‘I know something you don’t know’: The asymmetry of ‘strategic intelligence’ and the great perils of asymmetric alliances

Abstract

Given that South Korea is a reliant consumer of the United States’ ‘strategic intelligence’ concerning North Korea’s imminent threat, this article assumes an asymmetric market for trading such information between the two allied states. Based on the autonomy–security trade-off model, South Korea may purchase the United States’ strategic intelligence about North Korea’s threat at the cost of its political autonomy. When South Korea does not offer sufficient policy concessions, however, the United States has more incentive to transmit ‘low-quality information’ because the recipient cannot challenge its authenticity, and this information may bolster the opposition parties in South Korean politics by signalling the current Korean leadership’s poor performance in the national security arena. Given the United States’ control over strategic intelligence, South Korea faces the risk of being manipulated to make policy decisions that are at odds with its own interests, but may serve US interests.