Human rights and populism

At the present stage of their development the Ukrainian society and the state are characterized by their pursuit to provide maximum realization of human and civil rights and to create a full-scale civil society. Obviously, in this context, a significant attention is paid to the human rights in Ukraine, however there is insufficient research systematically conceptualizing the human rights employing philosophical and legal instruments and methodology. The author highlights that particular attention in the mechanism of organizational and legal remedies is paid to judicial and extrajudicial protection of human and civil rights. In accordance with the Article 55 of the Constitution of Ukraine the judicial protection of human and civil rights is maintained through the system of general jurisdiction courts of Ukraine. The state ensures the right of every person to appeal in court against any decisions, actions or inactivity of the state bodies, local self-government bodies and government officials that violate human and civil rights. In case of exhausting all remedies of his/her rights and liberties protection in national courts the person can appeal to the international courts, e.g. to the European Court of Human Rights. At present, Ukraine holds the third position in the number of its citizens’ appeals to this distinguished international legal institution. Every person is able to appeal to the extrajudicial institutions authorized to protect the constitutional human and civil rights and liberties. In Ukraine there is a special body for this purpose — the Ukrainian Parliament Commissioner for Human Rights, whose activities are determined by the Law of Ukraine «On the Ukrainian Parliament Commissioner for Human Rights» of 23 December, 1997. In case when all extrajudicial remedies of human rights protection are exhausted, a person has the right, guaranteed by the Constitution of Ukraine, to appeal to the international human rights organizations (Art. 55). In terms of the current theory and practice of guaranteeing the constitutional human and civil rights, together with the national regulatory, organizational and legal guarantees, it is worth to distinguish the international guarantees of the constitutional human and civil rights and liberties in Ukraine. The special international legal guarantees of the human and civil rights and liberties are usually divided into regulatory and institutional ones. Key words: human and civil rights and liberties, constitutional state, national legal doctrine, international law, imitation of human rights, constitutional and legal mechanism for ensuring human rights and liberties.

