Illuminating the Downside of Social Capital

Abstract

The potential “downside” of social capital has received relatively limited attention in research to date. In this article, the author presents a theoretical approach to urban crime and criminogenic conditions that emphasizes the potential for competition between two types of social capital, social network—based reciprocated exchange and collective efficacy, in the regulation of neighborhood crime. This “negotiated coexistence” approach hypothesizes that as network interaction and reciprocated exchange among neighborhood residents increase, offenders and conventional residents become increasingly interdependent. In turn, the social capital provided by network integration of offenders may diminish the regulatory effectiveness of collective efficacy. Using data from the 1990 Census and the 1994-1995 Project on Human Development in Chicago Neighborhoods Community Survey, the author tests the negotiated-coexistence model against competing expectations regarding the association between networks, collective efficacy, and crime. Consistent with the negotiated-coexistence approach, ordinary least squares and spatial regression models of property crime and social disorder indicate that the regulatory effects of collective efficacy on crime are reduced in neighborhoods characterized by high levels of network interaction and reciprocated exchange.