Le Roi ne meurt jamais: On the Permanence of the Theologico-Political in Revolutionary France

Ante as diversas crises humanitárias atuais e aquelas já enfrentadas, faz-se necessário destacar o debate acerca da conciliação do conceito de soberania e da flexibilização do princípio da não intervenção, eis que um dos mais relevantes choques axiológicos do cenário internacional ocorre entre os conceitos de soberania e direitos humanos. O presente artigo busca, portanto, abordar o conflito entre os conceitos de intervenção humanitária e soberania a fim de demonstrar a possível – e necessária – flexibilização do princípio da não intervenção. Por fim, apreciar-se-á o conceito, bem como a legalidade e a legitimidade do instituto da intervenção humanitária com objetivo de sustentar a ideia de que a comunidade internacional tem o direito, e até mesmo o dever, de realizá-las.

Is the uneven acceptance of international courts (ICs) an indication of different conceptions of state sovereignty? The conventional idea of the Westphalian model is that it involved the principles of state sovereignty, legal equality of states, and non-intervention in internal affairs. The 1648 Peace of Westphalia often serves as a historical reference, even though the modern conceptions of state sovereignty hardly goes back to the 17th century and the Westphalian treaties of Munster and Osnabruck (Osiander 2001; Beaulac 2004). The idea of sovereignty evolved during the 19th and 20th centuries, yielding several versions. The one relevant here is international legal sovereignty, which implies recognition of polity and territoriality by other states and domestic authority structures that exclude external actors (Krasner 1999). To explore whether different conceptions of sovereignty within the modern states system affect states’ acceptance of ICs, we categorize states according to a set of variables which includes colonial background, geopolitical position, political regime, legal system and resources. We then analyze how these factors correlate with the ratification of different types of ICs – two independent courts and two conflict resolution mechanisms connected to states’ broader acceptance of international organizations. We analyze the acceptance of four ICs with a global reach – the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the International Criminal Court (ICC), the WTO dispute settlement mechanism (DSM), and the dispute settlement system under United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), including the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS). These ICs vary in interesting respect. Acceptance of the WTO dispute settlement follows from ratification of the treaty establishing the WTO, and similarly for dispute settlement under UNCLOS and for the criminal jurisdiction of the ICC. However, acceding to UNCLOS implies that states have the opportunity to use ITLOS, the ICJ or ad hoc arbitration for dispute settlement. The ICJ was established in 1945 as the principal judicial organ of the United Nations, but the UN member states are only bound by the competence of the ICJ if this is explicitly accepted by the relevant state. This selection allows us to explore the difference between accepting substantive treaty obligations sanctioned by an IC, and only accepting the IC. The motivation of states may be to ensure general acceptance of the substantive obligations, or of the IC – or both. We employ a full dataset for when or if a country accepted each of these four courts. Using logistic regression analysis, we look for the links between a selected number of independent variables and the tendency to join the treaty that established each court. Is there a systematic pattern that indicates how the uneven judicialization of international law works?

Introduction: Russia's invasion of Ukraine gave rise to mixed opinions in the international community regarding the concept of state sovereignty, both in theory and practice.Purposes of the Research: The regulation of state sovereignty has experienced a conceptual shift according to international law and Russia's invasion of Ukraine has caused a shift in the concept of state sovereignty in international law.Methods of the Research: The research used is normative juridical, using an analytical perspective research type. The legal materials are primary, secondary and tertiary legal materials. The approaches used are the statutory approach, the conceptual approach and the case approach. The technique for collecting legal materials uses library research which is then analyzed qualitatively to answer the problems being studied.Results of the Research: The research results show that the concept of state sovereignty is experiencing changes and shifts in meaning according to developments over time. The revolutionary changes of the late 18th and 19th centuries gave rise to the concept of sovereignty which included the principle of equality of states and the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states as one of its important elements. Regarding the causes of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, it was influenced by various factors, including historical, political, economic, security and defense factors, as well as to protect pro-Russian separatist groups who wanted to separate themselves from Ukraine. Russia's invasion of Ukraine did not affect the shift in the concept of sovereignty as currently accepted by the international community in the modern ideology of sovereignty. On a theoretical and practical level, the will of the Russian state has great interests in carrying out actions that threaten peace, or violate peace by launching aggression against Ukraine as a sovereign state. Russia as a party to various international agreements has an obligation to respect international law where state sovereignty and equality between countries are recognized concepts and have become the basis of the international legal system

