How to be (non-)specific?

The history of science came early to Oxford. Its first champion was Robert T. Gunther, the son of a keeper of zoology at the British Museum and a graduate of Magdalen College who took a first there in the School of Natural Science in 1892, specializing in zoology ([figure 1][1]). As tutor in natural

Dogged Don

How does the non-conscious become conscious?

This guide accompanies the following article(s): ‘Mechanistic Theories of Causality Part I.’Philosophy Compass 6/6 (2011): 421–432, DOI: 10.1111/j.1747‐9991.2011.00400.x; ‘Mechanistic Theories of Causality Part II.’Philosophy Compass 6/6 (2011): 433–444, DOI: 10.1111/j.1747‐9991.2011.00401.xAuthor’s IntroductionMechanisms are a hot topic in the philosophy of science, with a large number of papers written on mechanisms and mechanistic explanation across the sciences in the last decade. The question naturally arises as to whether mechanisms can shed light on the notion of cause, and, indeed, several authors have suggested that C causes E just in case C and E are connected in the right way by a physical mechanism. The papers accompanied by this guide examine the prospects of mechanistic theories of causality.In the following section, I provide some related readings that would work well with the papers for more detailed discussion of mechanistic theories of causality. The sample syllabus below situates discussion of mechanistic theories of causality in the context of a course on the epistemology and metaphysics of causality.Author Recommends Salmon, Wesley. A New Look at Causality, in his Causality and Explanation. New York: Oxford University Press, 1998. 13–24. A very gentle introduction to process theories of causality. Dowe, Phil. Physical Causation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. A detailed defence of Dowe’s conserved‐quantity process theories of causality. Machamer, P., L. Darden, and C. Craver. ‘Thinking about Mechanisms.’Philosophy of Science 67 (2000): 1–25. Perhaps the most influential development of the mechanistic turn in the philosophy of science. Glennan, Stuart. Mechanisms. The Oxford Handbook of Causation. Eds. H. Beebee, C. Hitchcock and P. Menzies. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009. 315–25. A recent exposition of Glennan’s complex‐systems theory of causality. Illari, P. M., F. Russo, and J. Williamson. Causality in the Sciences. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011. A collection of papers on causality. The relationship between mechanisms and causality is a major theme running through the book. For example, chapter 24 extends Dowe’s account, while chapter 38 provides a general characterisation of mechanisms.Online Materials Causality in the Sciences conference series: http://www.kent.ac.uk/secl/philosophy/jw/cits.htm The main forum for discussion of theories of causality in relation to scientific method.Sample Syllabus Topic I: Difference‐making theories of causality Reading Paul, L. A. ‘Counterfactual Theories.’The Oxford Handbook of Causation. Eds. H. Beebee, C. Hitchcock and P. Menzies. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009. 158–84.Williamson, Jon. ‘Probabilistic Theories.’The Oxford Handbook of Causation. Eds. H. Beebee, C. Hitchcock and P. Menzies. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009. 185–212.Woodward, James. ‘Agency and Interventionist Theories.’The Oxford Handbook of Causation. Eds. H. Beebee, C. Hitchcock and P. Menzies. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 234–62. Topic II: Mechanistic theories of causality Reading Salmon, Wesley. ‘A New Look at Causality,’ in his Causality and Explanation. New York: Oxford University Press, 1998. 13–24.Machamer, P., L. Darden, and C. Craver. ‘Thinking about Mechanisms.’Philosophy of Science 67 (2000): 1–25.Williamson, Jon. ‘Mechanistic Theories of Causation Parts I and II.’Philosophy Compass (2011). Topic III: Pluralist theories of causality Reading Hall, Ned. ‘Two Concepts of Causation.’Causation and Counterfactuals. Eds. J. Collins, N. Hall and L. Paul. MIT Press, 2004. 225–76.Godfrey‐Smith, Peter. ‘Causal Pluralism.’The Oxford Handbook of Causation Beebee. Eds. H. Beebee, C. Hitchcock and P. Menzies. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009. 326–37.Reiss, Julian. ‘Third Time’s a Charm: Causation, Science and Wittgensteinian Pluralism.’Causality in the Sciences. Eds. P. M. Illari, F. Russo and J. Williamson. Oxford University Press, 2011. 907–27. Philosophica 77.1 – special issue on causal pluralism. Topic IV: The epistemology of causality Reading Russo, F. and J. Williamson. ‘Interpreting Causality in the Health Sciences.’International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 21.2 (2007): 157–70.Gillies, D. A. ‘The Russo‐Williamson Thesis and the Question of whether Smoking Causes Heart Disease.’Causality in the Sciences. Eds. P. M. Illari, F. Russo and J. Williamson. Oxford University Press, 2011. 110–25.Illari, P. M. ‘Disambiguating the Russo‐Williamson Thesis.’International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, forthcoming.Weber, E. ‘How Probabilistic Causation can Account for the Use of Mechanistic Evidence.’International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 23 (2009): 277–95.Darby, G. and J. Williamson. ‘Imaging Technology and the Philosophy of Causality.’Philosophy & Technology, forthcoming; doi: 10.1007/s13347‐010‐0010‐7.Russo, F. and J. Williamson. ‘Generic versus Single‐case Causality: The Case of Autopsy.’European Journal for Philosophy of Science 1.1 (2011): 47–69; doi: 10.1007/s13194‐010‐0012‐4.

