Hegemonic America: The Arrogance of Power

Abstract

The United States entered twentieth century as most powerful country in world. It has retained this status throughout century, although arguably German occupation of Europe in early 1940s provided brief interruption. This power has been based on large, well-educated and fairly homogeneous population, substantial and well-located territory, world's premier economy, and state supported by its people and capable of mobilizing its resources for military conflict when occasion has demanded. The purposes of American state have always provided fertile ground for intellectual debate. Unlike, say, British or French or German states, United States has rarely resorted to formulation of mere national interest when announcing its objectives. The balance of power, securing of natural frontiers, or creation of linguistic imagined community have been beneath dignity of state pursuing a world safe for democracy, Free World, or Order. Of course, critics and scholars alike have been quick to describe United States' traditional diplomatic pursuit of sphere of interest in Americas under Monroe Doctrine or its successive corollaries, and have even seen doctrines of balance of power behind its opposition to Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia. But to degree, this misses point. Americans believe in what Kissinger calls American exceptionalism.(1) The overarching ambition of U.S. state has marched beyond grubby confines of diplomacy of self-interest. This is state with global mission.(2) The character of this mission has been on view three times during this century after each of American defeats of rival and aspiring hegemonic powers. The key components of American mission are: free trade between states; removal of obstacles to movement of capital; creation of representative political institutions within states, or liberal democracies; and replacement of power politics by international institutions and rule of law. The American elite has believed for three generations that these conditions will produce world of economic growth and international peace from which America, among others, will greatly benefit. In 1918-19 this vision briefly emerged in guise of Wilsonian liberalism and its pursuit of liberal world order, sustained by collective security of League of Nations. It was defeated by even older American tradition of isolationism from affairs of Europe, which led to U.S. Senate's refusal to endorse League's Covenant. In 1944-48, after defeat of Axis powers, same impulses led United States to create political and economic architecture of post-war world, centred on United Nations, Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), and General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). This attempt to create global liberal order was resisted by Soviet Union and its allies for next half century. As result, Free World was always partly militarized and severely compromised by needs of national security state United States was forced to create. The third American attempt to construct liberal world is that in which we are now living and which is described variously as New Order (Bush), world of freely trading democracies (Clinton), or globalization (most of rest of us). Its economic policy dimensions are often termed the Washington consensus, and its military form is NATO (North Atlantic: Treaty Organization) multilateralism, as practised through NATO in Serbia. This design springs from American defeat of Soviet bloc ten years ago and its attempt to complete mission of 1918-19 and 1944-48 - that is, to create liberal world order from which it will be major beneficiary. It should not be doubted that United States possesses power and probably determination to try to enforce this vision on rest of international system, particularly since it has powerful allies in this endeavour. …