Abstract
IIT includes commitments about the very nature of physical reality, a fact both highly unusual for an empirical theory within neuroscience, and surprisingly underappreciated within the literature. These commitments are intimately tied to the theory; they are not incidental. This paper demonstrates as much by raising certain objections in a “naive” way, and then exposing how the principled IIT responses would rely upon metaphysical positions. Along the way we draw on the IIT literature for support for these interpretations, but also point to a need for elaboration and clarification. Section 1 applies the Placement Argument in a way that leads to problem involving zombies, treated in Section 2. Section 3 frames the zombie problem as an apparent dilemma, and addresses that dilemma by drawing on claims in the IIT literature concerning physical reality. Section 4 raises a related dilemma and treats it in a way that dovetails with the treatment in Section 3 of physical reality. All of this underscores not just the breadth of IIT, but the relevance of this breadth to a full consideration of IIT’s merits.
Highlights
A second apparent dilemma finds convergent resolution, adding both detail and credence to our speculations. These various objections are raised in a “naive” way, and followed by an exposition of how the principled Information Theory (IIT) responses would rely upon metaphysical positions
Blackmon [16] argues that IIT inadvertently implies that consciousness is not intrinsic using a mereological placement argument intended to show that if consciousness is Φmax, a physical system may be conscious while a physical duplicate of it is not
The Placement Argument leads to an apparent dilemma for IIT, where it seems it must choose between the non-existence of the universe, or the existence of classical zombies
Summary
The exact nature of IIT’s uniqueness is very subtle. True, it is a theory of consciousness that has implications for how we think about physical reality. More recently, Goff and Mørch [6] are among many who—following Russell [7]—argue that science only has the capacity to describe the structure of the physical world and that much of reality, including the nature of consciousness, lies necessarily hidden from the view of science as we know it Notice though that these figures, unlike IIT’s founder and many of its main proponents, are not engaged in empirical, neuroscientific work on consciousness. A second apparent dilemma finds convergent resolution, adding both detail and credence to our speculations These various objections are raised in a “naive” way, and followed by an exposition of how the principled IIT responses would rely upon metaphysical positions.
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