Haunted Life: Sovereignty, Affect, and Impunity in Iraq

Grounding Human Dignity and Rights:A Thomistic Response to Wolterstorff Paul A. Macdonald Jr. THE CATHOLIC CHURCH has taught consistently that there are basic human rights, such as the right to life, the right to the material means necessary properly to develop one's life, the right to be respected, the right to pursue truth freely, the right to worship God in accordance with the right dictates of one's conscience, and the right to be given the opportunity to work.1 Moreover, the Church has taught that the ground of these rights is the dignity and worth that all human beings inherently possess. For example, the Catechism of the Catholic Church says that "Being in the image of God the human individual possesses the dignity of a person, who is not just something, but someone."2 And as a person—a possessor of a nature "endowed with intelligence and free will," in the words of Pacem in Terris—the human individual "has rights and duties, which together flow as a direct consequence from his nature."3 The Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church puts the point this way: "the roots of human rights are to be found in the dignity that belongs to each human being" and that "the ultimate source of human rights is not found in the mere [End Page 1] will of human beings, in the reality of the State, in public powers, but in man himself and in God his Creator."4 The overall goal of this article is to defend the Church's teaching on human dignity and rights, and specifically the Church's claim that human dignity, as the ground of human rights and duties, derives from our being persons created in God's image. My defense unfolds in two main stages. First, in section I, I summarize Nicholas Wolterstorff's recent, important answer to the question of what grounds human dignity and rights, and specifically those rights that Wolterstorff calls natural human rights: legitimate claims against others to be treated in a certain way, which we retain not on account of the actions of others (conferring rights on us) but rather because qua human we possess great dignity and worth.5 Consistent with Catholic teaching, Wolterstorff holds that human beings possess great dignity and worth in virtue of standing in a certain relation to God. However, Wolterstorff denies that it is possible to ground human dignity and rights in either personhood or the imago dei. Instead, he argues that it is only because all human beings bear the property of being loved by God, with what he calls "attachment" love, that they possess great dignity and worth, in which human rights inhere. In the second, more extensive stage of my defense, drawing heavily on the thought of Thomas Aquinas, I reflect on and challenge Wolterstorff's claim that personhood and the imago dei cannot account for the dignity that grounds human rights. In section II, I show how, according to Wolterstorff's own criteria for what constitutes a dignity-based ground of human rights, [End Page 2] human beings possess rights- and duty-grounding dignity and worth as persons. In section III, I show how human beings possess rights- and duty-grounding dignity and worth as divine creations and image-bearers. Of course, from the Church's perspective, these claims speak to the same truth or reality: as divine creations and image-bearers, we are also persons ("endowed with intelligence and free will") who possess rights-and duty-grounding dignity and worth. What I argue, though, in an effort both to clarify and to bolster Church teaching, is that fully grounding human dignity and rights, or giving a complete account of human dignity and rights, requires affirming that human beings qua persons are divine creations and image-bearers, because it is only by affirming that we are divine creations and image-bearers that we can give a complete account for why we are also persons who possess dignity and rights. My main goal here is not to develop a Thomistic theory of rights or to ground a full theory of rights in Aquinas.6 Nor is it to defend the...

