Bildungsbürgertum and Late Development: The Class Dynamic of Economic Growth in Francoist Spain

In this article, we study the effect of the Unification on the network power of economic elites in the South of Italy. We study the persistence of economic elites as evidence of the stability of the institutional set up beyond the effect of Unification, and thus as a primary explaining factor of the persistence of social forces slowing and opposing modernization. We use original archival data on the universe of Naples enterprises to build the networks of business relations between individual economic actors for the 20-year period immediately before and after Unification. The persistence of network power and its determinants is tested via a difference-in-difference model. The main finding is that economic elites persist over Unification. The long-term business relations, rooted in the Bourbon period, the persisting lobbying power of the financial industry, the close collusive ties with potential foreign competitors and the closeness to politics after 1861 are all elements that explain how the Southern economic elites were able to crowd-out the change.

This article has two primary aims: first, to provide a non-sectorial history of business interest associations in Italy from 1861 to 1914, and second, to introduce a novel interpretation of the logic behind their collective actions. The study identifies three distinct periods in the evolution of these associations in liberal Italy, each defined by a unique collective action logic: the homogeneity phase (1861-1881), the fragmentation phase (1881-1898), and the conflict phase (1898-1914). In the homogeneity phase, there was a general unity among Italy’s political and economic elites, particularly among landowners who favored an antiprotectionist stance to support Italy’s agricultural export economy. This period was characterized by a relative uniformity of interests despite some conflicts. The fragmentation phase began in 1881, driven by the agricultural crises and the rise of new economic elites in the agrarian and industrial sectors. These new players challenged the traditional landowners and existing policies, leading to a diversification of economic interests and the splintering of their organizational representations. The final conflict phase occurred during the Giolittian Era, marked by the rapid development of organizations amid growing class struggles in both the industrial and agricultural sectors. This period saw significant adaptation within capitalist structures to counter the rising labor movement. The article ultimately examines the changing nature, scale, and scope of business interest organizations in response to the evolving phases of Italian capitalism from 1861 to 1914. It highlights how the transformation of these organizations reflects broader shifts in the relationships between the economy, state, and society.

Introduction to the Special Issue on Class Dynamics from Socialism to Post-Socialism

The paper summarizes the crucial concerns of the author's two major book contributions (see note above) to peace research and peace policy. On the basis of some hypotheses about militarism as a means of societal rule, the economic role of arma ment-expenditures, particularly in the Federal Re public, are described. It is shown that, since the middle of the 1950s, there has existed an intensive interest on the part of industry for high domestic armament orders of the government. The principles of disarmament economics are discussed; and the absence of any governmental effort in this direction as well as the general aver sion of the economic power elite against effective economic alternatives (welfare planning etc.) to a militarization of (parts of) the economy are noted. Principles for a socially oriented peace policy in Western Europe are then formulated. These are based on the ideas of strong intensification of socio-economic and socio-cultural exchange (learn ing processes) between Western and Eastern Europe and a growing cooperation of the progressive social forces in Western Europe.

Inequality and taxation are fundamental problems of modern times. How and when can democracies tax economic elites? This book develops a theoretical framework that refines and integrates the classic concepts of business's instrumental (political) power and structural (investment) power to explain the scope and fate of tax initiatives targeting economic elites in Latin America after economic liberalization. In Chile, business's multiple sources of instrumental power, including cohesion and ties to right parties, kept substantial tax increases off the agenda. In Argentina, weaker business power facilitated significant reform, although specific sectors, including finance and agriculture, occasionally had instrumental and/or structural power to defend their interests. In Bolivia, popular mobilization counterbalanced the power of economic elites, who were much stronger than in Argentina but weaker than in Chile. The book's in-depth, medium-N case analysis and close attention to policymaking processes contribute insights on business power and prospects for redistribution in unequal democracies.

The article provides a descriptive characteristics and classification of media support theories as a factor of external influence in conflict situations. In accordance with this goal, groups of neo-Marxist, poststructuralist, and socio-behavioral theories are identified. It is determined that the set of general theoretical postulates of the first group is, firstly, the postulate on the usurpation of media power by political and economic elites who are behind the financing and social patronage of cultural industries. Secondly, the postulate of information distortion, which consists in the fact that monopolizing classes are interested in forming a distorted picture of social reality. Thirdly, the postulate of forming a unified strategy of influence in the media space by power and economic elites, in respect of which media actors are considered mainly as repeaters of discourses. It is determined that a set of general theoretical postulates of the second group is the recognition of linguistic (rhetorical and linguistic) factors of media support as the key ones. Secondly, the consideration of media actors as relatively independent producers of discourses, which have an independent meaning in the sphere of influence in comparison with social groups and institutions. Thirdly, the postulate regarding the positioning of supranational identities through language and the use of a specific (globalistic) vocabulary is of great importance for poststructuralism.

