Abstract
The periodical fluctuation phenomenon appears in coal mine and other fields of government safety supervision. The paper provides a theoretical explanation by building an evolutionary game model between coal mine industry and governmental supervision institutions. Moreover, the paper provides a numerical example to demonstrate how the initial state and the costs (or gains) influence the fluctuation amplitude and the equilibrium position. We find that the initial state and the payoffs of different strategies are the two main determinants of periodical fluctuation phenomenon. The successful experience of coal mine safety supervision in China shows the importance of highly efficient government safety governance in developing countries.
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