How is reflection of a sense possible?

Abstract

The purpose of the paper is to investigate into the peculiarities of the reflection of sense as the main idea of modern European philosophy. This idea refers to self-consciousness, about which modern empirical philosophy speaks in the language of reflection (J. Locke), and rationalism - in the language of Cogito (R. Descartes). For Kant, Cogito is a transcendental condition for the formation of concepts, and therefore reflection should be transcendental. According to Husserl, the main task of phenomenological reflection was to obtain essences of processes, to build things from the acts of Cogito. In Husserl's words, reflection "carries the world as a meaningful sense". Such a sense (smysl) becomes a problem escaping both from analysis and interpretation. Its peculiarity lies in the deontological status of sense: the phrase "a sense should be" connects the sense with a realm of duty, and duty provides a correlation between Ego and integrity of the world, language and culture. Reflection of sense (smysl) becomes the process of comprehension, the mechanism of formation of the whole set of meanings in the culture.