Microsoft/Activision Blizzard and Booking/eTraveli : an ecosystem market definition in five takeaways

This paper addresses the potential for conflict between antitrust authorities in the arena of merger control in the new economy. By “new economy” we mean two related developments. First, the internationalization of the economy, i.e. the ability to sell and produce products world-wide, and secondly, markets with certain characteristics such as network effects and other aspects of natural monopoly. We focus on three types of substantive issues in merger control – market definition, assessment of competitive effects, and the role of remedies. We argue that the scope for conflict varies significantly across these three arenas. In particular, conflict over market definition is less likely. By contrast, the assessment of competitive effects and the role of remedies are areas where conflict between antitrust authorities may be more likely in “new economy-type” markets.

This paper examines the fundamental features of attentional markets in which online platforms attract users’ time and sell access to that time to advertisers. Using Facebook as an extended case-study, it shows how the “free at the point of use” business model adopted by social media platforms raises significant challenges for established standards of competition law regarding market definition, evaluation of market power and assessment of mergers. It then advances two proposals for how existing EU rules could be reformed in order to facilitate greater competition in the market for social networking. Finally, the paper responds to potential counterarguments. Competition policy, attention economy, network effects, switching costs, data privacy, merger control, interoperability

The Antitrust Market Does Not Exist; Long Live Market Definition

It is generally recognized that market definition by itself does not provide guidance regarding the likely competitive effects of a merger, but, rather, provides the framework in which to assess the likelihood that a merger will facilitate the anticompetitive exercise of market power. Due to academic scholarship and to work by the FTC to attempt to assess the “direct effects” of consummated hospital mergers, market definition has become a less contentious and dispositive issue in the antitrust assessment of hospital mergers. In this article, we discuss remaining controversies related to both product and geographic dimensions of market definition in hospital mergers. We discuss why a traditional interpretation of hospital product markets may be inconsistent with the ongoing evolution of how health care is delivered. We also discuss the econometric methodologies that have recently been used to assess competition between hospitals, and provide some cautionary notes regarding their reliability.

Within the current intense debate on the relevance of environmental considerations within competition policy, merger policy has received relatively little attention. This contribution assesses the potential role of environmental considerations in merger policy, and the arguments for and against their inclusion in merger assessments, in the light of practical examples. It proceeds by: (1) examining the classic approach to “public interest” factors in merger control; (2) offering a deconstruction of the orthodoxy; (3) proposing a conceptual framework for environmental issues in merger control; and (4) applying that framework by considering issues of market definition and the relevance of environmental benefits and harm in merger assessment.

Achieving Symbiosis between Disruptive Innovation and Merger Control: Challenges and Remedies

Necessity of a Broader Market Definition in the Analysis of Syndicated Loans

For more than six decades, competition authorities and scholars have developed and refined an approach to market definition based on the extent to which a hypothetical monopolist in a candidate market could profitably increase its prices. However, this approach is rarely applied in practice. Of the more than 3,000 merger cases published on the European Commission website between 1990 and 2019, less than 3 per cent mentioned a hypothetical monopolist test or related approaches at all. This gap between theory and practice raises the risk of inconsistent and opaque decision-making. There are important open questions about how market definition can best reflect, for instance, the dynamics of zero-price digital markets. But this should not be at the expense of abandoning the basic logic of market definition entirely. A mature approach to market definition would better align principle and practice, while recognising that the process of market definition will always provide a rule of thumb rather than a definitive answer.

Relevant market definition methodology has been a thorny issue over the years for antitrust doctrine and practice. This is especially true when it comes to digital markets, in which prices may not be a significant variable for defining relevant markets. Traditional or static views of competition may result in improper market definitions, which might result in the clearance of mergers in digital markets because antitrust authorities define market shares according to traditional methods of measurement. However, this seems like a chicken-and-egg problem, because it is only by appropriately defining relevant markets that it is possible to establish if market shares are high or low. This article discusses practical implications for antitrust enforcement derived from the relevant market definitions adopted in high-profile digital market mergers in Brazil, Chile and Mexico. Many of these cases have elements of conglomerate or vertical integration that go beyond traditional demand substitution measurement and test the authorities’ ability to foresee future competitive scenarios in which digital competition and brick-and-mortar competition have become increasingly complementary. These cases also show an increasingly large role of data concentration as a driver in the attractiveness of the acquisitions.

Judging a Book by Its Cover?: Analysing the Indian Approach to Defining Platform Markets

Market definition is a specific and important tool used in European competition enforcement practice to identify boundaries of competition between undertakings; it is used both in antitrust and merger cases. The EU Market Definition Notice was adopted in 1997 in conditions of conventional markets with relatively stable market structures. With respect to recent development, especially digitalisation and globalisation of economy, the Commission launched the process of evaluation of the Notice in March 2020, and the revised notice has to be published in Q3 2023. Having in mind profound changes challenging various aspects of the original market definition, the article lists at first the most important features of digital economy, especially importance of innovation conditioning rapid changes of the market. Regarding the fact that the main principles of market definition were confirmed as sound until now, the short characteristics of the relevant market follow. The core part of the article aims to present and discuss different approaches to market definition, methods of market assessment included, taking into account the corresponding case law and legal writings reflecting digital circumstances making markets interconnected like never before. The article confronts also sometimes differing opinions of theory and practice in approach to market definition. Analysis is carried out with the ambition to find out whether it is possible – based on case specific approach of competition authorities – to draw general conclusions necessary for coherent conception of the revised market definition, or at least unifying recommendations for the legal practice for the sake of legal certainty. Outcomes of the analysis are summarised in the conclusion, in context with the draft market definition notice.