Emergence in theological perspective: A corollary to professor Clayton's Boyle Lecture1

Teaching & Learning Guide for: Emotion

At a talk at the North Carolina State University in 1952, Mies van der Rohe recounted in rather dramatic terms a discovery that he had made while working on the design for the Barcelona Pavilion: ‘...

Sex-related variation in human behavior and the brain

One important role of belief systems is to allow us to represent information about a certain domain of inquiry. This paper presents a formal framework to accommodate such information representation. Three cognitive models to represent information are discussed: conceptual spaces (Gardenfors in Conceptual spaces: the geometry of thought. MIT Press, Cambridge, 2000), state-spaces (van Fraassen in Quantum mechanics: an empiricist view. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1991), and the problem spaces familiar from artificial intelligence. After indicating their weakness to deal with partial information, it is argued that an alternative, formulated in terms of partial structures (da Costa and French in Science and partial truth. Oxford University Press, New York, 2003), can be provided which not only captures the positive features of these models, but also accommodates the partiality of information ubiquitous in science and mathematics.

Teaching & Learning Guide for: Creationism

The pension funds have become America's new ‘tycoons’ – surely the most unlikely masters any society ever had. They have attained this position without any struggle, any crisis, any major ‘problems...

Teaching &amp; Learning Guide for: <i>Recent Work on Structured Meaning and Propositional Unity</i>

