Abstract
This article is a reconstruction of late Wittgenstein’s views on the notion of truth, found in the Philosophical Investigations and On certainty . I attempt to classify Wittgenstein’s theory of truth. I reject interpretations of Wittgenstein as an advocate of either the coherence or the deflationary theory of truth. My main thesis is that Wittgenstein’s thought can be understood as a form of the correspondence theory of truth, but his understanding of correspondence and reality is very distinct from that of the traditional realist interpretation.
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