Regional human rights courts like the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR), and the African Court of Human and People's Rights (ACtHPR) have become popular sites of mobilization for victims and activists who seek justice when justice fails at home. Besides being platforms for individual remedy, human rights courts increasingly shape social norms and state policy within countries, making them attractive avenues for rights advocates to develop new norms or to push domestic authorities to reform legislation. The judges of these courts can decide, for example, whether same-sex couples have a right to be married, if prisoners have the right to vote or receive HIV/AIDS treatment, or when a state can deport illegal immigrants to a country where they will likely be tortured. As these courts pass their judgments, they often find themselves in conflict with states that are violating human rights of marginalized groups on a large scale and are unwilling to implement international rulings. Although international human rights courts have become increasingly popular venues among victims and activists who seek justice when justice fails at home, we are only beginning to understand how activists play roles in shaping the development of regional human rights courts' case law—the body of judgments that shapes how judges will make their decisions in the future. We now have plenty of international relations and international legal research on the interactions between states and international courts: how judges in these courts wrestle between deferring to the interests of member state governments whose actions are on trial and sticking closely to the conventions' fundamental yet evolving principles (Alter et al., 2019; Helfer & Voeten, 2014). As some states begin to resist international courts' authority, scholars have begun to examine the dynamics of this backlash (Hillebrecht, 2022; Madsen et al., 2018; Sandholtz et al., 2018). Recent studies have also demonstrated that human rights advocates—whether NGOs or individual lawyers—have a significant impact on shaping the jurisprudence of international courts and the impact judgments have in concrete locations (Kahraman, 2018; Sundstrom, 2014; van der Vet, 2012; Kurban, 2020; Conant, 2018; Harms, 2021; Cichowski, 2016; Hodson, 2011; Haddad, 2018). Meanwhile, these advocates themselves have been subject to repression and stigmatization by governments as part of the backlash phenomenon. Without an adequate understanding of the factors shaping activists' engagement with international courts, we risk undervaluing their strategic impact on the expansion of case law, the human rights protection of marginalized groups who cannot find remedies at home, and the domestic implementation of these judgments in an age of state backlash. In this section, we summarize the three papers contained in this symposium and their original contributions to these themes. Over the last decade, dozens of countries have erected legal barriers or started vilifying campaigns to stymie the work of NGOs (Buyse, 2018; Chaudhry, 2022). One tactic in this toolkit is the enactment of burdensome regulation on NGOs that receive funds from foreign donors as they allegedly promote foreign agendas (Christensen & Weinstein, 2013; Dupuy et al., 2021). States that frequently abuse human rights are especially prone to target NGOs that engage in strategic litigation (Hillebrecht, 2019). Most NGOs depend on foreign funding, and NGOs that litigate international cases fall disproportionately in this category, but do funders affect the selection of cases? In “Foreign Agents or Agents of Justice? Private Foundations, NGO Backlash, and International Human Rights Litigation,” Heidi Haddad and Lisa Sundstrom examine the extent to which Western donors, particularly private foundations, have encouraged NGOs in Europe to litigate at the ECtHR as a human rights advocacy strategy. They examine overall patterns of donor funding and NGO litigation records, and look in more detail at the case of Russian NGOs' foreign funding and litigation records. The analysis is extremely timely, as the Russian government's criminalization of independent civil society actors, especially in the human rights field, and their accusation that foreign funding turns NGOs into “foreign agents” have been crucial elements of the Russian regime's autocratization. This claim has also provided fuel for Russia's disenchantment with the ECtHR in recent years, contributing to the assessment of many observers that Russia's full-scale attack on Ukraine was the last straw in an inevitable collision course leading to its exit from the Council of Europe. Haddad and Sundstrom debunk the idea that foreign donors are pushing NGOs toward strategies of human rights litigation. Instead, they argue, there is more evidence that NGOs themselves promoted the mechanism of international litigation as a strategy that donors later adopted. This article is a poignant reminder of the advocacy tools that Russian human rights activists and citizens have lost as a result of their government's departure from the Council of Europe, including ECtHR jurisdiction. Yet it also provides insight into the likely roles of foreign donors in other country cases where NGOs are using international court litigation as a human rights advocacy strategy, which is often a target of the ire of national governments, as explored in the next article in the symposium. When states attack human rights NGOs within their borders and/or international human rights courts themselves, how does this affect the willingness of those NGOs to take cases to international courts, and the ways in which they do so? De Silva and Plagis ask this question in their article about state backlash against NGOs in the case of Tanzania and the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights. A fascinating empirical question they pose is: does state backlash against NGOs increase NGO litigation at international courts (to contest state repression at those courts and use international mechanisms when domestic ones are not available), roughly in line with Keck and Sikkink's famous “boomerang pattern” (Keck & Sikkink, 1998), or decrease it due to heightened fear and restricted NGO capabilities that state repression creates? Employing a process-tracing analysis of NGOs' involvement in three cases before the African Court at different stages of the Tanzanian government's backlash against the Court, De Silva and Plagis find that “two-level backlash” by states can result in both phenomena, either promoting or deterring NGO legal mobilization at international human rights courts, depending on certain conditions. The three selected cases concerning the death penalty, the rights of persons with albinism, and the rights of pregnant schoolgirls and mothers, which took place at different time periods, demonstrate a number of patterns of state backlash interacting with NGO strategies. The authors find that domestic-level state backlash deterred domestic NGOs from partnering with international NGOs in litigation, but that such backlash, when it repressed domestic political and legal mobilization opportunities, actually encouraged both Tanzanian and international NGOs to turn to the African Court more frequently to seek remedies. International-level backlash in turn only deterred NGOs from international litigation when such backlash consisted of state efforts to restrict NGOs' ability to engage in litigation, and not when the international backlash was in the form of routine noncompliance with African Court rulings. Importantly, the authors find that NGO responses to state backlash were significantly shaped by their degree of legal consciousness and expertise with the rules, proceedings, and workings of the African Court. Those NGOs with less knowledge and experience were more likely to back away from engaging with the Court under the pressure of state backlash. De Silva and Plagis conclude that “NGOs' persistent human rights advocacy in the face of state backlash is a double-edged sword,” in the sense that they may not be deterred by state backlash initially, but there is a danger that their continued determination to engage in international litigation could prompt governments to engage in even more severe forms of backlash, with critical impacts on international courts and already vulnerable human rights defenders. Rights advocates have a growing menu of institutions and courts available to them. How do activists choose at which institution to lodge their cases in a world where legal remedies have diversified, or as some have argued, fragmented (Koskenniemi & Leino, 2002)? In “What Makes an International Institution Work for Labor Activists? Shaping International Law through Strategic Litigation,” Filiz Kahraman goes beyond the tendency of legal mobilization studies to only examine how activists interact with a single court or institution. Instead, Kahraman opens up how rights advocates imagine which institution is most receptive to their claims. Drawing on a comparative interview study of British and Turkish trade union activists and their legal mobilization campaigns at international courts and quasi-judicial institutions like the International Labor Organization (ILO), Kahraman examines how activists first probe and then strategically identify which court or international institution is most susceptible to their primary goals of influencing structural reforms and setting new norms. Through this probing process—or dynamic signaling game between courts and litigants—activists push a court's jurisprudence and case law into new issue areas. For instance, at the ECtHR, Turkish trade unionists challenged domestic courts' ruling that public sector workers did not have the right to establish unions, even though the ECtHR had no established case law on labor rights in 1990s. They won the case, with the ECtHR finding that Turkey violated the right of public sector workers to unionize. These cases not only had an impact within Turkey, but over the next decades, similar cases brought by British unionists would spin off the early precedent set by the Turkish legal mobilization efforts. Kahraman argues that they ultimately pushed the ECtHR to recognize the basic trade union rights as fundamental human rights. Kahraman sheds light on the often hidden strategies behind international litigation. Activists litigate not just for the immediate impact on the current case they work on, but how they envision that all the cases they work on may shape norms and domestic structural reforms further in the future. Whether an institution is perceptive of claims lies in the eye of the beholder. Kahraman finds that besides targeting institutions with high compliance rates, they also take cases to institutions with low rates of compliance, especially “if these institutions have extensive judicial authority to create new international norms.” So, it is not the de jure protection set by an international courts, but rather how activists perceive the juridical responsiveness and judicial authority of courts—or, how judges adopt either an activist approach or restraint in response to incoming cases and how willing states are to implement cases of a court, respectively—that determines why activists select certain courts or quasi-judicial institutions (like the ILO). Kahraman gives us new tools to interpret how activists perceive authority and receptiveness and respond to opportunities. Rather than static external legal remedies, courts and quasi-judicial institutions are opportunity structures that are malleable to the strategic vision of the activist or litigant. The articles in this symposium together reveal a number of key overlapping insights. At the broadest level, they demonstrate that activists' behaviors and strategies influence international courts' jurisprudence, politics within states, and the human rights outcomes of everyday citizens—and these influences have often been hidden in our existing canon of research on international courts. In addition, all of these articles show that, while activists may face challenges in their efforts, often including significant backlash from their home state governments, they also continue to retain significant agency through their creative efforts to develop legal strategies and circumvent state repression. Activists perennially innovate: sparking the ideas that inspire donors who fund them; calculating how to continue their litigation work when government actors threaten them; and taking risks in litigation to push courts to expand how they define human rights. However, along with these uplifting conclusions, there are worrying patterns that demand future research. States are increasingly pushing back against the powers of international courts to bind them to costly measures, and as this symposium has shown, national governments often point to activists as contributors to this “problem” of invasive international human rights standards. A growing body of research has tracked how human rights defenders of all kinds globally are under threat from actors like governments and corporations who disagree with their contentious actions. We need more studies that gather comprehensive data and systematically track these threats, specifically with regard to activists who engage in international human rights litigation. We suspect that such activists are likely disproportionately targeted due to the international visibility of their complaints. We also desperately need research into possible innovative responses to these threats to activists—responses from activists, funders, governments of countries that support human rights, and international courts themselves. Freek van der Vet is a University Researcher at the Erik Castrén Institute of International Law and Human Rights, Faculty of Law, University of Helsinki and the principal investigator of the Toxic Crimes Project. Lisa McIntosh Sundstrom is Professor of Political Science at the University of British Columbia. She is the director of the ActinCourts network at UBC and conducts research on legal mobilization by Russian activists.

