Hutcheson on moral obligation and its relations to virtue and right

BOOK REVIEWS 497 God and the Natural Law: A Rereading ofThomas Aquinas. By FULVIO Dr BLASI. Translated by DAVID THUNDER. South Bend, Ind.: St. Augustine's Press, 2006. Pp. 264. $37.50 (cloth). ISBN 1-58731-351-0. Fulvio Di Blasi's God and the Natural Law is a penetrating inquiry into the theological foundation ofThomistic natural law. The book is written in response to a trend among contemporary natural-lawtheorists towards a theory of natural law without God. Di Blasi rightly notes the difficulty with this position: "Natural law without God easily becomes a lex naturalis without lex" (68). According to Di Blasi, the main features of this trend are most clearly delineated in the "neoclassical theory of natural law" proposed by Germain Grisez and John Finnis. Contrary to the neoclassical natural-law theorists, Di Blasi aims to show the central importance of God in the natural law. After an introduction highlighting current trends among contemporary natural-law theories, chapter 1 examines in detail the neoclassical critique of the conventional or traditional reading of Thomas's natural-law doctrine. The conventional view, according to the critique of the neoclassical theorists, derives the content of the natural law from mere facts of nature which, of themselves, are unable to yield any sense of duty or moral obligation. Hence, conventional natural-law theorists attempt to locate the source of moral obligation in an extrinsic, arbitrarily imposed, divine command which falls prey to the "naturalistic fallacy"-the supposed fallacy of deriving an ought from an is. The neoclassical theorists instead posit principles of practical reason which are derived neither from mere facts of nature nor from the divine will, but from our primordial intuitions of basic values. Of course, the neoclassical theorists do not deny that God is the ultimate source of moral duty; rather, their claim is that moral obligation is knowable apart from any knowledge of God as a creator and providential governor. Hence, they effectively banish God from ethics and from the doctrine of natural law (neoclassical theorists find evidence for this position in Aquinas by appealing to the fact that for St. Thomas the being of God is not self-evident). Thus the contemporary trend towards natural law without God, Di Blasi points out, goes hand-in-hand with a trend towards separating ethics and metaphysics. This sets up Di Blasi's own account of natural law in chapters 2 and 3. In chapter 2, Di Blasi turns to an analysis of the necessary theological presuppositions of Aquinas's natural-law doctrine. His aim is to show that the natural law depends upon a natural knowledge of God (not only known by means of unaided human reason, but also accessible in some way to all men) and the natural inclination to love God "before oneself and with a greater love." Di Blasi begins by showing that for St. Thomas natural moral goodness is defined by conformity to the divine will since the very essence of moral action presupposes that man wants something because he knows that God wants it. Indeed, the notion of moral goodness as conformity to the divine will is implied in the very meaning of natural law as an extrinsic principle of human action. Natural 498 BOOK REVIEWS law not only pertains to human reason; it presupposes an authority capable of imposing its will upon other subjects. The Thomistic notion of moral goodness and the account of natural law as extrinsic principle of action, however, presuppose that we have a natural knowledge of God apart from divine revelation. Indeed, Di Blasi maintains that for Aquinas "man's moral sense is not only inseparable from his sense of God, but coextensive with it" (86). He goes on carefully to refute the claim of the neoclassical natural-law theorists that God is, for the most part, unknown to man since his existence is not self-evident. Di Blasi argues that for St. Thomas the non-self-evidence of God should not be taken as a denial of a natural knowledge of God, but as a rejection of St. Anselm's argument for the existence of God which begins with the idea of God as that-than-which...

<i>Target Centred Virtue Ethics</i>

Working out a criterion of morally right action is central to developing virtue ethics. Most advocates of virtue ethics believe that achieving such a criterion is crucial to vindicating virtue ethics as a normative theory. Yet the centrality of this task marks a departure from the views of at least some of the philosophers credited with the revival of virtue ethics in the twentieth century, especially from the views of G.E.M. Anscombe and Philippa Foot. Anscombe especially has sharp criticisms of the way philosophers handle the concept of morally right action along with related concepts like moral obligation. Yet the work of contemporary virtue ethicists such as Rosalind Hursthouse, Michael Slote, and Christine Swanton features little discussion of Anscombe’s criticisms or the reasons that the other virtue revivalists avoided providing a criterion of moral rightness. The dominant assumption appears to be that the earlier virtue revivalists neglect establishing a criterion of morally right action because their concern is to give priority to the evaluation of an agent over his acts as a corrective to the exclusive attention given to act-evaluation in the moral philosophy of the time. For Anscombe and Foot, at least, the concern to give priority to agent-evaluation is not among their motives for advocating a return to virtues. Instead, they believe that moral philosophers from the modern period forward have given the terms ‘‘right’’ and ‘‘ought’’ an artificial and incoherent sense.

