Historians’ Silence as Unspoken Judgment and the Role of Legal Theory
This article explores how historians' silences on certain topics can function as unspoken judgments, often more significant than explicit statements, using legal theory (uṣūl al-fiqh) as a methodology applied to pre-modern Arabic historiography, thereby fostering interdisciplinary engagement between humanities and legal theory.
Abstract The aim of the article is to understand historians’ silences toward certain topics. The main argument is that sometimes historians’ silence can be considered as unspoken judgment and such judgment tends to be more meaningful and important than spoken and articulated one. To achieve the goal and demonstrate the argument, I will utilize modes of conceptual implications that are derived from legal theory ( uṣūl al-fiqh ) as a methodology and apply them to some cases from pre-modern Arabic historiography. The article is an opportunity to vitalize humanities fields via interdisciplinarity and likewise to give legal theory a chance to engage with humanities fields.