Grounding Human Dignity and Rights:A Thomistic Response to Wolterstorff Paul A. Macdonald Jr. THE CATHOLIC CHURCH has taught consistently that there are basic human rights, such as the right to life, the right to the material means necessary properly to develop one's life, the right to be respected, the right to pursue truth freely, the right to worship God in accordance with the right dictates of one's conscience, and the right to be given the opportunity to work.1 Moreover, the Church has taught that the ground of these rights is the dignity and worth that all human beings inherently possess. For example, the Catechism of the Catholic Church says that "Being in the image of God the human individual possesses the dignity of a person, who is not just something, but someone."2 And as a person—a possessor of a nature "endowed with intelligence and free will," in the words of Pacem in Terris—the human individual "has rights and duties, which together flow as a direct consequence from his nature."3 The Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church puts the point this way: "the roots of human rights are to be found in the dignity that belongs to each human being" and that "the ultimate source of human rights is not found in the mere [End Page 1] will of human beings, in the reality of the State, in public powers, but in man himself and in God his Creator."4 The overall goal of this article is to defend the Church's teaching on human dignity and rights, and specifically the Church's claim that human dignity, as the ground of human rights and duties, derives from our being persons created in God's image. My defense unfolds in two main stages. First, in section I, I summarize Nicholas Wolterstorff's recent, important answer to the question of what grounds human dignity and rights, and specifically those rights that Wolterstorff calls natural human rights: legitimate claims against others to be treated in a certain way, which we retain not on account of the actions of others (conferring rights on us) but rather because qua human we possess great dignity and worth.5 Consistent with Catholic teaching, Wolterstorff holds that human beings possess great dignity and worth in virtue of standing in a certain relation to God. However, Wolterstorff denies that it is possible to ground human dignity and rights in either personhood or the imago dei. Instead, he argues that it is only because all human beings bear the property of being loved by God, with what he calls "attachment" love, that they possess great dignity and worth, in which human rights inhere. In the second, more extensive stage of my defense, drawing heavily on the thought of Thomas Aquinas, I reflect on and challenge Wolterstorff's claim that personhood and the imago dei cannot account for the dignity that grounds human rights. In section II, I show how, according to Wolterstorff's own criteria for what constitutes a dignity-based ground of human rights, [End Page 2] human beings possess rights- and duty-grounding dignity and worth as persons. In section III, I show how human beings possess rights- and duty-grounding dignity and worth as divine creations and image-bearers. Of course, from the Church's perspective, these claims speak to the same truth or reality: as divine creations and image-bearers, we are also persons ("endowed with intelligence and free will") who possess rights-and duty-grounding dignity and worth. What I argue, though, in an effort both to clarify and to bolster Church teaching, is that fully grounding human dignity and rights, or giving a complete account of human dignity and rights, requires affirming that human beings qua persons are divine creations and image-bearers, because it is only by affirming that we are divine creations and image-bearers that we can give a complete account for why we are also persons who possess dignity and rights. My main goal here is not to develop a Thomistic theory of rights or to ground a full theory of rights in Aquinas.6 Nor is it to defend the...