Universal Principles, Global Cooperation, and Moral Disagreement:A Natural Law Account Joseph Boyle (bio) I. Introduction Since ancient times a number of Western moral views have been described or self-described as "natural law" ethics. These views claim that there are universal moral principles and norms. Moral principles, according to natural law views, are somehow "natural," and, thus, are the common property of those who share human nature. That implies that the principles of the natural law are in principle accessible to all humans. Those who accept this ethical approach are not in full agreement about the precise sense and reference of the expression "natural law" or about the specific moral norms justified by the principles of the natural law. I do not here propose to address these differences among natural law theorists. Instead, I will sketch the approach to universal moral principles that I, as a philosopher working within the natural law tradition, think correct. My approach is within the broad tradition of natural law theorizing inspired by St. Thomas Aquinas; it is the version of Thomistic natural law called the "new natural law theory."1 Natural law theories include a conception of the nature and purpose of morality. Two closely related theses comprise the key elements of this conception. The first is that moral principles, and their implications in moral norms and judgments, are propositional realities having logical relationships and normative content that can be formulated, debated and judged either correct or incorrect. Thus, natural law theory is a form of ethical rationalism; moral judgments are a form of knowledge. The second thesis holds that moral principles are universal in two senses: they are applicable to all human actions, and they are accessible to all human beings capable of the reasoning needed for choice and action. Some immediate implications of these theses are obviously important for thinking about moral diversity, difference and consensus. First, the universal applicability of moral principles implies that there are no human actions, however complex their circumstances and obscure their significance, that are in principle immune from moral assessment. Second, the universal accessibility of the principles of the natural law implies that moral norms, customs, and practices are not finally a matter of local custom or particular circumstance. Criticism in the light of accessible moral principle is always possible. Third, the conjunction of the universal accessibility of natural law and its ethical rationalism makes the possibility of recognizing mistaken moral judgment and practice more than an abstract possibility, but, instead, an ordinary, intelligible aspect of moral life and thought. Any person capable of practical reasoning and choice can access enough of moral principle to criticize his or her own moral beliefs and those of his or her society. That capability is obviously ethically significant. Its availability in reflection to people generally implies that they are not simply stuck with the moral limitations and corruption of their culture, upbringing, and life experience; they have the resources for critical judgment and autonomous action based on that reflection. These claims about the nature of morality may now seem quaint given some defining features of post-modernity. The conjunction of two features of our post-modern world poses a special problem for natural law theory: (1) the rapidly emerging globalization of economic, social and political life; and (2) the pervasiveness of post-modern relativism, and "local-only" conceptions of morality. These conceptions reject the universalist theses I listed above. But they do so in a globalized context calling for moral guidance for the world-wide interactions that transcend the moralities of local communities and their members. Together these features challenge the core convictions of natural law theory. In this contribution, I will briefly articulate and defend these strong natural law claims about the nature of morality, and will bring natural law theory to bear on the challenge posed to them by the realities of our post-modern and globalized situation. I will develop this account as follows: In part II, I will summarize the account of the human good that underlies morality according to natural law theories that follow Aquinas's classic treatment. In Part III, I will sketch an account of how universal moral principles are justified...