How is populism distributed over the political spectrum? Are right-wing parties more populist than left-wing parties? Based on the analysis of 32 parties in five Western European countries between 1989 and 2008, we show that radical parties on both the left and the right are inclined to employ a populist discourse. This is a striking finding, because populism in Western Europe has typically been associated with the radical right; only some particular radical left parties have been labeled populist as well. This article suggests that the contemporary radical left in Western Europe is generally populist. Our explanation is that many contemporary radical left parties are not traditionally communist or socialist (anymore). They do not focus on the ‘proletariat’, but glorify a more general category: the ‘good people’. Moreover, they do not reject the system of liberal democracy as such, but only criticize the political and/or economic elites within that system.

This article summarizes a study of the political, bureaucratic and economic elites in Spain, from the Franco regime through the democratic transition to the socialist governments of the 1990s. Data on the people holding posts in one or more of these elite groups were used to test and extend the theory of elite circulation first formulated by Vilfredo Pareto. The data confirms that Spanish elites became more open to others in the democratic period. Up to the present time, they continue to be integrated through multi‐positionality – many bureaucrats also hold political or economic posts – though to a lesser extent than in the past. Our empirical findings enable finer distinctions to be made about the different modes of elite circulation. These results show the changing nature of the networks that form when posts in different sectors become associated through multiple post‐holding. These networks are an important component of the social fabric in Spain and elsewhere and deserve further investigation.

This paper examines the changing boundaries of statehood resulting from transformations in the nature and operation of public and private authority over local and global politico-legal orders. Transformations in the political purposes of states are being driven by powerful elites who advance a new form of constitutional governance. New constitutionalism, as evidenced by the investor-state regime, subordinates the interests, purposes, and rights of national citizens to those of foreign, transnational politico-legal, and economic elites. This regime is a highly privatized order that is expanding in influence, both in terms of the commercial activities under its remit, and in terms of its procedural operation and its normative influence. The specific focus of this paper is on the investor-state regime, which is contributing to the expansion of private power and authority in the settlement of investment disputes. This regime is effecting two transformations in the scope and nature of statehood. One transformation involves the imposition of severe limits upon the legislative and policy autonomy of national governments that are being developed and enforced by private commercial actors without public accountability. In agreeing to protect the private property rights of foreign investors against legislation or public policy that might impair foreign investment, states are also limited in their abilities to ensure the protection of the social, economic, or human rights of their peoples. However, this expansion of private power and authority is generating a countermovement in the form of resistance to the regime. This resistance is giving rise to a conflicting transformation in statehood as national governments seek to regain their policy and legislative autonomy. In some cases, the impetus comes from local sources, while in others it emanates from global and international human rights fora. This paper begins with an overview of the operational nature of the investor-state regime and new constitutionalism, revealing how the procedural and substantive provisions of the regime reach deep inside states to set clear limits on their legislative and policy autonomy. It then examines a selection of cases before investor-state tribunals that reveal contestation and resistance to the regime through the reassertion by state governments of their sovereignty and through the influence of international human rights. It concludes with an exploration of the potential for this regime to advance human rights protections and suggests a few changes that might enhance the regime’s democratic legitimacy.

To understand neoliberalism in Serbia, one has to go back to the time of Slobodan Milosevic. Of central importance to the rule of Milosevic was the direct political supervision of the country's economic elite. In Milosevic's Serbia the primary means of capital accumulation did not take place in the market. To the contrary, the major financial profits to be had were achieved via state intervention – in other words through state monopoly, systematic privileges, monetary speculation and shady financial transactions, generalized larceny and appropriation of property, illegal imports, and backroom deals and bribes. It was a given that, in such a system, the power elite could not only easily convert their own “political capital” into real financial gains, but could also control and influence the flow and direction of the entire economy.

The organizational culture elite is studied as a new elite group emerging within a stable neo-corporatist state. Does this new elite adopt existing modes of operation or place itself at bay from the more established elite groups? The emergence of and changes in the culture elite are discussed from a historical perspective in terms of social background, recruitment processes, occupational careers, gender composition, political outlooks, lobbying, and media strategies. The culture elite is systematically compared to two other elites: the university elite, the most similar among the elites, and the economic elite, assumedly representing the greatest contrast. Despite special characteristics in the social situations and political views of the culture elite, it is concluded that the mode of operation of this group indicates a high degree of adaptability to the general system of elites. A main reason is assumed to be the integrative power and liberal quality of the state in a neo-corporatist regime.