“Human dignity” is the foundation of the human rights discourse that evolved around the United Nations’ 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In recent decades, the concept of human dignity has been vastly over-extended, gradually becoming a vague, nearly meaningless “catch-all” phrase. In the 21st century’s pluralistic and multicultural world, this development has played into two worrisome trends. One is the formulation of any cultural-specific identity-based claim as involving a human dignity-based human right; such over-extension of human dignity and human dignity-based rights breeds growing skepticism regarding the usefulness of the whole human rights discourse. The second trend is the erroneous portrayal of cultural specific honor-based claims as involving dignity-based human rights. Such misleading portrayal blurs the boundaries between the universalistically humanistic dignity-based human rights discourse, and culturally specific, often separatist and conservative honor-based mentalities.Attempting to address these troubling trends, this paper defines a tightly knit human dignity, which marks the absolute value/ worth of the common denominator of humanness in all human beings. This human dignity gives rise to universalistic and absolute – yet minimal – fundamental human rights. It is conceptually distinguished from what I refer to as “respect”, which assigns tentative value/worth to the uniqueness of each and every concrete, specific expression of human existence. In this conceptualization, respect is the basis of tentative, secondary human rights – including those that address many specific identity claims in a pluralistic, multicultural world. Whereas "human dignity-based rights" derive from and protect the very essence of humanness, "respect-based rights" protect and enhance exclusive personal choices that manifest an individual's uniqueness, including each person's self-expression in lieu of his or her multiple affiliations. Such affiliations are often related to race, gender, nationality, religion, ethnicity, sexuality and/ or culture. Respect-based rights thus refer to most issues arising from pluralism and multiculturalism. Both dignity and respect are carefully distinguished from the very different notion of honor, which marks tentative, comparative human value/ worth that is intertwined with esteem and prestige within a specific (typically conservative and separatist) normative cultural context. Honor-based claims do not necessarily constitute either dignity or respect-based human rights.Such re-conceptualization yields a clear distinction between the absolute and universal fundamental dignity-based human rights, and the tentative, often cultural-specific respect-based rights. This allows to preserves the distinction between absolute, universal fundamental dignity-based human rights, and secondary, tentative, sometimes clashing respect-based rights. It highlights the difference between these two categories of human rights and any culturally-specific honor-based claims. These distinctions are important if we are to maintain the discourse of human rights and adjust it to a world which is ever more pluralistic and multicultural.

Reviewed by: The Culturalization of Human Rights Law by Federico Lenzerini Julie Fraser, Ph.D. Candidate (bio) Federico Lenzerini, The Culturalization of Human Rights Law (Oxford University Press, 2014), ISBN 978-0-19-966428-3, 304pages. I. INTRODUCTION The apparent tension between human rights and cultural diversity is as old as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In an effort to ease this tension, Federico Lenzerini uses this book to promote the “culturalization” of human rights: a differentiated understanding of rights based on the specific needs of the people in each case. Lenzerini makes important contributions by setting out the foundations of human dignity and rights in societies around the world, and providing examples of cultural approaches to human rights law by international and regional bodies. The book is a thoroughly researched and well-argued contemporary analysis of the long-standing human rights debate on universalism and cultural relativism. The book proceeds in five chapters, first introducing the universalism debate before turning to sources of human rights and dignity in societies around the world. Lenzerini provides detailed examples of human rights in pre-colonial societies, analyzing, inter alia, the Code of Hammurabi, the Qur’an, Confucianism, the Constitution of the Iroquois Nations, and Aztec and Incan texts. He concludes that from ancient times, ideas of human rights existed well beyond the “West.”1 Chapter Two notes that despite the development of “universal” human rights law at the international level, different parts of the world have retained their specific views on rights through regional instruments.2 Chapter Three sets out the culturally based approaches to human rights evident in international and regional law and practice. The in-depth study, including the African, European, Inter-American, and UN systems, concludes that culture today is recognized as an element to be considered in human rights adjudication.3 The fourth and final chapters articulate the advantages of a culturally based approach to human rights, as well as a methodology for identifying universal standards. The crucial issue Lenzerini addresses is not whether human rights can be interpreted and implemented in a culturally sensible manner, but to what extent. II. CULTURALIZATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS Like others, Lenzerini submits that almost all human rights include a cultural dimension4 resulting from the fact that “culture” includes features that characterize a society or social group, including the modes of life, the value systems, and the traditions and beliefs.5 As culture can [End Page 1110] play such a critical role in shaping the content of human rights for an individual or community, Lenzerini questions the traditional view that human rights are “wholly universal.”6 He subscribes to “moderate cultural relativism,” holding that cultural variations are acceptable to the extent that they do not impact upon the “basic core of fundamental rights which are universal.”7 Lenzerini advocates the “culturalization” of rights, an interpretive process by which the content of rights is made relevant for and tailored to communities around the world. This is necessary as people’s expectations differ, and human rights standards should be flexible to allow different expectations to be met in concrete ways.8 This process sits in contrast to the strict application of rigid international human rights norms regardless of the historical, social, and cultural context of the individual/community in question. Lenzerini’s culturalization can be compared to other culturally sensitive approaches to human rights advocated by scholars including Sally Engle Merry, Eva Brems, Abdullahi An-Na’im, Tom Zwart, and Alison Renteln.9 Yvonne Donders asserts that cultural sensitivity in human rights implementation is now generally accepted.10 In support of his approach, Lenzerini cites a number of benefits, including better community acceptance of human rights, improved effectiveness, and greater state compliance. He claims that culturalization promotes the “cultural acceptance, assimilation, and legitimization of human rights.”11 As a result, human rights are not perceived as “abstract dictates” from the outside, but are “brought down to earth” and seen as a key component of the social dynamics.12 As such, people support human rights as embedded and necessary, which may in turn increase state compliance.13 While this may be the case for nation-states, the process will arguably be more complicated...

