the potential to reduce stability and competitiveness,3 while the U.S. intelligence community's worldwide threat assessment for 2013 ranks cyber threats first, ahead of terrorism, transnational organized crime, and the proliferation of WMDs.4 This marks the first time since September 11 that international terrorism does not rank first in the U.S. intelligence community's assessment of global threats to national security.5This article finds that the current lack of cohesiveness in ASEAN's approach to cybersecurity detracts from regional security and undermines the proper functioning of a single market. Given the body's goal to establish the ASEAN Community by 2015, cohesive efforts to comprehensively tackle cybersecurity issues are crucial and in the shared interests of ASEAN members. The article concludes that the digital divide between developed and developing countries need not delay regional cooperation; rather, it is essential for ASEAN to enhance its overall resilience to serious cyber-related threats and collectively tackle common global cybersecurity challenges. Doing so would complement ASEAN's ambitions to create a successful single market and production base, buttress connectivity, and strategically enhance the body's position in the evolving regional architecture. In addition, it would support both wider regional and international cooperation on cybersecurity.Although the ultimate objective of a comprehensive framework is a more resilient regional architecture for cybersecurity, given the limitations of ASEAN, the measures that are more likely to be attained in the shorter term are those that complement the aims of the ASEAN Economic Community and ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community.This article is organized as follows:* pp. 135-37 examine why ASEAN is significant in terms of global cybersecurity issues.* pp. 137-40 examine the increasing probability of cyber threats in Asia.* pp. 141-45 address the digital divide both between ASEAN members and between ASEAN and other states.* pp. 146-49 outline current official ASEAN documents and measures on cybersecurity.* pp. 149-55 offer several policy options for ASEAN to create a more robust regional cybersecurity regime.* The appendices provide non-exhaustive lists of cyber incidents in the ASEAN region since 2012, official ASEAN documents related to cybersecurity, and ASEAN national computer emergency response teams (CERT).WHY ASEAN IS IMPORTANT FOR GLOBAL CYBERSECURITYASEAN is a particularly significant region in terms of international cybersecurity issues. …

In 1967, when the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was established, its members (then Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand; Brunei joined in 1984) found themselves plagued by a wide range of security problems. These included intra-regional conflicts, domestic instability, extra-regional intervention, and latent inter-ethnic tensions. It was not accidental that the ASEAN states as a group of newly independent (with the exception of Thailand, which had never been a colony) developing countries prioritized ‘respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states’ and ‘non-interference in the affairs of States’. Rather, the commitment of ASEAN members to the principle of the modern Westphalian state system should be understood in the context of the search for internal stability and regime security as newly independent countries engaged in nation-building and state-making. What made ASEAN politico-security regionalism (driven by nation-state centrism) really distinctive were the norms and values which came to be known as the ‘ASEAN Way’, Within the ASEAN Way context, in particular, this article explores ASEAN’s role in the Cambodian conflict (1978-1989) for the purpose of tracing the scope of which it contributed to the consolidation of ASEAN’s norms and principles regarding the way of conflict management in Southeast Asia. Indeed, ASEAN had considered the feasibility of accepting Vietnam (as well as Laos and Cambodia) within its group. However, Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia in December 1978 undermined an initial idea on the part of ASEAN to include Vietnam within its regional grouping. Therefore, by 1978 the intensifying conflict between Vietnam (supported by the Soviet Union) and Cambodia (backed by China) was a great difficulty to ASEAN for achieving the goal of ‘One Southeast Asia’ concept through including the rest of Southeast Asia. Against this background, this article analyses the creation, evolution and process of ASEAN politico-security regionalism up to the end of Cold War in order to highlight ASEAN’s approach to conflict management in the Cambodian crisis. Key words: Historical Evolution, ASEAN, Regionalism, ASEAN Way, Cambodian Conflict, Southeast Asia DOI : 10.7176/JAAS/58-12 Publication date :November 30 th 2019