Development of human rights and citizenship rights is based on publication of its concepts among the people in global society. This publication of concepts and introduction of the people from different nations to human rights are done through education. Media with their role in transfer of information and knowledge have educational function. Media with their educational function ensured education right as one of the human rights while informing the public thoughts with their own rights and increasing their demands through human rights and citizenship rights education. Human rights and citizenship rights education activate the people of society in normalization of the related rules and this media education which is directly and indirectly related to obligation of states to right of education binds the states to respond to increased demands of human rights and citizenship rights and take action regarding development of the human and citizenship rights in national and international level. Human rights and citizenship rights have exclusive capability which leads to increased awareness of states with human and citizenship rights and increased demands of states and international society considering high number of media addresses and diversity of their content in presentation of materials about human and citizenship rights in education for all society levels and increased demand leads states and international society to develop norms of the human and citizenship rights through legislation, codification and enactment of the conventions on human rights and this process leads to development of human and citizenship rights at local and global levels.

In the recent period of Ukrainian history, scholars pay attention to the discussion of the relationship between Ukrainian constitutional law and the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and the place of rulings and decisions of the European Court of Human Rights in the legal system of Ukraine. The analysis of the provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights and current Ukrainian legislation is made in the article. It is made in order to determine the impact of this act of the Council of Europe on the constitutional law of Ukraine. It is noted that the Convention plays an important role in the process of protection of human rights and freedoms in Ukraine and has an impact on the implementation of the rule of law, which relate to individual’s constitutional status. It is noted that the European Convention significantly increases the level of the effectiveness of constitutional human rights legislation. The role of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and the European Court of Human Rights in the formation and activity of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine has been determined. The thesis that within the ratio of the Convention and Ukrainian law, the supremacy of the latter within the national legal system does not eliminate the need to comply with international obligations is substantiated in the article. The grounds for restricting human and civil rights and freedoms in accordance with the requirements of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and the constitutional legislation of Ukraine are considered in the article. In order to ensure national security, the restriction of human and civil rights and freedoms in a state of martial law and emergency is analyzed. By introducing martial law and a state of emergency, it is possible to concentrate temporarily all the levers of control over the individual’s status by coercive means within the framework of official power. The conclusion that the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and the case law of the European Court of Human Rights have had a significant impact on the formation and development of human and civil rights and freedoms as basic, value priorities of the constitutional law of Ukraine is substantiated in the article. Key words: constitutional law, sources of law, Council of Europe, Constitution of Ukraine, Constitutional Court of Ukraine, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, European Court of Human Rights.

