Impact of Judicial Policies in the European Community: the Italian Constitutional Court and European Community Law

Abstract

HE European Community, three decades after signing of initial treaty creating it, remained but a collection of sovereign nation-states, a situation projected to change by end of 1992. Much of Eurosclerosis has been fostered by an axis of power lying between executives, European Commission and national regimes. The European Court ofJustice, although infrequently in limelight of European events, has, however, been most instrumental in forwarding cause of European integration, and its success can be measured by acceptance of its decisions by national judges. This article is a study of impact of legal norms of European Court of Justice on one member state court, Italian Constitutional Court; it is an analysis of judicial policies and implementation by two constitutional that influence future of European integration. Grand theories of comparative law, much less judicial politics, are noticeably scarce, and treatment of ties, amiable or adversarial, between national courts and supranational or international ones lies in realm neither of international politics nor of comparative politics. This state of affairs has left political and policy issues of courts in European integration to lawyers, who have no need to pretend that a descriptive account of case law has any wider implications than development of law qua law. And, thus, the dialogue between lawyers and political scientists has become increasingly difficult (Weiler 1983: 39) and mutual interest in European law has waned.' Transnational relationships between courts can be approached analytically, in this instance through framework of judicial implementation and impact. Such a perspective underscores essentially