A novel and multidisciplinary exposition and theorization of human dignity and rights, brought to bear on current issues in bioethics and biolaw. “Human dignity” has been enshrined in international agreements and national constitutions as a fundamental human right. The World Medical Association calls on physicians to respect human dignity and to discharge their duties with dignity. And yet human dignity is a term—like love, hope, and justice—that is intuitively grasped but never clearly defined. Some ethicists and bioethicists dismiss it; other thinkers point to its use in the service of particular ideologies. In this book, Michael Barilan offers an urgently needed, nonideological, and thorough conceptual clarification of human dignity and human rights, relating these ideas to current issues in ethics, law, and bioethics. Combining social history, history of ideas, moral theology, applied ethics, and political theory, Barilan tells the story of human dignity as a background moral ethos to human rights. After setting the problem in its scholarly context, he offers a hermeneutics of the formative texts on Imago Dei; provides a philosophical explication of the value of human dignity and of vulnerability; presents a comprehensive theory of human rights from a natural, humanist perspective; explores issues of moral status; and examines the value of responsibility as a link between virtue ethics and human dignity and rights. Barilan accompanies his theoretical claim with numerous practical illustrations, linking his theory to such issues in bioethics as end-of-life care, cloning, abortion, torture, treatment of the mentally incapacitated, the right to health care, the human organ market, disability and notions of difference, and privacy, highlighting many relevant legal aspects in constitutional and humanitarian law.

The lyrics of “Delayed Devotion,” a song by the artist Duffy, speak of a woman’s decision to end a relationship in which, it seems, her partner only began to realize her value as she prepared to leave. There are doubtless many situations in which these lyrics, and the story they tell, are applicable. One such situation is manifested in international human rights law, particularly in regard to the rise in the creation and use of individual complaint mechanisms as a part of international human rights treaties. As this article explains, these lyrics are applicable in the individual complaint mechanism context because the increase in creating these procedures for specific groups through specific conventions indicates a sense that the devotion of the international community to implementing the rights guaranteed in foundational human rights has been delayed. At the same time, the increase in individual complaint mechanisms indicates that individuals are being provided with a greater ability to penetrate the international human rights law system that has for so long regarded them as only peripheral actors to be given rights rather than as actors having the agency to claim these rights at the international level. In sum, the result is a steady penetration of the international system by individuals, albeit through a system that is designed by international actors and therefore has structural limitations to this interaction. Although clearly the structure of the international law system mandates that the individual complaint system is itself structured in a way that is essentially state-centric, it is argued that the increasing prominence of the individual in international human rights law is a discernible trend that stands to alter the understanding of the international system. This prominence, however, is based on a greater sense of individual empowerment than the language of individual rights that has been traditionally used in international human rights law. The article argues that the increase in individual prominence is certainly laudable but that, by attaching this increased individual penetration of the international human rights law system to an ever-increasing series of specialized conventions, there is a significant risk of fragmenting the concept of the international human rights law system. Instead, it is argued that the individual, as the foundation of the human rights and dignities that are the backbone of international human rights law, should not need to seek specialized avenues of redress, but rather should be able to penetrate the international law system based on his basic identity as the holder of human rights and human dignity. This is especially so because these concepts of essential human rights and human dignity are at the core of the entire international human rights law system. This recommendation stresses both the internal status of people as holders of human rights and human dignity while also doing away with the need to create new quasi-judicial structures that are themselves potentially limiting depending on the ways in which they are drafted and function.

