Haller on the Principles of Empirical Knowledge

The main question of metasemantics, or foundational semantics, is why an expression token has the meaning (semantic value) that it in fact has. In his reading of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s later work, Saul Kripke presented a skeptical challenge that threatened to make the foundational question unanswerable. My first contention in this paper is that the skeptical challenge indeed poses an insoluble paradox, but only for a certain kind of metasemantic theory, against which the challenge effectively works as a reductio ad absurdum argument. My second contention is that as a result of rejecting the theory which entails a paradoxical outcome, we will see that the foundational question essentially involves a temporal dimension. After arguing that the skeptical challenge gives us a strong reason to adopt a historical view of meaning, I shall further argue against certain authors who claim that meanings not only have histories but futures as well, or that the meaning of a word may change retroactively in time as a consequence of counterfactual change in its future use. The major aim of the paper is thus to bring together the arguably interrelated debates about the skeptical challenge and temporal externalism in philosophy of language.

Professor Rosenberg proposes to answer the challenge of scepticism against the possibility of empirical knowledge by a construction of an epistemic process, which legitimizes the acceptation of empirical theories. Professor Rosenberg tackles the challenge of scepticism which presents itself for him in the form of the following dilemma: (1) If empirical knowledge is not certain, but revisable, then it has to be arbitrary. (2) If it is certain, then it has to be necessary and thus not allowing to explain the possibility of error.

Kant took the challenge of skepticism about empirical knowledge very seriously, declaring it a scandal to philosophy that there was no known proof of the existence of the external world.1 What is troubling about Kant’s discussion of skepticism is its apparent generality. In the Preface to the, first edition of the Critique of Pure Reason he speaks of it without distinguishing among various kinds and representatives of skepticism, and his considering Hume to be perhaps the most profound (geistreichste) of the skeptics doesn’t betray an appreciation of the varieties of skepticism.2 In fact, however, the unfolding of Kant’s philosophical program displays distinct, systematically related responses to the distinct kinds of skepticism concerning the external world represented by Sextus Empiricus, Descartes’s demon, and Hume, This chapter considers Kant’s program for responding to skepticism about the external world and, with that, for defending the objectivity of empirical knowledge claims in the first Critique. After sketching Kant’s program, I will argue first, that the position he defends constitutes a distinctively subjectivist epistemology, and hence makes an unsatisfactory defense of the objectivity of empirical knowledge claims; second, that the direct argument for his position is not sound, so that he has not defended the objectivity of empirical knowledge claims; and third, that Kant fails to address second-order questions about the justification of his philosophical theory of knowledge.

Implicit Bias and Philosophy: Metaphysics and Epistemology, Volume 1

This look at Gassendi’s philosophy and science illuminates his contributions to early modern thought and to the broader history of philosophy of science. Two keys to his thought are his novel picture of acquiring and judging empirical belief, and his liberal account of criteria for counting empirical beliefs as parts of warranted physical theories. By viewing his philosophical and scientific pursuits as part of one and the same project, Gassendi’s arguments on behalf of atomism can be fruitfully explained as licensed by his empiricism.

When people become religious believers, when they talk about their religion or engage in verbal activity in practising it, what are they doing? Although he does not believe that a simple, unqualified answer can be given to this question, Patrick Sherry thinks that it is important, that certain ideas of Wittgenstein are a help in trying to answer it and that a proper answer raises problems of truth and justification which are often ignored: “Let us then ask ourselves what pictures and concepts are used in religion and theology: we want to know how doctrines are related to the world— what is their subject matter and what kind of description are they trying to provide? Now it is unlikely that we will be able to reach a simple answer to such questions, because so-called ‘religious language’ is of many different kinds ... even putatively ‘descriptive’ or ‘fact-stating’ uses of religious language are of many types (p. 18)... We need to ask how and why the religious ‘universe of discourse’, which supposedly structures the believer’s experience, ever arose in the first place (p. 45) ... There are three tasks which need to be tackled if we are to produce a viable Wittgensteinian philosophy of religion. These are to characterise the language-games and forms of life of religion by explaining their place in our lives and experience, to relate them to other language-games, and to deal candidly with the problems of truth and justification.

