How to avoid a coup d'état: The Federalist on the American constitution

Abstract

SUMMARY In this article Jack Pole considers whether the Constitution of the United States, as drafted in the Philadelphia Convention of 1787 could be regarded as the result of a coup d'état, since the original remit of the Convention had been to modify the existing Confederation of independent states, while the outcome was a constitution for a new sovereign, federal state. The article is based on the use of the collection of essays that were later published collectively as The Federalist to illustrate the thinking of the Convention leaders. It is important that The Federalist was not a work of political theory, but a collection of the ideas of Hamilton, Madison and Jay, which were written in response to developments with the aim of persuading the public to vote for ratification. The central problem for the authors was to balance their wish for a strong central government against the widespread contemporary belief, rooted in Whig thinking, that a strong central government was the most dangerous of all threats to individual liberties. The authors, collectively ‘Publicus’, begin with an orthodox view of sovereignty as ‘indivisible’: but this view was modified in face of strong Anti-Federalist attacks on ‘consolidation’. Key issues were open to later judicial interpretations. The article suggests that, quite apart from the complete absence of armed coercion on the Convention of 1787, the results of its deliberation cannot be seen as the result of any kind of coup.