Abstract
This chapter examines the role of counterbalancing during individual coup attempts. It examines in detail coups staged to unseat Daniel Arap Moi in Kenya, King Hassan II in Morocco, and Manuel Noriega in Panama. In each case, counterbalancing affected the outcome of the coup attempt: while soldiers within the regular military were hesitant to take a side, presidential guards, Ministry of Interior units, and militia built up as counterweights to the military defended incumbent rulers. In contrast to most existing accounts, which suggest that counterbalancing works primarily by creating obstacles to coordination between different security forces, the evidence in these cases suggests that counterbalancing creates incentives to resist the coup.
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