This article introduces the definition and connotation of the term Natural Law and Natural Moral Law. It also explains briefly the important viewpoints of the Chinese and Western philosophy and theology. The article especially cites Thomas Aquinas' view on the gradations of law among the 'Eternal Law', 'Natural Law'. 'Divine Law' and 'Human Law' and his theories on common moral and the transcendent moral. This article also explains the stand points of Ockham, Martin Luther and John Calvin, in either objecting or amending the theological aspect of the theory of Natural Moral Law. It also touches on the ethical studies of the segregation between moral and religions during ancient Greece and the Enlightenment Project. Secondly, there is a discussion on Buddhism's perspective of the Natural Law -the Law of Dependent Origination that explains that all phenomena arises and ceases according to causes and conditions and that our life is filled with ignorance and self-love (ego desire). The 'self-love' that everyone is equipped can in fact be cultivated into an opposite direction so that one develops a sense of sharing the feelings of others by putting oneself in others' shoes. The practice of putting oneself in others' shoes, the interrelationship among the dependent originated phenomena and the equanimity of the dharma nature of dependent origination, are the three major principles of Moral Law encompassed in the Natural Law. From the perspective of Buddhism, moral norms and moral principles all originate from Natural Moral Law. Even the norms formulated by the Buddha are still founded on Natural Moral Law to help practitioners develop wholesome moral habits during the process of practice. Moral and meritorious joy are not the apocalyptic or kindness bestowed by a god. According to Buddhism's theory of consistency in virtues and merits, the gods reap the merits of being reborn in heaven according to the virtuous deeds that they have done in the past. The practice of wholesome deeds with the hope of gaining good rewards; has its relative values in preventing one from doing bad and try to be good. However this can only lead to a limited degree of meritorious reward. We should not practice virtues just for the sake of gaining meritorious rewards. We should practice upholding precepts with the mind of putting ourselves in others positions, practice giving with the realisation of emptiness in three aspects (namely, realise that the donor, recipient and the item that is being donated are empty in nature) or non-attachment to the four forms. In this way we can pave our way to the noble stage.

Atheist moral philosopher Erik Wielenberg recently argued that Divine Command Theory is implausible as an explanation of objective morality because it fails to explain how psychopaths have moral obligations. In this paper I explain that everyone agrees the consciences of psychopaths don’t work as they should, but there’s disagreement among experts as to whether: A. The consciences of psychopaths don’t inform them of what’s right and wrong and that they should do what’s right or B. The consciences of psychopaths do inform them of these things but merely don’t generate the appropriate moral emotions. I argue that, based on the psychological research, a strong case can be made for B and thus under DCT psychopaths do have moral obligations because their consciences inform them of what’s right from wrong and that they should do what’s right. I also argue that even if A is true, God can, and does, make psychopaths aware of what’s right and wrong and that they should do what’s right through other means such as rationality, society, parents, culture, direct verbal commands, etc. Therefore, even if A is true, then psychopaths still have moral obligations under DCT because they do know what’s right from wrong and that they should do what’s right. Lastly, I turn the tables on Wielenberg and point out that his theory is even worse than DCT when it comes to providing an explanation for the moral rights and obligations of psychopaths

What a Natural Law Theory Claims My aim here is to provide an account of how an adherent of the natural law tradition should approach the topic of the desirability of a uniform planetary ethic. The term ‘natural law theory’ is notoriously slippery, and there are uses of it that are so broad as to fail to distinguish it from a variety of moral views (for example, utilitarianism, Kantianism) with which it is customarily taken to compete. While much is controversial about the definition of ‘natural law theory,’ it is not controversial that Thomas Aquinas is the paradigmatic natural law theorist, and that there are certain general features of Aquinas's view that structure his ethical thought. So I will take these features of Aquinas's view to be what distinguishes natural law theory from other moral views. What are those features? For Aquinas, natural law can be examined from the ‘God's eye’ and the ‘human's eye’ points of view. When we focus on God's role as the giver of the natural law, the natural law is just one aspect of divine providence. When we focus on the human's role as recipient of the natural law, the natural law constitutes the principles of practical rationality, those principles by which human action is to be judged as reasonable or unreasonable. I will here put to the side Aquinas's emphasis that the natural law is tied to divine providence, instead focusing on the natural law as the basis of practical reasoning.

Classical natural law theory derives moral conclusions from the essentialist and teleological understanding of nature enshrined in classical metaphysics. The paper argues that this understanding of nature is as defensible today as it was in the days of Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, and Aquinas. It then shows how a natural law theory of the grounds and content of our moral obligations follows from this understanding of nature, and how a doctrine of natural rights follows in turn from the theory of natural law. With this background in place, the implications of the theory for questions about property rights and taxation are explored. It is argued that classical natural law theory entails the existence of a natural right of private property, and that this right is neither so strong as to supportlaissez fairelibertarianism, nor so weak as to allow for socialism. Though the theory leaves much of the middle ground between these extremes open to empirical rather than moral evaluation, it is argued that there is a strong natural law presumption against social democratic policies and in favor of free enterprise.

abstract: In the Prolegomena to De Jure Belli ac Pacis , Hugo Grotius expounds his theory of natural law by way of reply to a skeptical challenge from the Greek Academic Carneades. Though this dialectical context is undeniably important for understanding Grotian natural law, commentators disagree about the substance of Carneades’s challenge. This paper aims to give a definitive reading of Carneades’s skeptical argument, and, by reconstructing Grotius’s reply, to settle some longstanding debates about Grotius’s conception of natural law. I argue that Grotius held a Stoic view of natural law, endorsing both the doctrine of eudaimonism and the claim that moral obligations are natural, not grounded in divine command. Consequently, Grotius’s view of natural law has more continuity with premodern, indeed ancient, morality than is usually supposed. However, I argue that we can still understand Grotius as a founder of modern moral philosophy.