The article provides a detailed account and elucidation of Karl Popper’s solution to Hume’s problem of induction. It is pointed out that the solution has two major aspects. The first, explicitly described by Popper as his solution to the problem of induction, is the replacement of the inductivist account of the development of empirical knowledge, according to which cognition begins with observations of particular events and proceeds through inductive inferences to certainly true or highly probable theories-generalisations, with the hypothetico-deductivist account, according to which cognition begins with a problem and proceeds through conjecturing its possible solutions (advancing hypotheses) and attempts to falsify them by reproducible results of observations/experiments. The second aspect has to do with the problem of justification of the hypothetico-deductivist account (which replaces Hume’s problem of the justification of induction). This problem is shown to be dealt with within Popper’s-Bartley’s general solution to the problem of justification, usually described as «non-justificationism», which admits the impossibility of absolute definitive justification (for any position) and replaces the search for such justification with the evaluation of relative advantages/disadvantages of competing approaches, which can provide us with reasons to prefer or tentatively accept one of them. The comparison is made between Popper’s hypotheticodeductivist account and Charles Pierce’s account based on abduction, or inference to the best explanation. It is shown that these accounts has similar logical structures, that with respect to empirical science they suggest mutual corrections and clarifications, and that inference to the best explanation can provide justification for the assumption of the existence of laws of nature, which is implicit in the hypothetico-deductivist account.

A STANDARD, anid now traditional objection to utilitarianism, is that it entails unjust punishments. It is replied to this objection, that the principle of utility should be construed as a test, not of particular punishments, but of systems or institutions of punishment, and that that institution of punishment which we commonly regard as just is one which in fact has the best utilitarian justification. Objections to this reply of the kind I have urged elsewhere 'that this in fact is not true, that in any case it is extremely unlikely that the one (just) system should be equally useful in all contexts, and that it is extremely difficult to test the utility of such diverse systems of punishment as prevail and have prevailed in civilised countries-tend to be ignored, if not denied. Hart's recent discussion illustrates this well.2 This suggests that there is need for the critic of utilitarianism to restate his case more simply and in a way which does not permit it to be circumvented by unsubstantiated claims to empirical knowledge. Such a restatement presents no difficulties. Surely the utilitarian must admit that whatever the facts of the matter may be, it is logically possible that an ' unjust ' system of punishment-e.g. a system involving collective punishments, retroactive laws and punishments, or punishments of parents and relations of the offender -may be more useful than a 'just' system of punishment ? If it is not thought to be logically possible, then reasons why need be offered; but none are apparent. Yet to expose the inadequacy of utilitarianism in dealing with the problem of justice, only the logical possibility of such an ' unjust ' utilitarian system of punishment needs to be indicated. The utilitarian can, of course, take the bull by the horns and argue that if it ever were to become apparent that some 'unjust' institution of punishment -has a sound utilitarian justification, then it would be superstitious rule worship to adhere the just system. But as far as I know, only J. J. C. Smart, among the contemporary utilitarians, is happy to adopt this ' solution '.

What was Saul Kripke’s personal stance on the sceptical challenge that he famously attributed to Ludwig Wittgenstein? It will be argued that despite his statements to the contrary, we can, in fact, outline at least a rough sketch of Kripke’s own views on the challenge and its aftermath on the basis of the remarks he left in the text. In summary, Kripke (a) rejected the sceptical solution to the challenge and (b) leaned towards a non-sceptical primitivist solution. If this is correct, it follows that there is a way in which Kripke's view makes his causal-historical picture of reference potentially able to solve the sceptical challenge.