This study investigates existence of any economic linkages among the five founding members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and explores the nature of these linkages. Based on the Vector Autoregression, variance decomposition and impulse response function analyses applied to quarterly real GDP data for the 1975-93 period, the results show the leading role of Indonesia and the significant economic linkages among them. The direction of causation and transmission is from Indonesia to the Philippines to Thailand to Malaysia and to Singapore. A two-way causation is found between Singapore and Malaysia. The study also finds the economic vulnerability of the ASEAN group of countries to changes in U.S. output, and the competitive nature between the Japanese and the ASEAN economies. These findings have important policy implications. 1. Introduction This article examines the issue of economic linkages among the ASEAN group of countries, and assesses the strength and the direction of these linkages.1 Although much has been written about the growing economic interdependence among these countries, so far no study has been undertaken to quantify and explore the nature of their interdependence. To achieve this objective, we utilize vector autoregression (VAR) techniques used to study regional linkages (Cargill and Morus 1988; Cromwell 1992; Sherwood-Call 1988). We examine the regional and international spillover effects on the ASEAN economies. Specifically, we investigate these questions: Which ASEAN country drives the ASEAN region? Do economic shocks in a member country spill over to other member countries? If yes, what is the direction of shocks transmitted among the ASEAN countries? Are these economic shocks external to the ASEAN economies? Understanding how economic shocks are transmitted among the ASEAN countries is important because of policy implications. If ASEAN economies are susceptible to spillovers from each other (which can be positive or negative) and if we can identify the source of transmission, then the effectiveness of one's macroeconomic policy setting will greatly be enhanced. Under this scenario, policy coordination for the mutual benefit of the ASEAN member countries may be called for. In light of growing intra-ASEAN trade and investments under a more liberal economic environment, the ASEAN countries are expected to share common economic linkages so that a recession in one member country may spill over into other member countries in terms of output and employment decline. The 1985 recession and the 1997 currency crisis, for example, which hit all the ASEAN group of countries, could be a reflection of these economic linkages. The questions of which ASEAN country drives the ASEAN region and how the economic shocks are transmitted among different economies are answered by employing vector autoregression (VAR) techniques using quarterly data on real GDP for ASEAN countries, Japan and the United States for the period of 1975 to 1993. The results can be used to identify leading and lagging relationships between variables and, with further identifying restrictions, to measure the economic importance of these dynamic relationships. Variance decomposition method is used to measure the economic importance of these relationships and impulse response functions are used to trace the direction of the effects of a shock in one country on the other countries. The objective is to examine the extent to which economic fluctuations in a country are driven by its own economy, or by linkages to other countries. This article complements other work that study linkages among the ASEAN economies. Ariff (1996) studies the external effects on financial liberalization in four ASEAN members and finds that external effects induces efficiency in the financial systems. Manzur and Ariff (1995), on the other hand, examine the relationship of prices in five ASEAN economies and find that a long-run relationship holds. …

T n HE ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS (ASEAN) has the reputation of being the most successful indigenously produced regional organization in the developing world.' Much of that reputation is attributable to ASEAN's apparent internal cohesion and international effectiveness. In the post-cold war era, ASEAN hopes to build on its success by shaping the emerging security relations of the Asia-Pacific through new mechanisms such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). However, ASEAN's influence on Southeast Asia's regional security environment during the cold war was both more nuanced than is commonly recognized and dependent on a set of unique circumstances. ASEAN's experiences with regional security in the cold war are not readily transferred to the post-cold war era. This paper is a discussion and evaluation of ASEAN's efforts to manage its regional security environment (i.e., to affect the actors and events shaping security in Southeast Asia). The main argument of this paper is that ASEAN's ability to manage regional security in Southeast Asia has been, and is, limited by two factors: one, the interests and actions of the great powers, which have defined the parameters of ASEAN's security policies; and two, divergent security perceptions and interests within ASEAN, which have defined the limits of intraorganizational cooperation and made it difficult to evaluate the significance of ASEAN's stated security objectives. ASEAN has improved relations between its member states, but these achievements are contingent on its success as a larger regional actor. The ASEAN member states remain mostly motivated by narrow understandings of their self-interests, which are not always congruent and can undermine ASEAN's unity and ability to function effectively. ASEAN's present efforts to incorporate Vietnam, Burma, Laos and, eventually, Cambodia, may exacerbate this problem. This paper is broken into five sections. After a brief historical overview, I review ASEAN's stated regional security objectives and the political and