Introduction: human dignity – an integrative and open concept ‘Human dignity’ has become one of the most important integrative formulas in international politics. Since 1948, when it was introduced into Article 1 of the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, it has successfully functioned as an umbrella concept that bridges seemingly insurmountable ideological gulfs and provides a basis for consensus and compromise. Similarly to other political guiding concepts such as justice, liberty, peace or, more recently, sustainability, human dignity is an essentially open concept that leaves room for varying interpretations and contextualizations and thereby allows even the otherwise fiercest adversaries to speak with one voice. Another reason why human dignity has been increasingly introduced into constitutions and international treaties since 1948 is the wish for an absolute – a foundational principle that overarches, as it were, all constitutional and other political principles, a common reference point that is beyond controversy and conflict and plays the role, in Kantian terms, of an a priori to which all other political ideas are subject. Human dignity is predestined for this role because of two characteristic factors: the openness of its content and its independence of any particular metaphysical background theory. The extent to which the concept is semantically open is documented by its function as a heuristic tool in the process of gradually extending the canon of basic human rights. Although it is generally agreed that there is a stable connection between the idea of human dignity and the idea of basic human rights, the number and identity of the rights associated with the idea of human dignity is not static but, rather, dynamic. What human dignity implies – its content and consequences – has no fixed magnitude but is open to interpretations that extend its range and content into new directions, though in continuity with its established content. Extensions usually respond to new threats posed, for example, by new and unexpected political constellations, natural phenomena or technological developments. That human dignity shares this dynamic character with human basic rights supports the widely held assumption that the notions of human dignity and basic human rights are closely linked to each other.

Since World War II the idea of human dignity has been a prominent feature of political thought, and to a degree of political practice. The language of human dignity indelibly entered the world of practical politics in 1945 in the United Nations Charter, a document inspired by revulsion against the many affronts to humanity and human dignity experienced during and prior to that war: “We the people of the United Nations determined … to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person.” A link between human dignity and human rights and of both to justice, or, rather, the claim that human dignity and rights are the basis of justice, was explicitly made three years later in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: “whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world …”

Counterterrorism, Dignity, and the Rule of Law

Human rights' limitations in patent law

Sixty years ago, on this day of 10th December 1948 at Paris, the state members of the United Nations, for the noble purposes stated in the 1945 Charter, for peace and respecting for fundamental human rights, dignity and values, maintaining justice and promoting social progress, adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in order to solemnly affirm human values, which are inherent, inalienable, indivisible and interlinked, of each individual human being in the whole mankind community. Since then, the Declaration has become a common standard for all peoples, nations and states to pursue this noble course of humankind and to make their best efforts in order to guarantee, enforce and realise the fundamental human rights and freedom, as well as to promote and to strengthen tolerance and respect of human dignity and values. Despite the fact is that the formulation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) was not reflected the full representation of diverse cultures and ideologies, as well as its historical shortcomings, its establishment is a great ever achievement of humankind in term of the progress of liberty, equality and human rights. The creation of the UDHR reflected the noble aspiration of human beings experiencing thousands of years of human history, especially at the time of the massive killings of people as a result of the most destructive wars (world wars 1 and 2), genocides, the ideology-based divided world, and the ignorance of human values, dignity and freedom spreading out all over the planet. Therefore, the need of a common international standard was more than ever before required and the establishment of a universal declaration of human rights was evitable. One of the reasons why this document is the world's most widely recognised international document because every culture and nation finds it as not only a highest aspiration, but also a common heritage of their cultures, religions and traditions of thoughts. Above of those the UDHR is a global language of our world of diverse cultures and ideologies; it is the foundation of peace, security, tolerance and human development. The recognition of universal human rights has been echoing the long-lasting aspiration of human beings on the fight for their dignity, fundamental freedoms and development. Although set out in the UDHR sixty years ago and there have been a lot of achievements in relation to the evolution and realization of human rights for all peoples, nations and individuals, many universal human rights have been deprived and seriously violated across the world. This requires greater, consistent efforts of the humankind community in bringing fully the noble implications of the UDHR into reality. During over the last two decades, the rise of cultural relativism has challenged the legacy of the UDHR as well as universalism of human rights. Lie in the front of cultural relativism is the 'Asian values' perspective that denied the universality of human rights and championed their partiularity. Inspired by Confucianism and Communialism, which have been heavily influential on East Asian countries, the 'Asian values' perspective is indeed a rivalry of universal human rights. This paper is to respond to cultural relativism in general, and the 'Asian values' perspective in particular, thereby it reasserts the global values of the UDHR and universal human rights rested upon human dignity and fundamental freedoms as a global value of human rights that can not be culturally challenged or practically denied. It also reminds that the return of fundamental principles enshrined in the UDHR in the global context of cultural and religous conflicts is more than ever a necessity.

