IBN SĪNĀ ON PROVING CAUSALITY

Abstract

AbstractIbn Sīnā famously opens The Metaphysics (Al-ilāhiyyāt) of The Healing (Al-šifāʾ) with a discussion of what constitutes the subject matter of that science. Several candidates are introduced and subsequently dismissed, before “the existent qua existent” is identified as its subject matter. Among the candidates dismissed, he mentions “the ultimate causes for all existents, the four of them” (which are, however, things investigated [maṭālib] in this science). Here, Ibn Sīnā comes to problematise the notion of causality itself. He is adamant that “the existence of causes for things which are effects” is not self-evident, but needs to be proven by the metaphysician by means of a “demonstrative clarification” (bayān burhānī). He explains why sensation (ḥiss) and experience (taǧriba) cannot prove causality, before turning to its metaphysical proof. In this article, I investigate what Ibn Sīnā thought this “demonstrative clarification” of causality is. I present an analysis of his train of thought and a commentary on the various points he makes, leading up to his proof of causality. These points touch on problems of psychology, scientific method, and scientific proof, and can be unpacked by taking into account explanations he offers elsewhere.