The creation of the human rights system with the adoption in Nairobi, Kenya, in 1981 of the Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (African Charter) under the auspices of the former Organization of Unity (OAU) and its entry into force on 21 October 1986, a culmination of the yearning of many civil society and human rights organisations have a home-grown human rights mechanism that works promote and protect the human rights of the peoples of Africa. It is now common knowledge that the 1961 International Commission of Jurists' African Conference on the Rule of one of the early fires in this regard. One of the resolutions of the conference (the famous Law of Lagos) in effect the creation of a human rights court under a proposed African Convention on Human Rights, which was lay down the basis for future efforts for the establishment of rules and mechanisms for the regional promotion and protection of human rights in Africa, and to give full effect the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Granted that it took 20 years after the Law of Lagos for the Charter that sets the tone for a regional human rights regime be adopted, its adoption a welcome development. During the early period of this development, the Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights (African Commission) the only organ mandated under the Charter to: 1) engage in promoting human rights; 2) protect human rights; 3) examine state reports; and 4) provide interpretation of the Charter. As part of its protection mandate, the Commission innovated the hearing of individual complaints for human rights violations brought it by victims of such violations or their representatives.

Africa (including its human rights system) is rarely imagined or considered an originator, agent and purveyor of ideas, including in the human rights sphere. On this occasion of the fortieth anniversary of the adoption of the 1981 African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights which founded the African human rights system, it is only fitting that its contributions or otherwise to global human rights praxis, over these four decades, be examined from this perspective. Utilising the theory of the norm life cycle, developed by scholars of international relations who work within 'strategic social constructivism', this article examines how the African human rights system has, or has not, functioned as a 'norm leader' with regard to certain important and increasingly widely-accepted human rights standards. To that extent, the article examines (as examples) certain human rights norms first elaborated and made into legally-binding forms in the African Charter, widely circulated and having achieved a considerable level of global dispersal and adoption, in part, as a result of the work of the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights and the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights. Focusing on three important norms (the right to self-determination, the right to development and the right to the environment) and based on a study of academic and other literature, treaties or instruments, case law and records of international negotiations, the article attempts to respond systematically to this overarching question. The article argues that although the African human rights system clearly is not a state, the critical but globally under-appreciated roles it has played regarding the globalised socialisation of certain human rights ideas fits within, and helps in extending, social constructivist human rights theory and praxis. The article concludes with a reflection on some key limitations that are observable as to how far the system has been able to travel in the direction of norm leadership in human rights law.

Recent legislation proposed or passed in Nigeria, Uganda and The Gambia has put the spotlight on the plights of homosexual persons living in sub-Saharan Africa. In Nigeria, discriminatory laws prohibit same-sex marriages and ban gay clubs and organisations. In Uganda, the Prohibition of the Promotion of Unnatural Sexual Practices Bill of 2014, with contents similar to the notorious Anti-Homosexuality Act, is being considered after a ruling by the Ugandan Constitutional Court rendering the Anti-Homosexuality Act unconstitutional. In The Gambia, the Penal Code has been amended recently to add the crime of 'aggravated homosexuality' with a lifetime prison sentence for any person found guilty. The rights to dignity and equality are protected under the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights; however, competing local and global values are arguably growing in Africa, challenging this right. This article explores two main problems: first, how the rights to dignity, equality and non-discrimination should generally be interpreted and applied under the regional African human rights system when related to sexual orientation. In this regard I draw on the interpretation of these rights under international human rights law as well as the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights and its Inter-American counterpart. Second, it analyses the procedural or other hurdles that may stand in the way of brining a claim of discrimination based on sexual orientation to the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights or the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights. In this regard, I specifically consider the general restrictions placed on individuals and NGOs in bringing complaints to the Court and the real potential of the Commission to act as a conduit to the Court in cases involving rights related to sexual orientation, bearing in mind its inconsistent approach to same-sex sexuality. The article addresses these questions by analysing some key developments by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. The main objective is to utilise the approach of these institutions to explore both the legal avenues under the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights and the rights and obligations under the African Charter available to anyone who would want to challenge any domestic law criminalising same-sex consensual sexual acts and/or any of the other related prohibitions. Key words: Equality; dignity; sexual orientation; gay and lesbian rights; African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights

