Historical Theory and Historical Confirmation

Abstract

An account of historical theory is central to a discussion of the logical level of historical discourse. This is one of the more neglected problems of critical philosophy of history;1 but it is a central concern of Our Knowledge of the Historical Past by Murray Murphey.2 Murphey's book is indispensable for anyone interested in critical philosophy of history and the relation of history to the social sciences. The arguments are elegant, and the examples come from historians; critical philosophy of history has rarely combined these virtues in a single work. As a bonus, the dense arguments have the saving grace of being well written. My purpose in this essay is to examine Murphey's arguments and to consider where they have left the notion of historical theory. One of the problems in discussing theory is the broad range of uses which this term has had. Theory can refer to a formalized deductive system, and we might argue that all theorizing should aspire to that condition, although we do not quite see how to go from here to there. Then there are theories which are explicit but not formalized, as is the case with much sociological theorizing. Finally one can argue that theorizing is implict even in our use of language and every description is theory-laden. Even a chronicle of events involves identifying and describing these events by means of concepts. In this sense, at least, history and theory are interwoven. Still, the distinction between theoretical and applied disciplines has become standard usage in academic discourse, and history is seen as an applied discipline which makes use of theories and generalizations developed by the theoretical disciplines. The relation of historians to theoreticians is seen as one of consumers or perhaps even of parasites.3 Murphey rejects the notion that historians only consume the theories of others; instead, he contends that historians theorize in their own right. He