Author's IntroductionPhilosophical interest in introspection has a long and storied history, but only recently – with the ‘scientific turn’ in philosophy of mind – have philosophers sought to ground their accounts of introspection in psychological data. In particular, there is growing awareness of how evidence from clinical and developmental psychology might be brought to bear on long‐standing debates about the architecture of introspection, especially in the form of apparent dissociations between introspection and third‐person mental‐state attribution. It is less often noticed that this evidence needs to be interpreted with due sensitivity to distinctions between different types of introspection, for example, introspection of propositional attitudes (beliefs, desires) vs. introspection of phenomenally conscious states (pains, emotional feelings). As contemporary debates about the machinery of introspection – and debates about mindreading in general – move forward, these distinctions are likely to figure more prominently.Author Recommends:Peter Carruthers, ‘Simulation and Self‐Knowledge: A Defense of Theory‐Theory’, in Theories of Theories of Mind, eds. P. Carruthers and P. K. Smith (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 22–38.Defends a sophisticated form of the theory‐theory of introspection, according to which we come to know at least some of our mental states (e.g., propositional attitudes) by reasoning from an innate folk‐psychological theory.Fred Dretske, ‘Introspection’, in Naturalizing the Mind (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995), 39–63.Introduces and defends the idea of introspection as ‘displaced perception’.Alvin Goldman, ‘Self‐Attribution’, in Simulating Minds: The Philosophy, Psychology, and Neuroscience of Mindreading (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 223–57.Defends a version of the ‘inner sense’ view of introspection in which mental state types are classified via their neural properties, and mental contents are classified via ‘redeployment’.Alison Gopnik, ‘How We Read Our Own Minds: The Illusion of First‐Person Knowledge of Intentionality’, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1993): 1–14.A noted psychologist defends a version of the theory‐theory of introspection, citing evidence of developmental symmetries between first‐person and third‐person mental‐state attribution.Robert Gordon, ‘Simulation without Introspection or Inference from Me to You’, in Mental Simulation: Evaluations and Applications, eds. T. Stone and M. Davies (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995), 53–67.Develops the idea of ascent routines – the rough analog of ‘displaced perception’ for the introspection of propositional attitudes.Uta Frith and Francesca Happé, ‘Theory of Mind and Self‐Consciousness: What Is It Like to Be Autistic?’Mind and Language 14 (1999): 1–14.Appeals to evidence from autism to motivate the idea that first‐person and third‐person mental‐state attribution have a common basis.Shaun Nichols and Stephen Stich, ‘Reading One's Own Mind’, in Mindreading: An Integrated Account of Pretence, Self‐awareness, and Understanding other Minds (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 150–99.Presents a comprehensive critique of leading theories of introspection (especially the theory‐theory), then introduces and defends the authors’ preferred alternative, the ‘monitoring mechanism’ account.Jesse Prinz, ‘The Fractionation of Introspection’, Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (2004): 40–57.Develops the idea that introspection admits of several varieties.Philip Robbins, ‘Knowing Me, Knowing You: Theory of Mind and the Machinery of Introspection’, Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (2004): 129–43.Defends a hybrid view of introspection for propositional attitudes, according to which both theoretic inference and monitoring play a role.Sample Syllabus: Week 1: Theory‐theory Alison Gopnik, ‘How We Read Our Own Minds: The Illusion of First‐Person Knowledge of Intentionality’, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1993): 1–14.Peter Carruthers, ‘Simulation and Self‐Knowledge: A Defense of Theory‐Theory’, in Theories of Theories of Mind, eds. P. Carruthers and P. K. Smith (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 22–38. Week 2: Displaced perception and semantic ascent Fred Dretske, ‘Introspection’, in Naturalizing the Mind (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995), 39–63.Robert Gordon, ‘Simulation without Introspection or Inference from Me to You’, in Mental Simulation: Evaluations and Applications, eds. T. Stone and M. Davies (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995), 53–67. Week 3: Monitoring theory Shaun Nichols and Stephen Stich, ‘Reading One's Own Mind’, in Mindreading: An Integrated Account of Pretence, Self‐awareness, and Understanding Other Minds (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 150–99. Week 4: Hybrid approaches Alvin Goldman, ‘Self‐Attribution’, in Simulating Minds: The Philosophy, Psychology, and Neuroscience of Mindreading (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 223–57.Philip Robbins, ‘Knowing Me, Knowing You: Theory of Mind and the Machinery of Introspection’, Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (2004): 129–43.Focus Questions: What distinguishes ‘inside access’ from ‘outside access’ views of introspection? To what extent is the theory‐theoretic approach to introspection wedded to the idea that first‐person and third‐person mindreading are mechanistically symmetric capacities? What reasons are there for distinguishing between different types of introspection, and why might those taxonomic distinctions matter for theory construction in this area? In what sense, if any, are personality traits introspectible? Debates about third‐person mindreading have revolved around the relative merits of theory‐theory and simulation theory, whereas debates about introspection have taken a slightly different focus. For example, no one has defended a simulation‐theoretic account of introspection. Why might that be?