Using the Western tradition of metaphysical and political thought as a backdrop, Critique of Sovereignty (a work in 4 volumes) re-examines the concept of sovereignty in order to better understand why our ethical values and technical capacities often seem so divorced from our lived realities. On the one hand, ostensibly self-enclosed entities like the nation-state and the person are rhetorically bolstered as sites of technical agency and/or moral responsibility. On the other hand, these same entities appear fragile — if not purely fictional — in relation to ever ongoing tidal processes such as the migration, diffusion, and conglomeration of bodies, capital, ideas, etc. While some of our institutions might work some of the time, they always seem to work differently than we like to think they do. Accordingly, the forging of more humane institutions might very well entail if not require ways of thinking that strive to undo the self-imagined binds, exceptions, and sureties of thought for the sake of embracing a continuity with all that withers, decays, and falls away. Book I, “Contemporary Theories of Sovereignty,” compares the varied interpretations of sovereignty given by a range of 20th-century political theorists (Maritain, Foucault, Derrida, Schmitt, Agamben, Hardt, and Negri) with Jean Bodin’s initial outline of the concept, rendered at the outset of modern political thought in the 16th century. The analytic framework of sovereignty encountered in these comparative readings provides an initial point of departure for unfolding a method of critique appropriate to the concept of sovereignty. Sovereignty is an ideal starting point for a critique of the deadlocks between thought and reality for a simple reason: it doesn’t actually exist. When it serves as a guide to action, sovereignty may be regarded as a particularly captivating fantasy. The closer it appears, the further it recedes, and, too often, the more vigorously it is pursued.

This chapter deals with discourses on sovereignty during the interwar period. The establishment of the League of Nations represented the optimism in the first decades of the interwar period, in which the concept of sovereignty was not abandoned, but considerably limited.’ As international society fell into political and economic turmoil, however, optimism disappeared. In this chapter we shall first briefly view Continental theories of sovereignty in order to understand their implications for Anglo-American scholars. Next we shall examine the development and the decline of the discourses on sovereignty in Britain and the United States in the interwar period.KeywordsInternational RelationLegal OrderSovereign StateNational SovereigntySovereign PowerThese keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

The state, as we understand it today, includes sovereignty as its defining element. But both state and sovereignty represent concepts that have had a variable content over time, depending on the context. The last years have brought a series of new perspectives regarding the exercise of power inside the state, its connection with the territory and, implicitly, the concept of sovereignty. Within the European Union, the desire for autonomy in relation to other international powers, but also in relation to member states or private actors, led to the birth of the doctrine of digital sovereignty as an objective to be achieved in the following years. As a result, this paper aims to analyze the evolution of the concept of sovereignty in order to better understand to what extent it can still be validly used from a constitutional point of view and to what extent it can still have a descriptive or prescriptive value for the way of evolution for the contemporary concept of state.