Despite the uncertain contribution of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) to Asian-Pacific security, its creation is significant in light of the region's lack of multilateral arrangements and especially the long reluctance of the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) to address questions of security formally as a collective body. By focussing on ASEAN perspectives, this article identifies both external and internal challenges to ASEAN and the notion of 'Southeast Asia' and examines how ARF -- a multilateral security dialogue involving ASEAN and 14 other interested powers, including the United States -- relates to them. It concludes that while the origins of ARF are to be found in basic concerns about Southeast Asia's growing strategic uncertainty, ARF is also an attempt by ASEAN to maintain not only its relevance as a regional organization but also the relevance of Southeast Asia, both conceptually and practically, in a changing world context.ASEAN AND THE, REGIONAL IDEAThis article begins with the premise that 'Southeast Asia' is an idea advanced by ASEAN states to increase certainty in their domestic, regional, and global environments. Though generally accepted today as comprising Indonesia, Thailand, Singapore, Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar, Southeast Asia is difficult to define in objective terms -- geographically or by its peoples. More water than land, Southeast Asia lacks any single dominant land mass that might identify it and includes both mainland and island countries. As for its peoples, Southeast Asia is far more heterogeneous than homogeneous and boasts a host of different religions, cultures, ethnicities, and languages.Nor can Southeast Asia's political cohesion be assumed. Modern Southeast Asia is plagued by intraregional rivalries, cold war divisions, and territorial disputes. Before the Association of Southeast Asia (ASEAN's predecessor) was created in 1961, there was no indigenous tradition of thinking of Southeast Asia as a political, economic, or cultural entity, and, even then, Southeast Asia's divisions were more apparent than its unity, as illustrated by the Philippines' disruptive claim to Sabah and, especially, by Indonesia's confrontational politics (Konfrontasi).(f.1) As one historian put it: 'Southeast Asia ... is so culturally diverse and politically subdivided as to raise doubts in some minds as to whether it constitutes a meaningful entity in any positive sense.'(f.2)In 1967 Southeast Asia gained political substance with the creation of ASEAN. The founding states -- Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Philipines, Thailand -- congregated not around primordial ties but rather around common and immediate concerns about domestic instability, regional tensions, and the West's commitment to the security of Southeast Asia. Even then, intraregional tensions continued to loom over the grouping: Konfrontasi was a fresh memory, the Philippines' claim to Sabah was unresolved, and four of the five members were engaged in at least one dispute with another member. The issue of security was considered so contentious that it was not identified as an area of intended intra-ASEAN co-operation in the 1967 Bangkok Declaration that established ASEAN, even though ASEAN was founded because of security concerns. These tensions further illustrate the extent to which 'Southeast Asia' as a region is artificial, a socially created political space that has provided member-states with a measure of insulation against the machinations of larger powers and a minimum of assurance about their intentions towards one another. This has allowed them to focus on the important tasks of economic and political development.Since 1967, ASEAN's cohesiveness has largely been sustained by conflict avoidance and by avoiding discussions of such divisive issues as security within the ASEAN framework. Though tensions and conflicts periodically threaten to rise above the surface, intra-ASEAN relations have nevertheless greatly improved over time, gaining both depth and breadth. …

ASEAN’s Stakes:The South China Sea’s Challenge to Autonomy and Agency Alice D. Ba (bio) The South China Sea has come to involve important stakes for all involved. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is no different—though its situation is also notably distinct. The South China Sea occupies what Michael Leifer once characterized as the geographic “heart of Southeast Asia.”1 Geography alone means that whatever happens in the South China Sea affects ASEAN states the most directly. Moreover, as smaller powers, these states confront much greater vulnerabilities when it comes to great-power demands, even as they may be particular beneficiaries of great-power association. China’s activities in the South China Sea have no doubt underscored these dilemmas as the ASEAN states all try to navigate between the strategic vulnerabilities and the economic opportunities associated with a rising, more confident China. Nor are ASEAN states’ great-power dilemmas limited to China: the latter’s activities in the South China Sea have also precipitated heightened attention from the United States. ASEAN’s challenge is thus compounded by the fact that the South China Sea has become an important focal point of rivalry and tension between the ASEAN region’s two most important great-power relationships. Maintaining a space between China and the United States—one in which Southeast Asian states can enjoy some range of maneuver and choice—may prove to be the greatest challenge confronting the ASEAN region. This essay considers what is at stake in the South China Sea disputes for ASEAN’s coalition of smaller