Happenings, Acts, and Actions: Articulating the Meaning and Implications of Human Agency for Criminology

Abstract

In recent years, criminological theorists, mainly theorists of desistance from crime, have incorporated notions of human agency into their theories. Although acknowledging the importance of human agency, most desistance theorists have not presented a detailed conceptualization of precisely what is meant by human agency (what agency consists of and how it is manifested) nor have they been aware of the fact that the understanding of human agency that they have articulated is fundamentally at odds with the substantive content of the theory. This paper presents a detailed discussion of one conceptualization of human agency, a conceptualization that sees human agency as both very individualistic and cognitive. At its core, human agency is understood to be action—deliberate and intended or willed conduct. When persons act as agents, they direct their behavior toward some goal and is preceded by processes of deliberation, decision-making, intention formation, volition or activation of the will, and guidance. This notion of human agency is incompatible with event causality but is entirely consistent with a teleological explanation, an explanation of human behavior in terms of the goals that are sought by persons. The conceptualization of human agency developed here is fully consistent with rational choice theory and the recently developed identity theory of desistance because our choices, and intentional actions based on those choices, are essential expressions of our identity.