leaders have maintained their traditional respect for the principle of non-interference in the affairs of states, despite predictions to the contrary as human rights issues have come to the fore in Southeast Asia's politics. Calls for constructive engagement from within and outside ASEAN, in the light of grave human rights abuses in Cambodia and Myanmar, have ultimately gone unheeded by leaders. This overt stance in favour of non-interference seems incongruous with a more subtle, historical approach of actual in each other's affairs. The two are reconciled thus: publicly A SEAN leaders adhere to the vaunted ASEAN way of non-interference while privately, behind-the-scenes, quiet diplomacy interference takes place to resolve issues causing tension between states. This practice contrasts sharply with that of Western countries, which favour intervention for humanitarian reasons. Introduction Since the formation of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1967 its members have adhered strictly to a principle of non-interference in the affairs of states. Non-interference stems from the traditional notions in international relations of equality of the sovereignty of states (from diminutive Singapore to mammoth Indonesia) and the consequent right to exclusive sovereignty. The respect for non-interference in each other's affairs has been a cardinal principle, and characteristic of concord since ASEAN's creation. In the post-Cold War era, however, the principle has come under strain. A practice contradictory in this respect appeared in connection with political turmoil in three Southeast Asian states, two prospective members (Cambodia and Myanmar), and the other a founding member of (Indonesia). This new practice begs two interrelated questions. Is the principle of sovereign equality of states disappearing? Or, is there a qualitative change in the concept of exclusive sov ereignty and the consequent non-interference? A hypothesis which is explored in this article is that there is a qualitative change in the concept of non-interference in the sovereign affairs of another state. The quality that distinguishes the concept from its traditional sense, strict adherence to non-interference, is the notion that a state will only be considered equal in its sovereignty if it ensures minimum standards of good governance for its citizens. In other words, treat your citizens well and we can do business. An examination of this hypothesis will lead us through, first, a brief discussion of the enshrinement of the concept of exclusive sovereignty as a fundamental principle governing inter-state relations; secondly, members' practice of non-interference; and thirdly, the forces motivating qualitative change in the principle of sovereign equality of states. The Principle of Sovereign Equality of States and Good Governance The concept of sovereignty is an elusive one that is hard to define. As Louis Halle notes in his foreword to Robert Klein's Sovereign Equality Among States: The History of an Idea: [I]nternational relations are determined by the myths that, as surrogates for realities beyond our comprehension, dominate our minds. The myths may represent the realities more or less truly, more or less falsely, with corresponding consequences, for good or evil, when action is taken on the bases they provide. [1] One such myth is that of sovereignty. As Klein shows, throughout history, by a process of analogy with individual personality, the state has acquired a corporate personality. The concept of sovereignty has evolved from being a signifier of the authority of an individual ruler (king, emperor) to a signifier of the authority of the people. The Romans dealt with associations of human beings as real persons; groups of individuals acting together were said to have a single legal personality. Hobbes applied the concept of personality to the territorial state, for the most part identified with the ruler, which permitted pinning on these new political entities rights and duties towards each other. …

The development of technology places data in cyberspace as a very valuable commodity. In the political aspect, seeing data sovereignty is a fundamental foundation in realizing state sovereignty in cyberspace. A country's data sovereignty is faced with the position of the state with the private sector in a global context. Cybersecurity systems and data sovereignty are inseparable in achieving state sovereignty in cyberspace. The main role of the state is to realize protection and maintain data security in national cyberspace. In 2017, the Government established the National Cyber and Crypto Agency (BSSN) which is a transformation of the National Crypto Agency which was combined with several other government agency work units related to cybersecurity. The presence of BSSN provides a very strategic key role in maintaining state sovereignty in cyberspace. This is in line with global challenges where cyber attacks and data leaks are increasingly rampant in Indonesia. For this reason, this study will explain the strategic role of BSSN in maintaining data sovereignty in order to realize state sovereignty in cyberspace. The author uses state theory and the concept of data sovereignty in analyzing this. The author uses qualitative methods to collect data through various literature studies, such as: books, journal articles, and other reference sources. The results of the study show that BSSN is a representation of the state's presence in maintaining the sovereignty of national cyberspace. This can be seen from the increase in Indonesia's cybersecurity index on a global scale which reflects an increase in national cybersecurity capabilities

This paper surveys Derrida's discussions of political sovereignty in order to highlight his preference for a cosmopolitan world order and show how the deconstruction of sovereignty cannot proceed on the model of his earlier analyses of concepts such as justice, hospitality, forgiveness and democracy. How does one deconstruct the unconditional and apparently undeconstructible concept and institution of sovereignty? Two elements of Derrida's response are then critically examined. First, I explore his qualified defence of the principle of sovereignty and his reluctance to unconditionally reject it on the grounds that it is implied in the ‘classical principles of freedom and self-determination’. I argue that the critique of the ideals of personal agency and freedom based on a conception of individual sovereignty ought to be pursued but that this need not imply rejection of the normative priority of individuals. Second, I examine his efforts to distinguish between sovereignty and the unconditioned that he aligns with deconstructive thought. I argue that, while the institutions and exercise of sovereignty are deconstructible, there is a sense in which pure sovereignty remains a necessary foundation for political liberalism and for a cosmopolitan world order.

