How Governments Ensure the Loyalty of Pro-Government Militias: Evidence from Chechnya

Does the military strength of rebel movements affect conflict-related sexual violence by pro-government militias (PGMs)? Existing studies on PGMs show the significant role that PGMs can have in shaping conflict dynamics and outcomes. What remains understudied is how the variation in power capabilities between conflict actors and the sources of support for PGMs influences civilian victimization by militia groups. We argue that strong rebels tip the balance of power against the state, making the state more susceptible to authorizing or allowing sexual violence by PGMs. In addition, the level of autonomy of PGMs from the government is likely to influence their sexual violence, conditional on rebel strength. When rebels are militarily strong, states are likely to order or tolerate sexual violence by PGMs that they train and/or provide resources to, thereby resulting in sexual violence by state-dependent PGMs. Examining all civil conflicts from 1989 to 2009 and using newly collected data on state-dependence of PGMs, our empirical findings provide evidence that PGMs are associated with higher levels of conflict-related sexual violence when the government faces strong rebels. Results also show that the likelihood of sexual violence by state-dependent PGMs increases when rebels exhibit strong military capabilities.

This study investigates how deployment of pro-government militias (PGMs) as counterinsurgents affects the risk of conflict recurrence. Militiamen derive material and non-material benefits from fighting in armed conflicts. Since these will likely have diminished after the conflict’s termination, militiamen develop a strong incentive to spoil post-conflict peace. Members of pro-government militias are particularly disadvantaged in post-conflict contexts compared to their role in the government’s counterinsurgency campaign. First, PGMs are usually not present in peace negotiations between rebels and governments. This reduces their commitment to peace agreements. Second, disarmament and reintegration programs tend to exclude PGMs, which lowers their expected and real benefits from peace. Third, PGMs might lose their advantage of pursuing personal interests while being protected by the government, as they become less essential during peacetimes. To empirically test whether conflicts with PGMs as counterinsurgents are more likely to break out again, we identify PGM counterinsurgent activities in conflict episodes between 1981 and 2007. We code whether the same PGM was active in a subsequent conflict between the same actors. Controlling for conflict types, which is associated with both the likelihood of deploying PGMs and the risk of conflict recurrence, we investigate our claims with propensity score matching, statistical simulation, and logistic regression models. The results support our expectation that conflicts in which pro-government militias were used as counterinsurgents are more likely to recur. Our study contributes to an improved understanding of the long-term consequences of employing PGMs as counterinsurgents and highlights the importance of considering non-state actors when crafting peace and evaluating the risk of renewed violence.

Since its independence the political situation in the Republic of Sudan is characterised by instability and constant armed conflicts between the central government and different peripheral regions. The longest civil war in Sudan was the one between the central government and rebel groups in Southern Sudan. The first civil war between North and South started on the eve of independence in 1956 and ended in 1972 with the Addis Ababa Peace agreement. As part of the peace agreement, a regional government and a university were established in Southern Sudan. However, only eleven years later, due to the abrogation of the agreement by the central government, a new civil war erupted between the central government and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM). This second civil war ended in January 2005 with the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between the ruling National Congress Party (NCP) and the SPLM. The CPA was followed by elections in April 2010 and a referendum on independence in 2011. After the Southern Sudanese overwhelmingly opted for independence in January 2011, Southern Sudan has become the 54th state in Africa in July 2011.KeywordsHigh EducationHigh Education SystemGovernance RegimeHigh Education ReformExternal GuidanceThese keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Introduction: In the recent years Juba the capital of South Sudan has been experiencing the problem of street children, a problem attributed to long civil war in the Sudan, current economic crisis and the current political conflict which started on 15th December 2013. According to UNICEF(Sweitzland 1983), a street child is “ Any girl or boy who has not reached adulthood for whom the street has become her or his habitual abode or source of livelihood and who is inadequately protected ,supervised or directed by irresponsible adult.” Methodology: The study took place in Juba city in the five major markets namely, Konyo konyo, Juba, Jebel, Custom and Munuki. It targeted children within the age of 6-17 years of age. The study was done by cross sectional design. The methods of data collection were questionnaires and interviews. The sample size was 120 and the data was analyzed by Excel program. Results: The findings were 55% were within the age of 10-14, 70% were boys,41.7% had both parents alive, 40% hadfamilies comprising of 6-10 members, 38.3% do minor business, 55.8% come from urban area, 54.2% sleep at home , 28.3% earn living by selling wares, 37.5% obtained food by buying, 30.8% used their money on family expense, 40% of them were School drop outs, 23.3% sniff glue, 59.2% go to the public hospital for treatment, 56.7% do not have knowledge about HIV/AIDS, 30% of the street children felt that the public do not like them, 43.3% of the street children said their life on the street was tough,44.2% of the street children were responsible for themselves and47.5% of the street children were on the street in search for employment. Limitations: The study was faced with limitations such as consent. Conclusion: Majority of the street children are male within the age of 10-14 years and originally from urban areas, with extended families of low socio-economic status. The highest percentages of the children go to the street for employment purpose, followed by parental loss, child abuse, strict regulations at home and commitment of offence. They survive by engaging in works such as selling wares, shoe shining, collecting rubbish, collecting empty battles for re-use by local beverage makers, washing cars, and others beg or steal, They face a lot of problems such as drop out from school, drugs abuse, feeding themselves by left over from restaurants and some sleep hungry, they experience inhuman treatment such as torture, rape and arrest by police. The government in collaboration with NGOs should create employment opportunities to the people, establish enough rehabilitation and correction centres, schools and health centres, campaign for the rights of street children rights, commemorate ‘Street children’s Day’(January 31st ) and empower street children by providing outreach education, training, food and health services.

