Abstract
Cooperation is of utmost importance to society, but is often challenged by individual self-interests. While game theory has studied this problem extensively, there is little work on interactions within and across groups with heterogeneous preferences. Yet, interactions between people with incompatible interests often yield conflict, since behavior that is considered cooperative by one population might be perceived as non-cooperative by another. To understand the outcome of such competitive interactions, we study game-dynamical replicator equations for multiple populations with incompatible preferences and different power to reveal, for example, what mechanisms can foster the evolution of behavioral norms? When does cooperation fail, leading to conflict or even to revolutions? What incentives are needed to reach peaceful agreements? Our quantitative analysis reveals some striking results, significant for society, law, and economics.
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