The concept of sovereignty in international law addresses the principle that a sovereign state, through its ruler or government has the right to determine and enforce the laws which it believes are appropriate for its own territory, and that it has the further right to protect its interests at an international level, whether those interests be from a trade or security perspective. However, the concept of sovereignty operates within a broader framework of international law, part of which is the rule of law in international affairs. This involves the existence of a comprehensive system of law which provides predictability as to the legal consequences of conduct, and the effective and impartial application of the law. This then relies upon the ‘adoption’ of a form of sociality, which implies that sovereign states will act in a manner which maximises optimal co-operation between regimes and/or governmental structures. The European Union (EU) has sought, by virtue of the notion of legislative networks to dissolve the concept of individual state sovereignty, thus weakening the ability of sovereign states to determine that which is most appropriate to its own territory, and seeking the imposition of policies and laws which arguably reflect common interests, such as the development of the energy sector. However, the recent global financial and economic crises have highlighted that economic co-operation is far more fragile and problematic than previously thought, and this combined with the fact that energy sources are largely located in sovereign states not part of the EU, some of which have a high ranking of political risk, arguably poses a new and real problem. This chapter argues that the concept of sovereignty is central to sustainable energy policy development in the EU. Accordingly there will be an examination of the concept of sovereignty, its relationship with political risk, and this will be followed by an econometric analysis by using country risk oil industry stock market data and related political risk indicators. The reader should note that this paper is primarily written from a legal perspective, so the language and concepts as used throughout is reflective of this perspective. Furthermore, inclusion of the econometric analysis is illustrative of the notion that the energy sector is highly influenced by the actions of sovereign states and by the political risk attached to those actions.

In this paper, I foreground the concept of economic sovereignty in order to clarify strategies that undergird the practices of, and hindrances to, political sovereignty. I argue that current critical discourses on sovereignty can be significantly furthered with careful examination of the framework of economic strategies that support, and are often driving forces of, these political actions. To illustrate the importance of these complex strategies, I focus on the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians’ (EBCI) casino and small-business markets during the volatile years of the Great Recession. This discussion begins by investigating continued Native Nation economic precarity in the context of economic actions taken by US governments specifically with regard to gaming regulation. I then explain the strategic methods by which Native Nations have addressed and mitigated some of these incursions, thereby highlighting how such strategies disrupt the settler–colonial narrative of the agency-less indigenous state. These strategies are enacted at both government and individual levels through (1) the economic development experiences of Native Nations in relation to their distinctive hybrid political–economic governmental structures, such as the EBCI’s charter of incorporation that also serves as its national constitution, and (2) the strength of the EBCI small-business market in supporting these efforts. In arguing for this framework of economic strategies, this study contributes to understandings of global indigenous communities’ current strengths and vulnerabilities by thoroughly disentangling models of economic sovereignty from economic power, demonstrating how discussions of political economy must engage with issues of economic sovereignty.