Introduction - Sudan's predicament, Girma Kebbede Sudan - the North-South conflict in historical perspectives, Girma Kebbede South Sudan - a war-torn and divided region, Girma Kebbede war, social transition and illness conception - the case of tuberculosis, Jok M. Jok civil war in Sudan - the impact of ecological degradation, Mohamed Suliman losing ground - land impoverishment in Sudan, Girma Kebbede the challenges of peace, Girma Kebbede.

Warfare, particularly civil warfare, has commonly been depicted as irrational. Recent civil wars, including the war in Sudan, have often been seen as the result of tribalism, mindless violence, religious rivalries or some combination of the three. Civil war in Sudan can be seen as a deepening of exploitative processes that existed in ‘normal’ times, a continuation and exaggeration of long-standing conflicts over resources. It is also a means of maximizing the benefits of economic transactions through the exercise of various kinds of force against groups depicted as ‘fair game’ in the context of civil, or ‘holy’ war. This chapter focuses on the ‘border’ area between north and south Sudan, particularly northern Bahr el Ghazal and southern Kordofan, an area of intense suffering, particularly during the period 1986–8.

It has long been understood that pro-government militia activity and pro-government militia violence increase during civil war. Recent literature contends that pro-government militia activity also rises when a state is involved in an interstate rivalry. We maintain that the combination of these two threats may, somewhat counterintuitively, result in reduced pro-government militia activity in some autocracies. This unexpected outcome can be explained by differences in state capacity and legitimacy. Using Geddes’ categorization of authoritarian regimes, we expect a decline in the number of operational pro-government militias when personalist and military regimes are challenged by both an insurgency and a rivalry. Pro-government militia liabilities are magnified in this context and add to these governments’ already considerable cumulative hazards. Pro-government militia numbers will, in contrast, remain consistent in single party regimes in this same circumstance. Since party governments have ample capacity, well-known disadvantages of pro-government militias rarely pose a threat to these capable regimes. In a sample of 142 autocracies from 1981 to 2010, we find considerable empirical support for our contention.

Why do governments choose to fund pro-government militias (PGMs) if doing so could extend costly civil conflict? While PGMs are active in a majority of civil wars, their impact on conflict termination remains poorly understood. We argue that the choice to fund PGMs is a strategic one for states and part of their efforts to influence wartime dynamics and conflict termination. We hypothesize that PGMs’ impact on conflict termination is conditional on whether they are government funded. Government-funded PGMs help states to ward off costly negotiations and encourage the rebellion's gradual dissolution. Using competing risks analyses on civil wars ending between 1981 and 2007, we find robust evidence that PGM funding affects conflict outcomes.