In this paper, we analyze the scope for conflict between national merger control agencies which simultaneously assert jurisdictions. We consider a positive model of merger control in which market definition and the analysis of dominance are both explicitly specified. Our main finding is that conflict in international merger control is less likely to occur when economic integration is high. Hence, economic integration should alleviate rather than exacerbate conflict. In addition, we observe that conflict is more likely to arise between countries of similar market size and for moderate competition policy rules.

Purpose: The authors argue that (1) marketing strategy should focus more on where to compete (rather than on how to compete); (2) making subjective market definitions or market innovations may be the key to growth; and (3) a starting point for business marketers wishing to outgrow their competitors is to increase the granularity of market definition to identify competitive arenas that are growing. The authors illustrate the use of morphological analysis for competitive arena mapping in a market definition and innovation context. Methodology: Using action research, involving a group of twleve firms of various sizes from different industries over a period of three-and-a-half years, we applied morphological analysis in a competitive arena mapping procedure, which enables firms to systematically plot possible competitive arenas and use managerial judgment to select those which are growing and for which the firm has exploitation capabilities. Findings: Competitive arena mapping allows firms to identify and investigate a large set of possible competitive arena configurations. The developed mapping method has certain characteristics: (1) it specifically focuses on the market boundaries and adjacencies, (2) it incorporates both exchange value and use value, and (3) it acts as a learning process that accelerates the practical application of the arenas in business strategy and practice. Contribution: The article builds a bridge between the market definition literature in strategic management and the industrial market segmentation literature, by introducing a novel method for increasing the granularity of market definition, using morphological analysis. Furthermore, the paper responds to the lack of research addressing strategic segmentation processes by developing a six-step market definition process.

Identifying the boundaries of a market is a critical component of most antitrust and competition policy areas. While there are established practices for market definition and delineation, dynamic processes of competition and the novel phenomenon of (digital) ecosystems provide new challenges: market boundaries become (i) inherently dynamic and subject to evolutionary change and (ii) subject to the deliberate design of powerful companies. Consequently, the prediction of post-event effects—for example, competitive effects resulting from a merger or an instance of abuse of market power—may fail if it relies on a static or stationary market definition. If market boundaries change inherently through dynamic market competition, identifying these boundaries and their evolution becomes an integral part of a dynamic approach to competition policy rather than mere preparatory work. Furthermore, if companies wield systemic market power within ecosystems (eg cross-market power) and thus have the power to shape market boundaries and deliberately alter (previous) market delineations, the identification of market boundaries cannot be regarded independently of the exploitation of market power. Both dynamics of market boundaries necessitate a different approach to market definition than the one outlined in the Commission’s 2024 Market Definition Notice.

In recent decades, global merger and acquisition (M&A) activity has intensified, particularly in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, culminating in record-breaking levels by 2014. This surge has coincided with the evolution of competition policy, particularly a shift toward more economics-based assessment frameworks within merger control regimes. This dissertation investigates the interplay between merger profitability and the effectiveness of merger control, offering a dual contribution through analytical modeling and empirical legal-economic analysis. On the analytical front, the study addresses a core contradiction in the merger literature: while empirical M&A activity remains high, classical industrial organization theory suggests that horizontal mergers are often unprofitable in Cournot competition and socially undesirable under Bertrand competition due to consumer surplus losses. This dissertation revisits those models by relaxing key assumptions. Specifically, it integrates uncertainty regarding merger-induced efficiency gains, risk aversion among firms due to capital market imperfections and managerial behavior, and the strategic role of information sharing with both competitors and regulators. By doing so, the revised models reveal a more nuanced profitability landscape: under certain conditions, uncertainty and risk aversion can reduce the profitability threshold of mergers, while transparency and strategic disclosure mechanisms can mitigate adverse market reactions. The second part of the dissertation presents an empirical ex-post analysis of European merger control following the 2004 EU Merger Regulation reform. This reform aimed to harmonize assessment practices across the EU’s enlarged membership and bring the European Commission’s procedures closer to U.S. antitrust standards, particularly by strengthening the role of economic evidence in merger assessments. Focusing on Phase II decisions—the most complex and contested cases—the study analyzes the use and consistency of economic assessment criteria post-reform. Results indicate that the 2004 changes have indeed led to a more systematic application of economic concepts such as unilateral effects, coordinated effects, and entry barriers. However, differences in enforcement philosophy and legal frameworks persist between the EU and U.S., particularly in how potential efficiency gains and consumer welfare impacts are weighted. Taken together, the dissertation provides a robust explanation for the observed discrepancy between theoretical predictions and real-world merger activity. It shows that, once more realistic assumptions are included, analytical models better align with empirical outcomes. Moreover, it offers evidence that merger control has become more economically grounded over time, potentially contributing to a regulatory environment in which profitable and welfare-enhancing mergers are more likely to be approved, while harmful ones face increasing scrutiny. This work makes significant contributions to the fields of industrial organization, competition economics, and regulatory policy. It informs both academics and policymakers about the evolving nature of merger profitability under modern market conditions and offers a critical review of how well merger control frameworks adapt to these changes in practice.