[For a later version of material in this paper, see these two papers: "Human Rights Theory, 1: What Are 'Human Rights'? Against the 'Orthodox' View" (2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2597403; "Human Rights Theory, 2: What Reason Do We Have, if Any, to Take Human Rights Seriously? Beyond 'Human Dignity'" (2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2597404.]In the period since the end of the Second World War, there has emerged what never before existed: a truly global morality. That morality — which I call “the morality of human rights” — consists not only of various rights recognized by the great majority of the countries of the world as human rights, but also of a fundamental imperative that directs “all human beings” to “act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.” The imperative — articulated in the very first article of the foundational human rights document of our time, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights — is fundamental in the sense that it serves, in the morality of human rights, as the normative ground of human rights.I begin, in the first section of this essay, by explaining what the term “human right” means in the context of the internationalization of human rights. I also explain both the sense in which some human rights are, in some legal systems, “legal” rights and the sense in which all human rights are “moral” rights.Then, in the longer second section, I turn to the inquiry that is my principal concern in this essay: Why should one take seriously the imperative that serves, in the morality of human rights, as the normative ground of human rights? That is, what reason or reasons does one have, if any, to live one’s life in accord with the imperative to “act towards all human beings in a spirit of brotherhood”?This essay, the final draft of which will be published in a symposium issue of the San Diego Law Review, was my contribution to the conference on “The Status of International Law and International Human Rights” that was held at the University of San Diego School of Law on May 3-4, 2013, under the auspices of the School’s Institute of Law and Philosophy. Some of the material in this essay is drawn from my new book, Human Rights in the Constitutional Law of the United States (2013). Most of the material here that is not drawn from my book was first presented in a lecture I was honored to deliver at Santa Clara University in March 2013, under the auspices of the Bannon Institute of the Ignatian Center for Jesuit Education.

[For a later version of material in this paper, see these two papers: "Human Rights Theory, 1: What Are 'Human Rights'? Against the 'Orthodox' View" (2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2597403; "Human Rights Theory, 2: What Reason Do We Have, if Any, to Take Human Rights Seriously? Beyond 'Human Dignity'" (2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2597404.]In the period since the end of the Second World War, there has emerged what never before existed: a truly global morality. That morality — which I call “the morality of human rights” — consists not only of various rights recognized by the great majority of the countries of the world as human rights, but also of a fundamental imperative that directs “all human beings” to “act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.” The imperative — articulated in the very first article of the foundational human rights document of our time, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights — is fundamental in the sense that it serves, in the morality of human rights, as the normative ground of human rights.I begin, in the first section of this essay, by explaining what the term “human right” means in the context of the internationalization of human rights. I also explain both the sense in which some human rights are, in some legal systems, “legal” rights and the sense in which all human rights are “moral” rights.Then, in the longer second section, I turn to the inquiry that is my principal concern in this essay: Why should one take seriously the imperative that serves, in the morality of human rights, as the normative ground of human rights? That is, what reason or reasons does one have, if any, to live one’s life in accord with the imperative to “act towards all human beings in a spirit of brotherhood”?This essay, the final draft of which will be published in a symposium issue of the San Diego Law Review, was my contribution to the conference on “The Status of International Law and International Human Rights” that was held at the University of San Diego School of Law on May 3-4, 2013, under the auspices of the School’s Institute of Law and Philosophy. Some of the material in this essay is drawn from my new book, Human Rights in the Constitutional Law of the United States (2013). Most of the material here that is not drawn from my book was first presented in a lecture I was honored to deliver at Santa Clara University in March 2013, under the auspices of the Bannon Institute of the Ignatian Center for Jesuit Education.