This article analyzes the law's pattern and debate between the theory of natural law, positivism, Islamic law, and customary law associated with the construction of its source and hierarchy. Second, the comparative perspective between Islamic Law and Conventional Law uses The Theory of Natural Law and the Positivism Theory of Law as fundamental analysis. The study used a comparative approach to know the synthetic elements of the four regular patterns. The results of this study show that, first, the Theory of Law of nature has a substantial relevance with Islamic law in aspects of its highest source, legal relationship with morals, and recognition to ratio. Legal positivism develops regulations with empirical approaches and scientific methods. Still, this idea ignores the metaphysical aspects, moral aspects, and aspects of justice in law. Customary law is a modern legal theory that substantially has a logical connection with the idea of legal positivism. Second, the Theory of Legal Positivism adheres to analytical principles by prioritizing the law. Positivism separates the law from morals and justice. The law of nature as a classical theory requires the transformation of the law in the current era. Islamic law is a modern theory that confirms the legal character of the theory of natural law.

Consent and Natural Law Theories, Classical and Contemporary There is a popular but false story concerning the connection between the rise of consent theories of political authority and the fall of natural law theories of political authority. The story is, to put it crudely, that the rise of consent theory in the modern period coincided with, and came as a result of, the fall of the natural law theory that dominated during the medieval period. Neat though it is, the story errs doubly, for it supposes both that consent did not play a key role in natural law theories of political authority offered in the medieval period (a supposition falsified by close inspection of the view of Aquinas, the paradigmatic natural law theorist; see Murphy 1997a) and that natural law theory did not play a key role in the consent theories of political authority offered in the modern period (a supposition falsified by close inspection of the views of Hobbes and Locke, perhaps paradigmatic consent theorists; for Hobbes as a natural law theorist, see, for example, Murphy 1995, and for Locke, see, for example, Tuckness 1999). It is bad history to set up natural law and consent theories of political authority as unqualifiedly antagonistic to each other. But it is not an unfair description of the accounts of political authority offered by contemporary natural law theorists to say that these accounts were developed in self-conscious opposition to voluntaristic accounts of political obligation, and that their formulations rule out as normatively unnecessary a citizen's consent to adhere to the dictates of the civil law.

