HoneyCirculator: distributing credential honeytoken for introspection of web-based attack cycle

Abstract

A web user who falsely accesses a compromised website is usually redirected to an adversary’s website and is forced to download malware after being exploited. Additionally, the adversary steals the user’s credentials by using information-leaking malware. The adversary may also try to compromise public websites owned by individual users by impersonating the website administrator using the stolen credentials. These compromised websites then become landing sites for drive-by download malware infection. Identifying malicious websites using crawling techniques requires a large amount of resources and time. To monitor the web-based attack cycle for effective detection and prevention, we propose a monitoring system called HoneyCirculator based on a honeytoken, which actively leaks bait credentials and lures adversaries to our decoy server that behaves like a compromised web content management system. To recursively analyze attack phases on the web-based attack cycle, our proposed system involves collecting malware, distributing bait credentials, monitoring fraudulent access, and inspecting compromised web content. It can instantly discover unknown malicious entities without conducting large-scale web crawling because of the direct monitoring behind the compromised web content management system. Our proposed system enables continuous and stable monitoring for about one year. In addition, almost all the malicious websites we discovered had not been previously registered in public blacklists.