What explains the persistence of racial or ethnic inequalities in descriptive representation in the absence of strongly politicized racial or ethnic cleavages? This article uses new data to demonstrate a substantial racial gap between voters and politicians in Brazil. The authors show that this disparity is not plausibly due to racial preferences in the electorate as a whole, for instance, deference toward white candidates or discrimination against nonwhites, and that barriers to candidate entry or discrimination by party leaders do not likely explain the gap. Instead, they document persistent resource disparities between white and nonwhite candidates, including large differences in personal assets and campaign contributions. The findings suggest that elite closure—investments by racial and economic elites on behalf of elite candidates—help perpetuate a white political class, even in the absence of racialized politics. By underscoring this avenue through which representational disparities persist, the article contributes to research on elite power in democratic settings.

This article examines the mechanisms behind the formation and transformation of Algeria’s economic elite during the formative phase of its post-independence statehood – from 1962 to the mid-1970s. Against the backdrop of far-reaching political changes and the consolidation of power by the FLN, the Algerian leadership launched efforts to define a national path for economic development and to rebuild key sectors through the creation of new administrative and industrial infrastructures. One of the key objectives of this article is to identify the individuals who were appointed to lead the country’s major state-owned enterprises, which became central to implementing Algeria’s industrialization strategy. The empirical section of the article focuses on biographical case studies of CEOs at Sonatrach, Société nationale de sidérurgie, Crédit Populaire d’Algérie, and Air Algérie. Methodologically, the study applies a sociobiographical approach based on memoirs, archival publications, press clippings, and interviews, which together reveal correlations between broader political processes and elite formation trends. The analysis highlights consistent links between political loyalty, educational background, participation in the national liberation struggle, and access to top positions in economic sphere. The article emphasizes the role of informal networks in shaping elite trajectories, including regional identity, revolutionary credentials, filiation, and clan-based loyalties. The article argues that membership in the economic elite was determined not solely by technical or managerial competence, but also by proximity to ruling political elites. It also underscores how elite reproduction mechanisms were often institutionalized and persisted across political transitions, reinforcing a stable governing class during the early years of independent Algeria.

PurposeContemporary literature has paid scholarly attention to financial criminal practice from a variety of competing perspectives. However, this paper seeks to encourage reflections on some questionable practices of the political and economic elite which increase their capital accumulation but harm citizens.Design/methodology/approachWithin a socio‐political framework, this study adopts the theories of the developmental state and globalisation in order to understand the relationship between social agency and society, and focuses on the institutional structures and the role of social actors.FindingsThe paper used publicly available documents to construct case studies to provide some evidence of the strategies and tactics used by political elite to facilitate their capital accumulations. Evidence is provided to show that large sums of government revenue have been undermined by the financial criminal practices of the Nigerian political and economic elite (both local and international), which have enriched a few, but impoverished most, Nigerians.Practical implicationsFinancial criminal practices have played a major role in causing serious damage to the economic and social landscape of Nigeria, which in turn, has undermined social welfare and also investment in the public services, thereby eroding the quality of life and producing a decline in average life expectancy. As a consequence of recurring corrupt practices by the political and economic elites in Nigeria, there is a need for reform in order to curb the practice which has had and continues to have, a serious effect on Nigeria and its future development.Originality/valueBroader accounts of the impact of financial criminal practices on development in developing countries are relatively scarce. Previous studies have tended to individualise the problem.

The study of late capitalist development is often characterized as a battle between protagonists of market-led versus state-led development. For the latter position, Alexander Gerschenkron looms large, as one of the most significant theorists of state-led development under conditions of relative backwardness. There are striking similarities between Gerschenkron's explication of the advantages of backwardness and Leon Trotsky's concept of uneven and combined development and the privilege of backwardness. (These similarities have been commented upon often but rarely subject to closer comparison.) Indeed, both men share a common problematic – the comprehension of how economically backward countries could skip stages of development in order to join the ranks of economically advanced countries. This article compares their conception of this problematic and illustrates how in a number of areas the two are complementary. These are: their rejection of unilinear patterns of capitalist development, their appreciation of the role of states and institutions in facilitating late development and their understanding of development as a disruptive social process. However, in crucial areas the two diverge. These are: their comprehension of international economic and political relations, the role and position of labour in late development and, ultimately, the potential for late capitalist development to unleash social upheavals and further, non-capitalist transformations. Overall, I suggest how Trotsky's and Gerschenkron's approaches can complement each other, but that ultimately they represent fundamentally opposed approaches to human development.