powers, with special attention paid to institutional interests and constraints. It considers not only the more immediate challenges created by territorial disputes but also the more general great-power dilemmas that heightened tensions have recently thrown into sharp relief. [End Page 47] ASEAN’s Immediate Challenges Most immediately, China’s physical and jurisdictional assertions create the challenge for ASEAN of agreeing on a collective response. This challenge, however, is made more complicated by the fact that it is an intergovernmental organization. Tus, while other governments may have to manage a constellation of domestic interests and agencies, ASEAN as an institution is the expression of ten distinct sovereign actors. States differ not just in the importance they attach to the disputes but also in their relations with China and the kinds of regional responses they prioritize. ASEAN’s unprecedented and very public failure to produce a joint communiqué at its 2012 annual foreign ministers’ meeting chaired by Cambodia in Phnom Penh dramatically illustrated this challenge. Additionally complicating ASEAN’s response is the fact that critical differences exist even among the grouping’s four claimant states. The Philippines and Vietnam have been the most vocal and active in responding to China’s activities, while Brunei and Malaysia—even with recently growing Malaysian concerns—have generally favored softer approaches. Such differences challenge ASEAN’s efforts to adopt a collective position as well as implement possible ad hoc workarounds that might facilitate a way forward. In its response to the South China Sea disputes, ASEAN as a collective has prioritized the pursuit of a regional code of conduct (CoC) because it keeps attention on the principles of international law, as well as existing codes of conduct like ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation. Following the embarrassment of ASEAN’s 2012 meeting, Indonesia quickly moved to facilitate ASEAN’s Six-Point Principles on the South China Sea. This statement identifies the “early conclusion” of a CoC and the “full implementation” of both ASEAN’s 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea and the 2011 guidelines as important priorities alongside self-restraint and the nonuse of force by all parties, “full respect” for the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), and the peaceful resolution of disputes. These six principles continue to provide ASEAN states with an important basis for consensus and action. Indonesia’s moves to quickly correct the failures of the 2012 ASEAN ministers’ meeting under Cambodia’s chairmanship are indicative of the understood risks that the South China Sea disputes pose to the organization. Notably, however, the CoC is “not meant...

The present ASEAS issue features a focus on 'Conflict Dynamics and Trans- formations in Southeast Asia'. It brings together topical works of researchers from various academic fields that offer a comprehensive perspective on current developments in some of the region's political, social, and environmental con- flicts as well as on approaches to their management and resolution. The con- tributions include case studies from Indonesia, Myanmar, the Philippines, and Thailand, as well as analyses of the status and prospects of regional security co- operation within the framework of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).The complex and interdependent nature of conflicts makes it inevitable to study their causes and potential solutions through approaches that transcend the borders of classical academic disciplines. In his comprehensive monograph Peace by Peaceful Means, Johan Galtung (1996), the 'father' of peace research, reminds us just how challenging and intellectually demanding peace research is. He argues that this is owed to the many spaces in which peace and conflict researchers have to search for causes, conditions, and contexts in order to un- derstand their subject of study (Galtung, 1996, p. 1). Thus, the multi- and inter- disciplinary character of area studies - here, Southeast Asian Studies - provides a suitable framework for deciphering the multilayered trajectories of conflicts, which, after all, might contribute to their peaceful transformation.Despite its political, religious, and ethnic diversity, Southeast Asia is by no means more prone to inter- or intrastate conflicts than other regions of the world. On the contrary, especially with regard to interstate conflicts, the mem- ber states of ASEAN rightfully claim that the norm of non-interference in do- mestic issues and consensus diplomacy has largely spared the region the terrors of interstate armed conflict. Yet, the postcolonial states of Southeast Asia are still the arena of a significant number of domestic armed conflicts in which resis- tance and liberation movements (Dudouet, 2009) are challenging the respective nation states by striving for greater self-determination or even secession, with all the tragic consequences.On the other hand, during the last decade, Southeast Asian governments have gradually moved away from military conflict resolution approaches. It ap- pears that the mode of procedural conflict resolution (Elwert, 2004) through legitimate institutions is becoming the dominant norm in managing domestic violent conflict. Timo Kivimaki (2012, pp. 419-420), for example, shows that battle deaths related to violent conflicts in Southeast Asia have significantly de- clined since the mid-2000s. Indeed, since the formation of