Abstract
Islamic fundamentalists and their secular opponents recognize that the decision of women to cover their head in public generates social pressures to conform on those wishing to remain unveiled. This article identifies the essence of social coordination problems generated by this type of externalities in terms of large anonymous games. The main result is a general characterization result that reveals the structure of equilibria. In particular, various levels of veiling can be interpreted as different equilibria of the same anonymous game.
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