Abstract
This chapter examines one important feature of bicameralism: the desirability of seeking second opinions and the benefits of the added deliberation that comes from the double scrutiny of both House and Senate. More specifically, it considers how many opinions are optimal and who should have the last word if the various decision-makers disagree. It first looks at the presidential veto as a feature of the U.S. Constitution before turning to Alexander Hamilton's defense of the veto. It then explains the difference between institutional self-defense and protecting the “general welfare,” along with the president's line-item veto authority and “reductive” vetoes. The chapter concludes by focusing on the electoral college and the president as a uniquely “national” official.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