AT THE TIME OF WRITING,1 hopes were high that a peace agreement would be signed between the Khartoum government and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), bringing an end to a war in southern Sudan that has lasted on and off since independence in 1956. At the same time, there were worrying signs of growing conflict in the Darfur region in the west of the country, pitting forces based among the local Muslim peoples against pro-government militias known as the Janjaweed. The growth of this new conflict indicates that Sudan's civil war was never entirely a north-south or a Muslim-Christian struggle, but that it is a country-wide conflict that even incorporates other Muslim populations. The two main anti-government groupings in the Greater Darfur region are the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and the Sudanese Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A). The Janjaweed militias are said to be largely of Chadian origin and finance themselves through plunder and pillage, reportedly enjoying implicit support from the government in Khartoum. The conflict has already left thousands of Darfurians killed, with an estimated 600,000 internally displaced and some 110,000 crossing as refugees into neighbouring Chad. As the government has denied access to most of the relief agencies operating in the country, the Darfur region is in effect sealed off from the outside world, leaving displaced people with little chance of receiving food aid and medical supplies. Despite its geographical remoteness, by late 2003 the crisis in Darfur gradually came to international attention. The grave deterioration of the situation during recent months has led Western supporters of the ongoing IGAD (Inter-Governmental Authority on Development) negotiations between the government of Sudan and the SPLM/A to acknowledge the seriousness of the escalating violence in Darfur. As the crisis is throwing a shadow over the peace talks in Naivasha in Kenya, the international community is expected to respond to the fighting. The insurrection in Darfur is gaining rapidly in coherence. In the light of the SPLM/A's bilateral talks with the government, several opposition movements are afraid that, once part of the transitional government, the

A growing line of research examines causes and consequences of militant group competition. However, empirical work on these topics has limitations. Most quantitative research uses relatively rough proxies for competition, such as counts of groups in a country. Other work uses dichotomous indicators, ignoring the intensity or degree of rivalries. Additionally, many studies examine either terrorist organizations or rebel groups, overlooking cross-type rivalry (e.g., terrorist vs. rebel). We address these issues by introducing time-varying dyadic rivalry data on hundreds of groups – rebels, terrorists, and pro-government militias – in Africa and Asia, 1990-2015. Rivalry levels include denouncements, threats, and violence. After presenting the data, we test the “outbidding” hypothesis: the notion that inter-organizational competition leads to more terrorism. This argument has found support in qualitative analyses, but quantitative tests using rivalry proxies show mixed results. Using our data we find support for the hypothesis. We conclude with research questions that could be addressed with the data.

In recent years, the relations between weak central governments and armed groups in the periphery have attracted great attention. Rebels, warlords and other actors have not only undermined the authorities' grip on power, but gradually come to shape the nature of governance and political system in their countries. Warlordism, rebelocracies and aliocracies are just a few of the political systems identified by students of conflict and armed groups. However, the literature has generally overlooked one category of armed groups and their implications on political order: pro-government militias (PGMs). As PGMs have become ubiquitous in civil wars, this article identifies a new political order emerging in countries where central governments have become reliant on PGMs in counter-insurgency operations. The article defines this order as a militiatocracy. Unlike armed groups in other political orders, PGMs do not seek to overthrow, undermine or replace the central government. Instead, in militiatocracies, PGMs and central governments develop symbiotic relations, which on the one hand help the government to survive an insurgency, but on the other allow militia leaders to secure an increasing presence in politics. The article illustrates the emergence and nature of militiatocracies by employing the case of Syria during the civil war.

Expanded third edition of this key text on the complex underlying conditions of the civil war from the 1960s to the present day, including a new chapter on the current wars in Sudan's new south and South Sudan. Sudan's post-independence history has been dominated by political and civil strife. Most commentators have attributed the country's recurring civil war either to an age-old racial divide between Arabs and Africans, or to recent colonially constructed inequalities. This book attempts a more complex analysis, briefly examining the historical, political, economic and social factors which have contributed to periodic outbreaks of violence between the state and its peripheries. In tracing historical continuities, it outlines the essential differences between the modern Sudan's first civil war in the 1960s and today, including an analysis of the escalation of the Darfur war, implementation of the 2005 peace agreement and implications of the Southern referendum in 2011 and the new war in Sudan's new south and South Sudan. The author also looks at the series of minor civil wars generated by, and contained within, the major conflict, as well as the regional and international factors - including humanitarian aid - which have exacerbated civil violence. This introduction is aimed at students of North-East Africa, and of conflict and ethnicity. It is essential reading for those in aid and international organizations who need a straightforward analytical survey which will help them assess the prospects for a lasting peace in Sudan. Douglas H. Johnson is an independent scholar and former international expert on the Abyei Boundaries Commission.

