Abstract
In addition to setting out the problem of free will as a problem generated by our commitment to the explicability of the world or the principle of sufficient reason, this chapter accomplishes two tasks. First, it explains why extant interpretations of Hegel's theory of agency that do not engage the causal structure of agency or the modern problem of free will necessarily fall short of articulating Hegel's view as a full theory of self-determination. Most importantly, it argues that for Hegel, the problem of expression is fundamentally a problem concerning the balance between self- and other-determination in productive activity, a problem Hegel terms of the problem of reflection. Second, the chapter briefly traces Hegel's basic theory of free will in the Introduction to his Philosophy of Right.
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