Abstract

Abstract The paradox of hedonism is the idea that intrinsically desiring nothing other than pleasure can prevent one from obtaining pleasure. In this article, I show how the paradox of hedonism can be used as the basis for an objection against hedonism about well-being, and one that is more defensible than has been commonly recognized. Moreover, I argue that the challenge presented by the paradox can be used to target not only hedonism about well-being, but also desire satisfactionism and the hybrid theory. However, I argue that certain sophisticated versions of all three theories can escape it.

Highlights

  • 2.2 What the Problem Is that we have considered the nature of the paradox of hedonism as a psychological phenomenon, I will lay out how we can use the paradox as an objection to hedonism about well-being

  • I have laid out a version of the paradox of hedonism objection, and argued that it is a symptom of a deeper problem facing all desire-based theories of welfare

  • Hedonists and hybrid theorists, I suggest, could make the same move: they could deny that pleasure or the relevant hybrid state are intrinsically good for us, but rather claim that these states make other natural states intrinsically good for us.41 (In the terms of our formal statement of the paradox of hedonism objection, this means that hedonists could deny P2, the definitional premise stating that hedonists take pleasure to be the only thing that is intrinsically desirable.)

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Summary

Introduction

The acceptability requirement: Other things equal, we should reject an axiological theory if rational agents who believe in its claims about which objects are intrinsically desirable will be significantly prevented from obtaining those objects. Via free access have formulated them, cannot all be correct.17 So, for example, the objection shows that if we want to accept axiological hedonism, but we acknowledge the paradox of hedonism, we must reject either Rational Desire or the acceptability requirement.

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