Securing the Foundations:Karol Wojtyła's Thomistic Personalism in Dialogue with Natural Law Theory Petar Popoviß Introduction Any attempt to exhaustively present the contributions of Karol Wojtyła's Thomistic personalism as elaborated in his pre-pontifical philosophical writings to the theory of natural law is surely not a task that can be easily reduced to a summary overview of Wojtyła's ready-made arguments. In his writings, John Paul II did not, in fact, reflect extensively on the topic of "natural law" as an immediate object of his philosophical enquiries. We can find only a few explicit references to it in his 1969 magnum opus The Acting Person, while a substantial philosophical argumentation on this subject in the immediate textual context of these references is virtually nonexistent. In his only philosophical text explicitly dedicated to the topic of natural law, entitled "The Human Person and Natural Law,"1 also from 1969, a more extensive elaboration on brief references to St. Thomas Aquinas's definitions of natural law is completely absent. Even in his later pontifical documents, John Paul II hardly ever extensively referred to natural law in its classic Thomistic formulation until his 1993 encyclical letter Veritatis Splendor.2 However, such a notable absence of explicit references [End Page 231] to natural law did not discourage Kenneth L. Schmitz, the author of one of the most significant studies of Wojtyła's philosophical project, from repeatedly highlighting the importance of Wojtyła's "personalist approach to natural law" and of his underscoring the "personal dimension within the metaphysics of natural law."3 How can an author who is so reluctant to avail himself of classical natural law discourse be, at the same time, celebrated as an important contributor to its more adequate comprehension? In this paper, we will aim to postulate that Wojtyła enters into an enriching dialogue with the Thomistic theory of natural law, in both its classical and its contemporary formulations, on a specific systematic level that does not directly engage the classic elements of natural law theory (such as natural inclinations, first precepts of natural law, etc.). We will show that Wojtyła, rather, grounds his most important contributions to this theory within the framework of his specific methodology of Thomistic personalism,4 which he held to be essential [End Page 232] to secure more completely the foundations5 that natural law and its adequate understanding offer to the moral and legal normative "grammar" of the humanum. The Personalistic Value of the Human Act as the Immediate Conceptual Context of Wojtyła's Contributions to Natural Law Theory In order to present Karol Wojtyła's contributions to natural law theory, we will first have to delimit the immediate conceptual context of his arguments on the topic. In his writings, he touches upon the topic of natural law in three distinctive ways. First, he sometimes only incidentally refers to some general topics of natural law theory while pursuing his personalistic line of argumentation, only to arrive at the already firmly established conclusions within the theory itself.6 Second, he sometimes, though seldom, explicitly refers to the concept of "natural law" (Polish: prawo naturalne) in order to invoke elements of the classical theory of natural law and to touch upon elements of his philosophical contribution to the theory from the perspective of Thomistic personalism.7 Finally, Wojtyła, at times, and without explicitly invoking the [End Page 233] term, provides arguments that represent his genuine, more developed contributions to the theory of natural law from his own specific philosophical perspective of Thomistic personalism. The first approach to the concept of natural law is not taken into consideration in this paper, while the second has already been thoroughly researched at length by other authors.8 Instead, this paper seeks to present the key elements of Wojtyła's third approach to the understanding of natural law—namely, his arguments on the enriching potential of viewing natural law from the perspective of the analysis of the personalistic value of the human act as the immediate object of philosophical analysis. We have elaborated at greater length on Wojtyła's concept of "the personalistic value of...

Three Forms of Political Ethics

The Coherence of a Mind: John Locke and the Law of Nature* Alex Tuckness it is almost thirty years since John Dunn’s book, The Political Thought of John Locke, argued that a more coherent understanding of Locke was possible if his religious beliefs were taken to play a crucial role in his political theory.1 Since that time many scholars have expanded our historical knowledge of the role of religion in Locke’s political thought.2 This article will not use a historical methodology, but will rather take the claim that religion is crucial to Locke’s thought as a starting point. When one combines this assumption with a careful reading of the Two Treatises of Government (Two Treatises), The Reasonableness of Christianity as Delivered in Scripture (The Reasonableness), and the Essay Concerning Human Understanding (Essay), significant progress in resolving many of the long-standing difficulties in Locke’s theory of natural law is possible. The difficulties are indeed serious. Prior to Locke there was a long standing theological debate about whether the laws of nature were binding because they were the command of God (voluntarism) or binding because of their intrinsic compatibility with reason (“rationalism” or “intellectualism”). There has been much dispute about whether Locke was consistently a voluntarist or not.3 Second, Locke argues in the Essay that the principles of morality are [End Page 73] capable of proof just like principles of geometry, yet Locke never produced a proof of the law of nature. In the Second Treatise the laws of nature are more asserted than defended, as if they were self-evident, yet in The Reasonableness Locke says that it is exceedingly difficult to discover the moral law through reason alone and says that no one has ever discovered the complete law of nature through unaided reason. It appears that Locke “… went on believing the arguments of the Second Treatise were plainly true even after he knew he could not properly ground them in natural law… .”4 Third, Straussians have been quick to point out that Locke adopted a hedonistic theory of human motivation and of good and evil, a position which seems to sit poorly with a Christian theory of natural law. Locke claimed that men5 were motivated to obey the law of nature by their perception of future pleasure or pain and that divine sanctions in the next life were necessary for the law of nature to be a proper law, yet later in life Locke admitted his inability to prove the existence of an afterlife.6 Fourth, the account of moral knowledge in the Essay seems to sit poorly with Locke’s account of natural law in the Two Treatises; his commitment in the latter to empiricism is questionable and the law of nature is presented with little argument as if it were obvious. Laslett has argued that the difficulties are so severe that Locke the philosopher of knowledge and Locke the political thinker should be kept very separate.7 This article will respond to each of these difficulties in order to show that Locke’s theory of natural law is more coherent than his critics have allowed. 1. the ground of natural law: rationalism and voluntarism The early Essays on the Law of Nature of Locke link morality to conformity with the rule of a superior; it is the will of God which provides the essential binding force of the law of nature. (ELN 183–185)8 In the Essay Concerning Human [End Page 74] Understanding, this theme continues. “I grant the existence of God, is so many ways manifest, and the Obedience we owe him, so congruous to the Light of Reason, that a great part of Mankind give Testimony to the Law of Nature”: But nonetheless many affirm these principles not “admitting the true ground of Morality; which can only be the Will and Law of a God, who sees Men in the dark, has in his Hand Rewards and Punishments, and Power enough to call to account the Proudest Offender” (Essay 1.3.6). There are, however, passages which seem to point to a more rationalist account of morality. When Locke writes in the Two Treatises that...