International law is based on sovereign states as its subjects; sovereignty is the most fundamental principle of international law. Ever since the classic works of Grotius, the concept of sovereignty has long been established in traditional international law in the West. Although bourgeois international jurists had concocted a distinction between so-called "semisovereign" or partially sovereign states and sovereign states, to suit the aggressive policy of imperialism, yet not until the beginning of the 20th century did anyone basically deny or attempt to change this concept on the basis of international legal theory. The new trend may be said to have emerged since World War I. At first, a few continental international jurists in Europe, applying to international relations the theory of social solidarity advocated by Duguit, the celebrated French scholar on public international law, attacked the concept of sovereignty and held it incompatible with international law. In particular, Professor Politis, of the University of Paris, in his book New Aspects of International Law, made an all -out attack on the sovereignty concept in international law, invoking the theory of social solidarity. (17) He said that during the past three generations, the concept of sovereignty had dominated the theory of international law. This implied that the state had an absolute and unquestionable power to take actions in foreign relations according to its own will, subject to no restrictions not accepted by it. But, following the development of international law, the state's freedom of action was increasingly limited. This phenomenon became increasingly difficult to explain, because if the will of the state was truly sovereign, then it could not be restricted by compulsory rules. Consequently, a dilemma emerged: either the concept of sovereignty had to be abandoned, or the restrictive character of international law had to be negated. Because it was impossible to resolve this dilemma, the alternative was to deny the existence of absolute sovereignty and to recognize only a relative and limited sovereignty, subject to obligations under international law. However, this concession has not saved the principle of sovereignty, but only accelerated its decline. In fact, to recognize that sovereignty can be diminished is to concede that it does not exist, because true to its definition, the concept of sovereignty excludes any limitations. As has been correctly pointed out, limited independence is no independence. One cannot but realize the need to abandon completely the concept of sovereignty and to face the fact squarely. This revision had begun long before 1914, but it became more urgent and necessary as a result of World War I. The war poignantly drove home to the states their interdependence; and it demonstrated that in order to eliminate international anarchy, states must accept the restrictions of law and the maxim that no state can impose its will on others. They must all regard law as supreme and equally submit to its rule. If we face the facts, sovereignty aside, we will realize that the so-called "independence" of the state implies only that the state has freedom of action within the scope of law; this is only a kind of special jurisdiction enjoyed by the government and is based upon international law. The more developed international relations become, the more limited will be the freedom of the state. Each step toward solidarity symbolizes some new limitations to state freedom.

This article focuses on the impact of globalization on international law and the discourse of sovereignty. It challenges the claim that we have entered into a new world order characterized by transnational governance and decentered global law, which have replaced “traditional” international law and rendered the concepts of state sovereignty and international society anachronistic. We are indeed in the presence of something new. But if we drop the concept of sovereignty and buy into the idea that transnational governance has upstaged international treaty organizations, we will misconstrue the nature of contemporary international society and the political choices facing us. In the contemporary context where there is a powerful imperial project afoot (on the part of the United States) that seeks to develop a useful version of global (cosmopolitan) right to justify its self-interested interventions, proposals to abandon the default position of sovereignty and its corollary, the principle of nonintervention in international law, are both premature and dangerous. Instead, we should rethink the normative dimensions of the concept of sovereignty in light of the new principle of sovereign equality articulated in the UN Charter, and show how it can complement cosmopolitan principles such as human rights and collective security. The task is to strengthen, not abandon, international law and supranational institutions, and to foster a global rule of law that protects both the sovereign equality of states, based on a revised conception of sovereignty, and human rights.

This paper analyses the question of how to perceive the traditional theoretical concept of state sovereignty vis-á-vis European integration. Within the European project we face the paradox of having two authorities claiming autonomy and dominance. It is undisputable that the European Union is behaving like an autonomous public power - the new sovereign of its kind. But at the same time the Member States also maintain their sovereign statehood. This duality cannot be comprehended together with the old characteristics of sovereignty, which accepts only one holder of this feature. To reconcile the phenomena of European integration and the concept of sovereignty, we must shift into new definitions of the latter. This paper argues in favour of the acceptation of a shared sovereignty concept.

In the last three decades, the rise of a populist challenge to the liberal political mainstream exposed how shallow the supposed victory of global liberalism was, even in its heartlands in Europe and North America. Exclusive nationalism and nativism, identity politics, critiques of globalisation and internationalism, and calls for democratic re-empowerment of the demos have converged politically on a new locus of inflated territorial, indeed ‘border’ sovereignty, aligning the call of ‘taking back control’ on behalf of a radically re-defined community (‘we’) with a defensive re-territorialisation of power along existing fault lines of nation-statism. In this paper, I argue that the very same call has become the new common political denominator for all populist platforms and parties across Europe. I argue that populists across the conventional left–right divide have deployed a rigidly territorialised concept of popular sovereignty in order to bestow intellectual coherence and communicative power to the otherwise disparate strands of their anti-utopian critiques of globalisation. In spite of significant ideological differences between so-called right- and left-wing populism, in the short-term the two populist projects have sought to stage their performances of sovereigntism on, behind or inside the borders of the existing nation-states.