The article conducts an ontological study of the trends in the development of human and civil rights and duties in contemporary conditions. It proposes to understand human rights as fundamental moral and natural needs and opportunities of an individual to self-realize, as enshrined in legal forms, without limiting the freedom of others. It is determined that the contemporary development of human and civil rights and duties reflects the striving for a more just, equitable, and sustainable society. An important trend is the expansion of both rights and duties in the context of changing technological, environmental, social, etc. conditions, as well as the need to adapt to new challenges. The article identifies the directions of the development of human and civil rights and duties in modern conditions, including: globalization of human rights, expansion of environmental rights and duties, improvement of social rights and duties, guaranteeing digital rights and the right to accurate information, and strengthening the duties regarding civic activism. The most pressing directions for ensuring human rights in the context of armed aggression by one state against another are identified, in particular, ensuring human rights related to the restoration of justice and strengthening democratic values, ensuring the rights of victims of armed aggression, internally displaced persons, the right to accurate information, a clean environment, and others. The article substantiates the view that the building of a rule of law state is possible if such development is based on a common idea – justice, freedom, equality, and dignity as the key fundamental principles of social development. The article analyzes the normative consolidation of generations of human rights in fundamental international normative acts, in particular, in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, and also clarifies the state of their objectification in the Constitution of Ukraine. The ontological dimension of human and civil rights and duties is determined, which is characterized by social, economic, political, cultural, and security changes in society that, in one way or another, determine the trends in the development of modern state policy in this area.

Problem setting. The current state of affairs in society requires increased attention to the protection of human and citizen rights and freedoms. Martial law, as a legal regime, causes significant changes in the functioning of state institutions and society in general, endangering the basic rights and freedoms of citizens. Under such circumstances, it is especially important to develop and implement innovative approaches to ensuring the protection of human rights, which would take into account the specifics of the state of war and, at the same time, act as guarantors of compliance with the basic principles of the rule of law. This requires not only the reform of the legislation, but also the introduction of new technologies and methods that will allow more effective protection of citizens’ rights even in difficult conditions. Innovative approaches should be based on an increased level of awareness and training of both state bodies and civil society regarding mechanisms for the protection of rights in wartime. Analysis of recent researches and publications. Important aspects of the issue of innovative approaches to the protection of human and civil rights and freedoms have been studied by R. Shai, S. Husarov, O. Gilyaka, V. Kovalenko. However, despite the considerable experience in this area, the issue of introducing innovations to protect human rights and freedoms has not been fully explored. Purpose of the research is a comprehensive study of the features of innovative approaches to the protection of human and citizen rights and freedoms under martial law. This involves an analysis of the latest technologies, legal mechanisms and organizational solutions that can be effectively used to protect civil rights in emergency situations. In addition, the article examines the challenges and prospects of implementing these innovative approaches in the context of Ukrainian realities, in particular, taking into account socio-economic and legal aspects. Article’s main body. The research materials are: 1) normative and legal support for the protection of human and citizen rights and freedoms under martial law, including international conventions, domestic laws and by-laws; 2) works of domestic and foreign authors who conduct scientific and practical research in the field of human rights, innovative technologies and methods of protecting rights in armed conflicts. In the research process, the following scientific methods were used: theoretical generalization and grouping – to characterize the components of the system of protection of human and citizen rights and freedoms in the conditions of martial law and functions related to ensuring security; the method of formalization, analysis and synthesis – for the study of the domestic and the needs for the protection of rights in the conditions of martial law; comparative analysis – to develop different strategies and approaches to the protection of human and citizen rights in the conditions of martial law. The generalization of the results was used to formulate conclusions and develop recommendations for improving the system of protection of rights and freedoms in similar conditions. Conclusions and prospects for the development. The protection of human rights under martial law is a complex and multifaceted task that requires an integrated approach, including legal, administrative and socio-economic processes. The war caused and continues to cause a lot of grief, destroying everything in its path, the most valuable of which is human life and health. The main goal currently remains the issue of effective protection of a person and a citizen from external dangers lurking in modern Ukrainian society. This study aims to analyze approaches to the protection of human rights under martial law, determine their effectiveness and outline ways of improvement. Special attention is paid to the study of international experience and the possibility of its adaptation to modern Ukrainian conditions. As a result, it is planned to develop recommendations for the implementation of innovative approaches that will contribute to strengthening the legal protection of citizens in the conditions of martial law, increasing the level of their security and well-being.