Reviewed by: Aquinas’s Theory of Natural Law: An Analytic Reconstruction by Anthony J. Lisska V. Bradley Lewis Anthony J. Lisska. Aquinas’s Theory of Natural Law: An Analytic Reconstruction. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996. Pp. xv + 320. Paper, $24.95. This volume aims to provide an explication of the natural law theory of St. Thomas Aquinas “consistent with the expectation of philosophers in the analytic tradition” (10–11, 17). Accordingly, the author begins, in the first three chapters, by reviewing the recent history of Anglo-American metaethics, aligning himself broadly with those critics of analytic ethics like G. E. M. Anscombe, Alasdair MacIntyre, John Finnis, Martha Nussbaum, and Henry Veatch, who have argued for a recovery of Aristotelian moral theory, against varieties of intuitionism, non-cognitivism, and neo-Kantianism. Lisska’s principal objective is to present a reconstructed natural law theory based primarily on Aquinas’s discussion in questions 90–97 of the prima secundae of the Summa theologiae (a translation of these questions is appended to the book). This he offers mostly in the fourth, fifth and eighth chapters of the book. The sixth chapter is a critique of John Finnis’s account of natural law and the seventh is an exposition of the views of Henry [End Page 526] Veatch. The ninth chapter presents some suggestions on how the author’s account can illuminate controversies over the grounding of human rights, and the tenth is a brief conclusion. The three introductory chapters consist mainly of a review and endorsement of the critics of academic ethics since Moore’s Prıncipia Ethıca. Having accepted arguments for the inadequacy of modern ethics, Lisska argues for the recovery of Aquinas’s views which he sees as in fundamental continuity with Aristotelian ethics (84, 89, 100, 102–105, 108, 134–36). His central thesis is that natural law is a “second-order inquiry” based on a realist metaphysics of the human person as defined by a set of dispositional properties, the realization of which constitutes Aristotelian eudaimonia and Thomistic beatitudo (17, 104–106, 131–37, 152–55, 186, 195–201). Moreover, Lisska contends that Aristotelian “eudaimonism” constitutes an adequate account of moral obligation: what he calls, after Veatch, “obligatory teleology” (107–109, 121, 202–205, 235). At the core of Lisska’s account, then, is a metaphysical dispute that pits Aristotelian essentialism against modern reductionist ontology. This metaphysical core is separated from any theological implications in the fifth chapter (especially 119–23, 137) and Lisska reinforces his metaphysical thesis by appealing to Saul Kripke’s discussion of natural kinds and the early work of Hilary Putnam (97–99, 125, 206–209). Given the centrality of metaphysical argument, a critique of Finnis’s theory goes without saying, and Lisska devotes a chapter to it, adding another to expound Henry Veatch’s contrary view. While this book undertakes an important effort to recover a workable natural law theory—especially in its commendable stress on metaphysical questions—it is, as a whole, less satisfactory than it might have been. A good part of this owes to the book’s abstraction from historical questions. No sustained attention is devoted to the problems that accompanied the reception of Aristotle by Christian theologians, nor to the place of natural law in Aquinas’s overall understanding of morality. The former point is not so surprising, given the book’s analytic concerns; the latter, however, carries more serious theoretical implications. Why is it, for example, that natural law takes up so little space compared to the questions on happiness, human acts, and the habits and virtues in the prima secundae, not to mention the detailed treatments of the virtues and vices in the secunda secundae? Similarly, where Aquinas stresses that natural law as law is directed to the common good (Iallae 90.2), Lisska treats it mostly as a guide to “self-realization.” This issue suggests the tensions between Aristotle and Aquinas, tensions that seem to show themselves precisely in Aquinas’s discussion of the very notion of natural law, a notion that has no equivalent in Aristotle. This question hangs over Lisska’s brief treatment of obligation, in particular, since that concept is also lacking explicit treatment in...