Implicit Conceptions, Understanding and Rationality

Abstract

*Earlier versions of this material were presented as an Invited Lecture at the 1996 Barcelona meeting of the European Society for Philosophy and Psychology, and as seminars at the Universities of Hamburg and St. Andrews, and at New York University. At a presentation at the Pittsburgh meeting of the Central Division of the American Philosophical Association in 1997, my commentator was Tyler Burge; and at a presentation at the 1997 meeting of the Conference on Methods in New York, my commentators were Georges Rey and Gideon Rosen. I am very grateful for all their comments, from which I have learned much. It will soon be apparent to those who have followed my earlier efforts that the present paper involves a significant change of view. In grappling with these issues, I have been helped too by the comments and advice of Paul Boghossian, Ned Block, Bill Brewer, John Campbell, Martin Davies, Hartry Field, Wolfgang Kiinne, Barry Loewer, Stephen Schiffer, Stewart Shapiro, John Skorupski and Crispin Wright. I have also taken the opportunity to correct a mistake pointed out to me by Eric Margolis in private discussion at the SOFIA meeting. Once again, I acknowledge with gratitude the support of the Leverhulme Trust. Without one of their Research Professorships, none of this work would have been possible. ? Copyright C. Peacocke 1998.