In the first part of this chapter I finish the axiomatization of the causal nets framework started in Chap. 3 I also argue that the causal Markov axiom provides the best explanation for two statistical phenomena. In the second part I present several results about the empirical content of different versions (i.e., combination of axioms) of the theory of causal nets. Both parts together show that causation satisfies the same modern standards as theoretical concepts of good empirical theories do. This can be seen as new empirical support for the theory of causal nets, but also as an answer to Hume’s skeptical challenge: Actually, it seems that we have good reasons to believe in causation as something ontologically real out there in the world.

Intergenerational Justice

In this article, a comparative analysis of Karl Popper’s falsifiability theory and Ludwig Wittgenstein’s theory of meaning in the context of the historical-philosophical approach to the problem of new knowledge formation and justification is undertaken. An assumption is made that the constellation of fact is connected with the possibility of the emergence of an epistemological field. Researchers have repeatedly addressed this issue; however, one important detail received no due attention: Popper’s counter-arguments regarding Wittgenstein’s view on semantic paradoxes show the fundamental difference of these philosophers’ views on the sign and the signified (language and world), which contributes to the analysis of new knowledge formation. Arguments that concern both early and late periods of Wittgenstein’s philosophy are used in this study. The uncertainty of the demarcation criterion (according to Popper) allowed analyzing Wittgenstein’s position as to how and why different rules of inference form different epistemological fields.

In 1992, Thomas Uebel set the standard for scholarship on both Neurath and the protocol-sentence debate in Overcoming Logical Positivism from Within: The Emergence of Neurath’s Naturalism in the Vienna Circle’s Protocol-Sentence Debate. That book was an in-depth study of the logical empiricists’ protocol-sentence debate, which ‘‘concerned the form, content, and status of scientific evidence statements’’ (1). Put otherwise, this debate addressed how best to understand those scientific activities (including linguistic activities) that make the empirical sciences empirical. The book reviewed here, Empiricism at the Crossroads: The Vienna Circle’s Protocol-Sentence Debate, is a heavily revised and expanded version of that earlier work. Before delving into the content of the book, let us ask: how does the new version differ from the old? First, there are light revisions throughout, including small expository additions or deletions, and additional citations of primary and secondary sources. Second, there are many entirely new subsections, several of which address developments in the secondary literature since 1992. For example, Uebel engages with Chris Pincock’s ‘reserved reading’ of Carnap’s Aufbau, and when discussing Popper’s interactions with the Vienna Circle, Uebel draws upon Malachi Hacohen’s recent biography. Third, at the macro-level, one old chapter has been deleted (‘‘Beyond Logical Empiricism’’), and (roughly) two new chapters have been added. The first covers archival precursors to major articles of the early 1930s (discussed further below), and the second primarily interprets and evaluates Schlick’s puzzling notion of Konstatierungen (‘affirmations’), the supposed evidentiary bedrock of empirical science, including a summary and extension of Uebel’s own recent debate with Thomas Oberdan on this topic. Despite these many changes great and small, both the general historical narrative and argumentative thrust of Empiricism at the Crossroads are similar to that of the

