Abstract
In China's spent lead-acid battery (LAB) recycling market, there is a fundamental issue of irregular recycling due to the illegal industrial chain's vicious price competition. Investigating stakeholders' behavior evolutions and strategic choices will help explore solutions. Focusing on spent LABs' collection, this paper introduces an evolutionary game model consisting of the government agency (GA), massive collection site (MC), and primary collection site (PC). After identifying evolutionary stability strategies, this paper assigns parameter values to simulate evolution process and investigate parameter sensitivity and effect comparison. The results demonstrate that: (i) it is necessary for the GA to regulate market with the parameters meeting corresponding stability conditions. (ii) the GA can appropriately increase policy support, fine, and subsidy, but excessive intensity is inappropriate. (iii) different parameters need to be focused on respectively from result orientation and process orientation. This study provides valuable management implications for policymakers to promote spent LABs' regular recycling.
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