Abstract
In recent years, a person-centred approach to patient care in cases of mental illness has been promoted as an alternative to a disease orientated approach. Alexandra Parvan's contribution to the person-centred approach serves to motivate an exploration of the approach's most apt metaphysical assumptions. I argue that a metaphysical thesis or assumption about both persons and their uniqueness is an essential element of being person-centred. I apply the assumption to issues such as the disorder/disease distinction and to the continuity of mental health and illness.
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