Reviewed by: The Culturalization of Human Rights Law by Federico Lenzerini Julie Fraser, Ph.D. Candidate (bio) Federico Lenzerini, The Culturalization of Human Rights Law (Oxford University Press, 2014), ISBN 978-0-19-966428-3, 304pages. I. INTRODUCTION The apparent tension between human rights and cultural diversity is as old as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In an effort to ease this tension, Federico Lenzerini uses this book to promote the “culturalization” of human rights: a differentiated understanding of rights based on the specific needs of the people in each case. Lenzerini makes important contributions by setting out the foundations of human dignity and rights in societies around the world, and providing examples of cultural approaches to human rights law by international and regional bodies. The book is a thoroughly researched and well-argued contemporary analysis of the long-standing human rights debate on universalism and cultural relativism. The book proceeds in five chapters, first introducing the universalism debate before turning to sources of human rights and dignity in societies around the world. Lenzerini provides detailed examples of human rights in pre-colonial societies, analyzing, inter alia, the Code of Hammurabi, the Qur’an, Confucianism, the Constitution of the Iroquois Nations, and Aztec and Incan texts. He concludes that from ancient times, ideas of human rights existed well beyond the “West.”1 Chapter Two notes that despite the development of “universal” human rights law at the international level, different parts of the world have retained their specific views on rights through regional instruments.2 Chapter Three sets out the culturally based approaches to human rights evident in international and regional law and practice. The in-depth study, including the African, European, Inter-American, and UN systems, concludes that culture today is recognized as an element to be considered in human rights adjudication.3 The fourth and final chapters articulate the advantages of a culturally based approach to human rights, as well as a methodology for identifying universal standards. The crucial issue Lenzerini addresses is not whether human rights can be interpreted and implemented in a culturally sensible manner, but to what extent. II. CULTURALIZATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS Like others, Lenzerini submits that almost all human rights include a cultural dimension4 resulting from the fact that “culture” includes features that characterize a society or social group, including the modes of life, the value systems, and the traditions and beliefs.5 As culture can [End Page 1110] play such a critical role in shaping the content of human rights for an individual or community, Lenzerini questions the traditional view that human rights are “wholly universal.”6 He subscribes to “moderate cultural relativism,” holding that cultural variations are acceptable to the extent that they do not impact upon the “basic core of fundamental rights which are universal.”7 Lenzerini advocates the “culturalization” of rights, an interpretive process by which the content of rights is made relevant for and tailored to communities around the world. This is necessary as people’s expectations differ, and human rights standards should be flexible to allow different expectations to be met in concrete ways.8 This process sits in contrast to the strict application of rigid international human rights norms regardless of the historical, social, and cultural context of the individual/community in question. Lenzerini’s culturalization can be compared to other culturally sensitive approaches to human rights advocated by scholars including Sally Engle Merry, Eva Brems, Abdullahi An-Na’im, Tom Zwart, and Alison Renteln.9 Yvonne Donders asserts that cultural sensitivity in human rights implementation is now generally accepted.10 In support of his approach, Lenzerini cites a number of benefits, including better community acceptance of human rights, improved effectiveness, and greater state compliance. He claims that culturalization promotes the “cultural acceptance, assimilation, and legitimization of human rights.”11 As a result, human rights are not perceived as “abstract dictates” from the outside, but are “brought down to earth” and seen as a key component of the social dynamics.12 As such, people support human rights as embedded and necessary, which may in turn increase state compliance.13 While this may be the case for nation-states, the process will arguably be more complicated...

Human rights are issues that are always discussed and have not provided a single understanding. This article aimed to analyze human rights from the perspective of the Imam school of thought by using the analysis of the thought of Imam Al-Shafi'i. This research was qualitative using the library research method based on data management obtained from several pieces of literature. Furthermore, this research used a normative approach by adapting several books of Imam Al-Shafi'i. The research found that human obligations and rights in Islamic law, according to Imam Al-Shafi'i, became an inseparable unit. Muslims must be far back to see the birth history and the development of human obligations and rights. As is meant by Imam Al-Shafi'i, human right is a fundamental thing, and it is worth fighting for social beings. His thinkers about human rights can be seen in some of his works, such as Al-Umm and Al-Risālah. These works are very outside for those who want to learn about human rights. The work and application of human rights imposed by Imam Al-Shafi'i are not much different from what is explained by several figures of human rights thinkers who come from the West. It was as the author found a match in his application after seeing the development of human rights thought from several figures. It is expected that contemporary Muslim scholars prioritize the issue of human obligations and rights in providing legal solutions to Muslims.

The Nuremberg tribunal was the expression and the beginning of states' recognition of their duty to prosecute genocide and other gross human rights violations. It was a first step towards fulfillin...