BOOK REVIEWS 685 hand to resolve a hermeneutical controversy. For instance, when he considers the question of whether or not Peirce is in some sense an idealist, Hausman does not use Peirce's distinction among the three grades of conceptual clarity as itself a tool for becoming clear about just this question. Yet Peirce himself turned, near the end of "How to Make Our Ideas 'Clear," to the idea of reality as a means of clarifying the pragmatic maxim (a maxim by which grades of clarity higher than subjective familiarity and abstract definition might be reached). In general, Hausman relies too heavily on the conceptual clarity to be attained via abstract definitions, and too sparingly on the clearness to be reached via pragmatic considerations. Without taking back in the least what was said earlier, I find that Hausman's Peirce is not enough of a pragmaticist . In particular, such topics as habit, history, and agency are somewhat occluded by the author's emphasis, at a very abstract level, on such topics as intelligibility, continuity, and resistance. From a pragmaticist perspective, abstract definitions and dialectical arguments are in the end insufficient; translating concepts into hab/ts of acting and of imagining is imperative. So, too, is the task of constructing a thick narrative of the habit changes of historical agents (in more familiar language, the paradigm shifts so forcefully brought to our attention by Thomas Kuhn). As a crucial feature of the case for evolutionary realism, thick narratives need to be offered as pointed alternatives to those stories so captivatingly told by, say, Richard Rorty in, e.g., "The Contingency of Language" (chapter 1 of Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity). Yet another curious feature is that Hausman develops his own views without reference to several Peirce scholars who are at once the ablest expositors of Charles Peirce and the strongest allies of Carl Hausman (most notably, David Savan, T. L. Short, and Joseph Ransdell--the three expositors to whom I alluded above). But this is a quibble and the above criticisms perhaps not much more than that; for Carl Hausman's book is a firstrate interpretation of a first-rank philosopher. In sum, for those of us who are specialists in Peirce, this study is required reading; for those who are interested in the most central issues of contemporary philosophy, it is nothing less than highly recommended. VINCENT COLAPIE'rRo Fordham University Thomas E. Uebel. Overcoming Logical Positivismfrom Within: The Emergence of Neurath's Naturalism in the.Vienna Circle's Protocol Sentence Debate. Studien zur Osterreichen Philosophie, Band XVII. Amsterdam-Atlanta: Rodopi, 199~- Pp. xv + 377- Paper, $93.~176 To recent generations of analytic philosophers, Otto Neurath is forever bound to his "parable of the mariners," employed frequently and to great effect in Quine's endorsements of naturalized epistemology. Given that the explication, defense, and pursuit of naturalized epistemology has occupied philosophers for the last quarter century (and that this is due in part to Quine's writings), it is remarkable that only recently have the historical questions posed by Quine's use of Neurath's parable received much attention . Was Neurath in fact a naturalist among the logical positivists of the 192os and 686 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 32:4 OCTOBER 1994 x93os? If so, what sort of naturalism did he put forward, and how did he defend it? Moreover, how should we alter our philosophical understanding of the Vienna Circle, if one of its central members turns out to have held just the views usually taken to have supersededthe Circle's? Thomas E. Uebel's OvercomingLogicalPositivismfrom Within: The Emergence of Neurath's Naturalism in the Vienna Circle'sProtocolSentenceDebateprovides detailed and persuasive answers to all these questions, and as such it is a crucial contribution both to Neurath scholarship and to the ongoing reassessment of logical positivism. Uebel's scholarship and analysis is sustained, thorough, and first-rate. He argues that Neurath did formulate a naturalized epistemology--albeit not Quine's, for it was neither reductive nor rooted in behavioristic psychology. Its character is reflected piecemeal in the course of Neurath's defense of his physicalist proposal for protocol sentences--the evidence sentences of science--against the proposals of...

The Circle of Security Parenting (COS-P) is an early attachment based intervention that can be used with groups, dyads, and individuals. Created in the USA and now used in many countries, COS-P is a visually based approach that demonstrates its central principles through videos of parent/child interactions. The core purpose of the COS-P is to provide an opportunity for caregivers to reflect on their child's needs and on the challenges each parent faces in meeting those needs. Even though there is a wide range of clinical settings in which child/parent attachment is an important component of assessment there is limited empirical data on when and how attachment based interventions are appropriate for specific clinical profiles and contexts. The aim of this paper is to present a clinical application of COS-P in order to explore and reflect on some specific therapeutic tasks where it works and on some clinical indicators and contexts appropriate for its application. A single case study of a father, “M.” (43 years old) in conflict for the custody of his 5 years old daughter is reported. The Adult Attachment Projective Picture System (AAP), the Parenting Stress Index, the Strengths and Difficulties Questionnaire, and the Parental Alliance Measure, were administered pre- and post-intervention. The clinical significance analysis method revealed that numerous changes occurred in the father. The AAP showed improvements in the level of agency of self. M. made gains in his capacity to use internal resources and to increase his agency of self. M. was classified as recovered in his perception of the child's functioning and as improved in his parenting stress and parenting alliance with the mother. Considerations on specific contexts and clinical indicators for the application of COS-P are proposed.