Southeast Asia's post- colonial states following the end of the Second World War, the region has never been as peaceful as it is today (Vatikiotis, 2009, p. 28). Recent successful conflict mediation processes underline this trend, for example, that between the Free Aceh Movement and the Government of Indonesia in 2005 and the comprehensive peace accord be- tween the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the Government of the Philip- pines in the southern Philippines in March 2014.This issue begins with a regional macro-perspective, proceeds to a comparative national perspective, and finally offers thickly described empirical case studies at the micro-level. In the first two articles, the authors address one of the most hotly debated issues with regard to the increasingly integrating ASEAN: regional secu- rity cooperation. Henning Borchers ponders the possibility of the development of an ASEAN peacekeeping force despite member states' reluctance towards a regional conflict resolution mechanism, as this could challenge ASEAN's constitutive norm of non-interference in domestic politics of its member states. Borchers argues that the progress in institutionalizing regional cooperation regarding 'soft' security issues - such as environmental challenges - stands to facilitate a slow deepening of 'hard' security cooperation at the ASEAN level, which can deepen political trust among member states. …

From a geopolitical perspective, the Asian littoral divides into three subregions: Northeast Asia (the People's Republic of China, Japan, North and South Korea, Taiwan and the Russian Far East), Southeast Asia (Brunei, Cambodia, East Timor, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam) and South Asia (India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal and Sri Lanka). Both Northeast Asia and South Asia contain political and economic Great Powers. In the latter, India's economic activities and growing politico-security influence extend to all of Asia. In the former, Japan, China, South Korea and Taiwan play significant global economic roles, while Tokyo and Beijing are also major political-security players. By contrast, Southeast Asia contains no Great Powers with global reach. While the region consists of several states with vibrant economies--Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand--or economic potential--Vietnam and Indonesia--in geopolitical stature, Southeast Asia pales in comparison to its Northeast and South Asia neighbours. Yet Southeast Asia is where most Asian regional organizations originate and whose structures and procedures are determined by Southeast Asian preferences. The primary goal of this article is to explain how this has happened, what the implications are for Asia's future and whether Southeast Asian states organized for the past forty years through the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) will be able to maintain their pivotal position in Asian affairs. For the past several decades, the Asia-Pacific region has been marked by a difficult asymmetry: the most dangerous disputes lie in Northeast and South Asia while the region's multilateral institutions designed to manage and reduce conflict have originated in Southeast Asia. While ASEAN has maintained its organizational integrity, it has added new internal and external dimensions. The former include the incipient ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), the ASEAN Interparliamentary Organization which has been particularly vocal in condemning Myanmar's human rights violations, and the Track Three ASEAN People's Assembly, an NGO that brings a variety of societal interest groups together to lobby ASEAN governments. ASEAN-dominated organizations encompass the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) on security matters, ASEAN+3 (Japan, South Korea and China), various ASEAN+1 dialogues with important states, the ASEAN-Europe meeting (ASEM), and most recently, regular dialogues with the Gulf Cooperation Council, Africa and Latin America. The newest and most contentious addition to the mix is the East Asian Summit (EAS) inaugurated in December 2005. The EAS brings ASEAN+3 countries together with India, Australia and New Zealand--all of which have signed ASEAN's Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) as a membership condition. Conceptualizing ASEAN The Asia-Pacific region has no hegemon. Instead, political, economic and social networks proliferate. Regional issues are addressed through collective action. The various frameworks have diminished the strength of the absolute sovereignty norm that dominated ASEAN at the time of its 1967 creation. Over the ensuing decades, security issues have become increasingly transnational. Money laundering, human trafficking, environmental degradation, multi-national river development, migratory maritime species, terrorism and piracy require multilateral regime building rather than ad hoc diplomacy. In theory, at least, organizations such as ASEAN have established procedures and decision-making rules in which all governmental stakeholders have a voice. (2) Conceptualizing ASEAN, International Relations theorists generally employ three analytical frameworks: neo-realism, neoliberalism and constructivism. (3) Neo-realists disdain ASEAN's role in regional security because, in their view, institutions are epiphenomenal. Stability depends on the distribution of power within the Asia-Pacific and not on an international organization of small and medium states confined to Southeast Asia. …