The work is devoted to the concept of human rights and freedoms in the context of globalization. The concept of the human dimension of globalization, the factors influencing the content of human and peoples' rights and freedoms are analyzed. In particular, human rights standards in the field of modern information technologies have been determined. It is determined that the transformation of society is due to the development of the information society and the gradual transition to a knowledge society, the impact of digitalization on all social processes. The active use of digital technologies in various spheres of life has led to the question of the need and sufficiency of human and civil rights and freedoms, and highlighted the concept of digital human rights and freedoms. Summarizing different approaches, it is determined that the globalization of human rights is a process of influencing human rights of various factors and factors of international importance (political, social, economic, information, etc.) in individual countries; the interdependence of the social status of the individual from the life of peoples and humanity as a whole and vice versa; it is the universalization of positive world experience in the field of human rights, recognition and consolidation of the universal status of human rights and freedoms, their protection at the international level. It is analyzed that personal rights and freedoms are known to be inseparable from the security of man, society and the state. Under these conditions, the problem of finding a balance between the protection of privacy, including information privacy, and the need to protect information and national security becomes relevant. That is, in the conditions of the rule of law and the development of the information society, restrictions on the arbitrary treatment of human rights, in particular in the information sphere, should be legally defined. This problem has become significantly more relevant in the current context of digital transformation and the introduction of an emergency situation related to quarantine and restrictive measures, which has helped to identify a number of important issues that need urgent attention. The transformation of society is due to the development of the information society and the gradual transition to a knowledge society, the impact of digitalization on all social processes. The active use of digital technologies in various spheres of life has led to the question of the need and sufficiency of human and civil rights and freedoms, and highlighted the concept of digital human rights and freedoms.
 Digital rights include fundamental rights, such as freedom of expression, privacy, the right to information, the right to participate in public affairs, etc., and such as the right to be forgotten, the right to anonymity, or even the right to the Internet. .
 The modern scientific literature identifies and explores such new rights as the right to be forgotten, the right to anonymity, the right to personal data protection, the right to digital education and access to digital knowledge; rights related to the protection of genetic information; the right to participate in the turnover of property in the digital sphere, etc. It is noted that the right to privacy, which is one of the main rights that embody human freedom in its negative sense, ie freedom from outside interference, is particularly vulnerable in the digital transformation era. The right to education is also actively developing in the digital age. A new right has been defined - the "right to digital death". Attention is paid to the group of digital rights, which are designed to ensure the implementation of constitutional principles in the democratic system of our state, so the category of "electronic democracy" is firmly in modern constitutional and legal usage. It is concluded that ensuring security in the information and communication environment is becoming a priority area of ​​scientific and technical activities, requiring significant attention and efforts from man, society, government agencies and legal science of the state.

“Human dignity” is the foundation of the human rights discourse that evolved around the United Nations’ 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In recent decades, the concept of human dignity has been vastly over-extended, gradually becoming a vague, nearly meaningless “catch-all” phrase. In the 21st century’s pluralistic and multicultural world, this development has played into two worrisome trends. One is the formulation of any cultural-specific identity-based claim as involving a human dignity-based human right; such over-extension of human dignity and human dignity-based rights breeds growing skepticism regarding the usefulness of the whole human rights discourse. The second trend is the erroneous portrayal of cultural specific honor-based claims as involving dignity-based human rights. Such misleading portrayal blurs the boundaries between the universalistically humanistic dignity-based human rights discourse, and culturally specific, often separatist and conservative honor-based mentalities.Attempting to address these troubling trends, this paper defines a tightly knit human dignity, which marks the absolute value/ worth of the common denominator of humanness in all human beings. This human dignity gives rise to universalistic and absolute – yet minimal – fundamental human rights. It is conceptually distinguished from what I refer to as “respect”, which assigns tentative value/worth to the uniqueness of each and every concrete, specific expression of human existence. In this conceptualization, respect is the basis of tentative, secondary human rights – including those that address many specific identity claims in a pluralistic, multicultural world. Whereas "human dignity-based rights" derive from and protect the very essence of humanness, "respect-based rights" protect and enhance exclusive personal choices that manifest an individual's uniqueness, including each person's self-expression in lieu of his or her multiple affiliations. Such affiliations are often related to race, gender, nationality, religion, ethnicity, sexuality and/ or culture. Respect-based rights thus refer to most issues arising from pluralism and multiculturalism. Both dignity and respect are carefully distinguished from the very different notion of honor, which marks tentative, comparative human value/ worth that is intertwined with esteem and prestige within a specific (typically conservative and separatist) normative cultural context. Honor-based claims do not necessarily constitute either dignity or respect-based human rights.Such re-conceptualization yields a clear distinction between the absolute and universal fundamental dignity-based human rights, and the tentative, often cultural-specific respect-based rights. This allows to preserves the distinction between absolute, universal fundamental dignity-based human rights, and secondary, tentative, sometimes clashing respect-based rights. It highlights the difference between these two categories of human rights and any culturally-specific honor-based claims. These distinctions are important if we are to maintain the discourse of human rights and adjust it to a world which is ever more pluralistic and multicultural.