This article examines the state of implementation and compliance with generally recognized legal principles and norms of international law in the field of fundamental human rights © Корж І.Ф., 2023 and freedoms in Ukraine. It is noted that human rights should be understood as the defining principles of a person’s legal status, which belong to them from birth, are natural and inalienable, without which a person cannot exist as a full-fledged social being, and therefore they are a necessary element of citizens, society and the rule of law. The concept of human rights is based on two basic values – human dignity and equality. Human rights are defined and formalized primarily by international law, which includes a number of basic international legal acts, such as: Universal Declaration of Human Rights; European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and its protocols; Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Ukraine, which noted its further development in the direction of integration into the EU, formalized the rights of its citizens in the Constitution adopted in 1996, which enshrines a whole series of both traditional and new guarantees of human and citizen rights and freedoms, which allow each citizen to choose the type of his behavior, to use economic and socio-political freedoms and social benefits both in personal and public interests. It is emphasized that the establishment of human rights in Ukraine as the highest social value is complicated by a number of factors, which is mainly determined by the low legal culture of both the general public and civil servants and is confirmed by the fact that for many years Ukraine occupied one of the first places among the member states of the Council of Europe by the number of cases of violation of citizens’ rights that were pending in the European Court. This indicates the existing problems in the state regarding legal education, legal awareness, legal culture, etc. of citizens who are primarily in public authorities, and which manifests itself in the manifestation of corruption, as legal nihilism of citizens. This becomes particularly cynical during the period of fighting against Russian aggression, as evidenced by numerous reports in the mass media. Such manifestations of corruption scandals in the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, in civil-military administrations, in local self-government bodies, in other state bodies of the country testify to the presence of a deep political and legal crisis in the state administration bodies of the country, as a result of the lack of program documents on the implementation of state personnel policy, inactivity legal mechanisms to fight corruption. Even the Law of Ukraine “On De-Oligarchization” was subjected to devastating criticism not only from the Ukrainian public, but also from the “Western” community. Confirmation of the relevance and importance of the need to solve the problem of corruption in Ukraine is evidenced by the fact that our ally the USA put forward clear conditions for further support of Ukraine in its fight against aggression and aspiration to join the European Union. The future success of Ukraine depends on accelerating the pace of reforms that remain unimplemented and the immediate implementation of identified priority transformations in Ukraine.

This is the second in a series of papers I plan to post in the next few months. Each paper addresses an issue, or a set of related issues, in Human Rights Theory. The overarching subject of the first two papers — of this paper and the first one — is the morality of human rights, which has become, in the period since the end of the Second World War, a global political morality. For the first paper in the series, see Michael J. Perry, “Human Rights Theory, 1: What Are ‘Human Rights’? Against the ‘Orthodox’ View” (2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2597403.In this paper, I pursue this inquiry: What reason (or reasons) do we have — if indeed we have any — to take human rights seriously; more precisely, what reason do we have, if any, to live our lives in accord with this imperative, which is articulated in the very first article of the foundational human rights document of our time, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and which is the very heart of the morality of human rights: “Act towards all human beings in a spirit of brotherhood.” Of course, not all of us who have reason to live our lives in accord with that imperative — and, in so doing, to do what we reasonably can to get not only our own government but every government to conduct its affairs in accord with the imperative — have the same reason. Those of us who are religious believers may have one or another theological reason. But many of us are not religious believers.What reason do those of us who are not religious believers have, if any, to live our lives in accord with the “in a spirit of brotherhood” imperative? Probably the best known response to that question relies on a secular version of the idea of “human dignity.” However, it is far from clear, as I explain in this paper, that the secular “human dignity” response works as a reason to take seriously the morality of human rights. Be that as it may, what reason can one have if she is not only a nonbeliever but, philosophically speaking, a “naturalist” — and therefore one for whom, much contemporary moral-philosophical discourse to the contrary notwithstanding, “human dignity” is wholly unavailing as a “foundation” or “ground” for the morality of human rights?

In October 2005, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization adopted the Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights (UDBHR). A concept of central importance in the declaration is...