Abstract

Supplement is available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3118417 Economic agents face an evolving, non-ergodic environment. The corresponding permanently undersampled “population” distribution naturally permits unseen, rare events. The principle of indifference, implemented via the methods of parameterization invariance and maximum entropy, provides a disciplined, rational approach to learning, inference and decision in this underinformed setting. Canonical economic problems of choice under uncertainty from both the micro (binary lotteries) and macro (consumption-investment) domains can be formulated in terms of dynamic online learning when new gambles and new regimes are regularly encountered. The implied Bayesian updating under invariant ignorance priors allows to reverse-engineer and rationalize, in a mutually consistent way, the Allais paradox/prospect theory’s probability distortions identified in laboratory experiments as well as the equity premium/risk-free rate, non-monotone pricing kernel and portfolio underdiversification puzzles observed in financial markets.

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