Aspect-seeing, I claim, involves reflection on concepts. It involves letting oneself feel how it would be like to conceptualize something with a certain concept, without committing oneself to this conceptualization. I distinguish between two kinds of aspect-perception:1. Preparatory: allows us to develop, criticize, and shape concepts. It involves bringing a concept to an object for the purpose of examining what would be the best way to conceptualize it.2. Non-Preparatory: allows us to express the ingraspability of certain experiences. It involves bringing a concept to an object for the purpose of showing—per impossible—what it would take to properly capture one’s experience. I demonstrate the usefulness of the two kinds of aspect perception in making conceptual judgments, and in making moral and aesthetic judgments.ReferencesSara Bachelard. On Euthanasia: Blindspots in the Argument from Mercy. Journal of Applied Philosophy, 19(2):131–40, 2002.http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-5930.00210PMid:12747357Avner Baz. What’s the Point of Seeing Aspects? Philosophical Investigations, 23(2):97–121, 2000.http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-9205.00116Avner Baz. On Learning from Wittgenstein, or What Does it Take to See the Grammar of Seeing Aspects? In W. Day Anew and V. J. Krebs, editors, Seeing Wittgenstein Anew, pages 227–48. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2010.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511750663.013Avner Baz. Seeing Aspects and Philosophical Difficulty. In M. McGinn and O. Kuusela, editors, The Oxford Handbook of Wittgenstein, pages 697–713. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011.http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199287505.003.0031Stanley Cavell. The Availability of Wittgensteins Later Philosophy. In his Must We Mean What We Say?, pages 44–72. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1969.Stanley Cavell. The Claim of Reason. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1979.Bob Dent. Why I Wanted to Die: Bob Dents Last Words. Journal of Applied Philosophy, 16(1):19–32, 1999.Cora Diamond. Secondary Sense. In her The Realistic Spirit, pages 225–41. MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1991a.Cora Diamond. The Face of Necessity. In her The Realistic Spirit, pages 243–66. MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1991b.Richard Eldridge. An Introduction to the Philosophy of Art. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139164740Juliet Floyd. On Being Surprised: Wittgenstein on Aspect-Perception, Logic, and Mathematics. In W. Day and V. J. Krebs,editors, Seeing Wittgenstein Anew, pages 314–337. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2010.Geach, P.T. Mental Acts. Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1957.Immanuel Kant. Critique of the Power of Judgment, translated by J.C. Meredith. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1952.John Locke. An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Hackett Publishing Co., Indianapolis, 1996.John McDowell. Non-Cognitivism and Rule-Following. In S. Holtzman and C. M. Leich, editors, Wittgenstein: To Follow A Rule, pages 141–62. Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1981.Stephen Mulhall. Inheritance and Originality. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001.Jean-Paul Sartre. Nausea. New Directions, New York, 2007.David Seligman. Wittgenstein on Seeing Aspects and Experiencing Meanings. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 37(2): 205–17, 1976.http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2107192Timothy Williamson. Vagueness. Routledge, London, 1994.Ludwig Wittgenstein. Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Routledge, London, 1922.Ludwig Wittgenstein. Philosophical Investigations. Blackwell, Oxford, 3rd edition, 1958.Ludwig Wittgenstein. The Blue and Brown Books. Blackwell, Oxford, 2nd edition, 1969.Ludwig Wittgenstein. Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology. Blackwell, Oxford, 1980.Ludwig Wittgenstein. Culture and Value. Blackwell, Oxford, 1998.

Since artificial intelligence (AI) emerged in the mid-20th century, it has incurred many theoretical criticisms (Dreyfus, H. [1972] What Computers Can’t Do (MIT Press, New York); Dreyfus, H. [1992] What Computers Still Can’t Do (MIT Press, New York); Searle, J. [1980] Minds, brains and programs, Behav. Brain Sci. 3, 417–457; Searle, J. [1984] Minds, Brains and Sciences (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA); Searle, J. [1992] The Rediscovery of the Mind (MIT Press, Cambridge, MA); Fodor, J. [2002] The Mind Doesn’t Work that Way: The Scope and Limits of Computational Psychology (MIT Press, Cambridge, MA).). The technical improvements of machine learning and deep learning, though, have been continuing and many breakthroughs have occurred recently. This makes theoretical considerations urgent again: can this new wave of AI fare better than its precursors in emulating or even having human-like minds? I propose a cautious yet positive hypothesis: current AI might create human-like mind, but only if it incorporates certain conceptual rewiring: it needs to shift from a task-based to an agent-based framework, which can be dubbed “Artificial Agential Intelligence” (AAI). It comprises practical reason (McDowell, J. [1979] Virtue and reason, Monist 62(3), 331–350; McDowell, J. [1996] Mind and World (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA)), imaginative understanding (Campbell, J. [2020] Causation in Psychology (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA)), and animal knowledge (Sosa, E. [2007] A Virtue Epistemology: Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge, volume 1 (Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK); Sosa, E. [2015] Judgment and Agency (Oxford University Press, Cambridge, MA)). Moreover, I will explore whether and in what way neuroscience-inspired AI and predictive coding (Hassabis, D., Kumaran, D., Summerfield, C., &amp; Botvinick, M. [2017] Neuroscience-inspired artificial intelligence, Neuron 95(2), 245–258) can help carry out this project.