Expanded third edition of this key text on the complex underlying conditions of the civil war from the 1960s to the present day, including a new chapter on the current wars in Sudan's new south and South Sudan. Sudan's post-independence history has been dominated by political and civil strife. Most commentators have attributed the country's recurring civil war either to an age-old racial divide between Arabs and Africans, or to recent colonially constructed inequalities. This book attempts a more complex analysis, briefly examining the historical, political, economic and social factors which have contributed to periodic outbreaks of violence between the state andits peripheries. In tracing historical continuities, it outlines the essential differences between the modern Sudan's first civil war in the 1960s and today, including an analysis of the escalation of the Darfur war, implementation of the 2005 peace agreement and implications of the Southern referendum in 2011 and the new war in Sudan's new south and South Sudan. The author also looks at the series of minor civil wars generated by, and contained within, the major conflict, as well as the regional and international factors - including humanitarian aid - which have exacerbated civil violence. This introduction is aimed at students of North-East Africa, and of conflict and ethnicity. It will be essential reading for those in aid and international organizations who need a straightforward analytical survey which will help them assess the prospects for a lasting peace in Sudan. Douglas H. Johnson isan independent scholar and former international expert on the Abyei Boundaries Commission.

Despite the benefits of rebel governance such as increased legitimacy and resource extraction, providing governance is also costly for rebel groups, as it entails constant investment of time and money as well as the need to protect their properties and territories. Rebels, therefore, weigh the costs of providing governance against the benefits in their decision to provide governance. In this paper, we explore the impact of pro-government militias (PGMs) on the cost-benefit analysis of rebel governance. We argue that governance becomes a suboptimal strategy for rebel groups in the presence of semi-official PGMs but not informal PGMs. This is because semi-official PGMs’ relationship with the government makes them more formally accountable to the government, which effectively bolsters the counterinsurgency capabilities of the state (and thereby weakens rebels) through providing credible and timely intelligence and undermining civilians support for the rebels, and even allowing rebel defection. We test our argument using data on rebel governance and PGMs and indeed find that semi-official—but not informal—PGMs decrease the likelihood of rebel governance.

The Republic of Sudan is suffering a catastrophic famine. The entire country is in food crisis or food emergency. In July 2024, the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) declared famine in the Zamzam camp for internally displaced people in North Darfur, near El Fasher; between 500,000 to 800,000 people live in the camp.1 The IPC also reported that 755,000 people in Sudan would be ‘in catastrophe’ (IPC phase 5) in the period to September 2024, while 25.6 million people face crisis conditions, the worst levels of food security ever recorded by the IPC in Sudan.2 The significant humanitarian crisis affecting Sudan has been greatly exacerbated by the current civil war in which the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) have been fighting against the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). Hunger is being used as a weapon by both sides. Every humanitarian crisis eventually gives rise to a set of ‘lessons learned’, often set out in the relevant evaluations. But there is also the possibility of ‘lessons not learned’, the title of an article on peacekeeping by Mats Berdal.3 It is true that the relevant lessons are often far from obvious or agreed upon. But it is clear that some important lessons from past crises are not being sufficiently taken into account as one crisis gives way to another. We should also recognise that it is not just humanitarians who are trying to learn lessons from humanitarian crises: those who manipulate and even promote these crises are also learning lessons about how best to do so. An important question here is: who is learning fastest? The immediate and longer-term survival of Sudan’s people depends on concerned governments learning lessons more quickly than abusive armed groups. Another concern is that the practice of ‘learning lessons’ may itself have become a kind of ritual that insures the humanitarian system against the charge of complacency while the system itself does not change very much. This brief provides humanitarian organisations with key information about the background to the current civil war in Sudan and the factors that have had a role in creating famine. The brief also looks at responses to the humanitarian crisis, highlighting reasons for civilians not having adequate protection and reasons why relief has been inadequate. The brief sets out opportunities to push against the obstacles or constraints to humanitarian relief. The brief and the key considerations have been informed from consultations with experts active in or knowledgeable about the history of Sudan and humanitarian work in Sudan, the author’s own expertise, and academic and grey literature.